Steckl v. Motorola, Inc.
Decision Date | 04 April 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-5524,82-5524 |
Citation | 703 F.2d 392 |
Parties | 31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 705, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,494 Rudolph STECKL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOTOROLA, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Richard S. Cohen, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lawrence Allen Katz, Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Before TRASK, KENNEDY and POOLE, Circuit Judges.
Rudolph Steckl appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of his employer, Motorola, in Steckl's action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq. (the ADEA). Steckl contends that the order is improper because the company's explanation for denying him a promotion was a pretext for age discrimination rather than a legitimate business reason. He also argues summary judgment is inappropriate because it was his intention to prove pretext by attacking the motivation and intent of Motorola's witnesses on cross-examination.
Steckl had worked for Motorola for 15 years in various management positions. A new position, formally titled "Senior Products Manager, Opto Products, Chips and Strategic New Programs," was created in 1976. Motorola refused to promote Steckl, who was then 50 years old, and gave the job to Nicholas Schaefer, a younger man. Steckl claims that Motorola failed to promote him because of age discrimination while Motorola contends that Schaefer was promoted because of his qualifications and technical expertise.
A plaintiff under the ADEA has the ultimate burden of proving that age was a "determining factor" in an employer's decision affecting him. Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.1981); Kelly v American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 984 (9th Cir.1981). We agree with the district court that Steckl had established a prima facie case of discrimination as required by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). He was clearly within the protected class, had applied for an available position for which he was qualified, and was denied a promotion which was given to a younger person. The result was creation of an inference of discrimination.
In the face of that prima facie showing, Motorola had to meet the inference by articulating some "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its conduct. Motorola met this burden by offering evidence that Schaefer's expertise, not Steckl's age, was the determining factor in the promotion decision. Motorola proved that Schaefer had substantially more education, training and experience in circuit design and circuit systems than Steckl, in a position calling for those qualifications.
With the inference of discrimination rebutted, the burden then returned to Steckl to demonstrate that Motorola's explanation was but a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1285. However, Steckl failed to produce any specific, substantial evidence of pretext and that age was a determining factor in the decision. Consequently, the district court's ruling was proper.
A party opposing a summary judgment motion must produce "specific facts showing that there remains a genuine factual issue for trial" and evidence " 'significantly probative' as to any [material] fact claimed to be disputed." Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1600, 63 L.Ed.2d 786 (1980). Steckl's mere assertions that Motorola had discriminatory motivation and intent in failing to promote him were inadequate, without substantial factual evidence, to raise an issue precluding summary judgment. Cf. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School District, 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.1974) (...
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