Steele v. Davis
| Docket Number | 23-3192-JWL |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2023 |
| Parties | LAMAR RAY STEELE, JR., Plaintiff, v. RONALD L. DAVIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Lamar Ray Steele, Jr. is hereby required to show good cause in writing, to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a proper amended complaint to cure the deficiencies.
1. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens[1] based on conditions while housed at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas (“USPL”). Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and proceeds in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he arrived at USPL in the custody of the United States Marshal Service on April 6 2023. He was assessed by NPN Brooke Crane, who discontinued Plaintiff's medication for high blood pressure and anxiety. Plaintiff alleges that she took this action without conducting any tests or documenting his blood pressure despite the fact that Plaintiff is a chronic care detainee with a documented history of high blood pressure and had been taking the medications for years. Plaintiff states that Crane's action was authorized by Medical Director Clark. Since the medication was discontinued, Plaintiff has had his blood pressure checked only once or twice and has not received a check up for his chronic health issues. Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered harm to his internal organs as a result of his medication being stopped, as well as headaches, chest pains, accelerated heart rate, and anxiety.
Plaintiff further complains of the conditions of his confinement at USPL. He alleges that he is housed with convicted prisoners and inmates he is “flagged against.” He asserts there are no ladders on the bunks, and no lockers or storage space in the rooms. The lack of lockers resulted in Plaintiff's shoes being ruined when a neighboring inmate flooded the unit by stopping up his toilet. In addition, the inmates were not given cleaning supplies to disinfect their rooms after the flood. Also, the inmates were not given new laundry even though their belongings were soaked.
Plaintiff states that he complained of black mold in the rooms and showers and the fact that pretrial detainees are subjected to the same rules as convicted inmates, such as 300 minutes a month telephone time and being locked in their rooms for 19-24 hours a day. Plaintiff alleges that when he is allowed out of his room, there are close to 100 other men out at the same time, all wanting to use the three computers for legal research and the two computers available for recreation. He further states that there are no typewriters or printers available for inmate use.
Plaintiff also claims that pretrial detainees are denied visitors because they do not yet have a pre-sentencing report (“PSR”) as they have not even had a trial. Further, he claims there are no newspapers, indigent detainees are not provided with headphones to hear the televisions, and the rooms have no panic buttons, meaning a prisoner has to bang, kick, yell, and scream to get the attention of staff. Plaintiff further claims that all of his legal mail has been opened.
Plaintiff asserts that he has complained of all of these issues by submitting BP-9s, 10s, and 11s, but he has received no response to any of them. When he complained to the Marshal Service, he was told that they have no say over what happens to him while at USPL.
Since complaining, Plaintiff alleges that he has become a target. He describes an incident where Counselor Toot had him sign for certified mail that included photographs. Toot questioned why Plaintiff was receiving photos of white women. Plaintiff states that he is fifty percent white so he has white and mixed race relatives. Plaintiff further alleges that he managed to get his children's mother approved as a visitor, and she visited once before she was removed from his list even though he had not broken any rules or been in trouble. Plaintiff describes another incident occurring on July 19, 2023, when visitors from “Region” walked through the A-1 cell house. A woman in the back of the group stopped and talked to Plaintiff. She saw the broken sink in his room that is “jimmied” to drain into the toilet since the pipes are clogged. Plaintiff told her about the plumbing as well as other issues. As soon as she left, Case Manager Gulley and Counselor Collins came to his door. Gulley called him a bitch, told him he now has “nothing coming from him,” then told the unit that “because of Steele, you guys are fucked.” (Doc. 1-1, at 9).
Plaintiff brings claims for violation of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Plaintiff names the following defendants: Ronald L. Davis, Director, U.S. Marshal Service; D. Hudson, Warden, USPL; (FNU) Grecco, UTM, USPL; Michael Naller, North Central FBOP Regional Director; (FNU) B., USP Psychologist; (FNU) Gulley, Counselor, USPL; (FNU) Toot, CM, USPL; Brooke Crane, NPN, USPL; and Jason Clark, Medical Director, USPL. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages of $100,000 from each defendant.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
Bivens and its progeny permit a damages claim against a federal officer in his individual capacity for a deprivation of certain constitutional civil rights. See Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“In Bivens - proceeding on the theory that a right suggests a remedy - Court ‘recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights.'”) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66, 68 (2001)). The Supreme Court “held that, even absent statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1854, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017). Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens remedy in only two other types of cases: Fifth Amendment ...
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