Steele v. First Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 17 December 1936
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 932
• Citation: Steele v. First Nat. Bank, 171 So. 353, 233 Ala. 246 (Ala. 1936)
• Parties: STEELE et al. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF MOBILE et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

171 So. 353

233 Ala. 246

STEELE et al. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF MOBILE et al.

1 Div. 932

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 17, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Claude A. Grayson, Judge.

Bill of interpleader by the First National Bank of Mobile and Merchants National Bank of Mobile, as administrators of the estate of Margaret Cox, deceased, against Robertha Steele and Albert E. Steele, and Thomas M. Stevens and others, as partners under the firm name of Stevens, McCorvey, McLeod Goode & Turner, with interposition of claim by respondents Stevens and others. From a decree overruling demurrers to the bill and to the claim interposed, respondents Steele appeal.

Affirmed.

Gordon Edington & Leigh, of Mobile, for appellants.

Smith &amp Johnston, of Mobile, for appellees-administrators.

Stevens, McCorvey, McLeod, Goode & Turner, of Mobile, pro se.

GARDNER Justice.

Complainants, administrators of the estate of Margaret Cox, deceased, file this bill of interpleader, and deposit in court the sum of $8,400, decreed on partial settlement of said estate to be paid defendants Robertha and Albert Steele, as heirs at law of said Margaret Cox, upon which judgment or decree defendant law firm of Stevens, McCorvey, McLeod, Goode & Turner assert an attorney's lien for services rendered said heirs.

Complainants are shown to be mere stakeholders, and the bill discloses upon its face they are wholly disinterested in the subject-matter of the suit, thus meeting one of the prime requisites of a bill of interpleader. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson Banking Co., 223 Ala. 177, 134 So. 800; Marcus v. People's Savings Bank, 227 Ala. 576, 151 So. 467; Finn v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 222 Ala. 413, 416, 132 So. 632.

The cited cases are distinguished in First National Bank v. McKee, 227 Ala. 573, 151 So. 444, from that character of suits wherein the claimant seeks kindred relief by virtue of the provisions of section 10390, Code 1923.

The original bill sufficiently discloses the claim of the respective parties, the doubt as to the proper course to be pursued, the hazard of any action on complainants' part without authoritative sanction, and there was no necessity, as seems to be advanced in argument, that complainants go further and show an apparent title in either. 4 Pomeroy Eq.Jur. (3d Ed.) § 1328; 33 Corpus Juris 430; Modern Order of Praetorians v. Merriman, 204 Ala. 197, 85 So. 473.

The original bill was not subject to any assignment of demurrer interposed thereto. Enterprise Lumber Co. v. First National Bank, 181 Ala. 388, 61 So. 930; Johnson v. Blackmon, 201 Ala. 537, 78 So. 891; Collins v. Morgan County National Bank, 226 Ala. 376, 147 So. 161; section 10390, Code.

The claimant law firm (so designated for brevity) asserts its lien by virtue of services rendered, under contract, for the named heirs in the matter of the Margaret Cox estate, wherein said heirs have been decreed the sum deposited in court. There is sufficient privity between these claimants to justify a bill of interpleader (33 Corpus Juris 433, 434), and the insistence the bill is defective in that the claims are not derived from a common source (citing Kyle v. Mary Lee Coal & Ry. Co., 112 Ala. 606, 20 So. 851; Gibson v. Goldthwaite, 7 Ala. 281, 42 Am.Dec. 592; Davis v. Douglas, 12 Ala.App. 581, 583, 68 So. 528) is without merit. Crass v. M. & C.R.R. Co., 96 Ala. 447, 11 So. 480; Marsh v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 200 Ala. 438, 76 So. 370; Enterprise Lumber Co. v. First National Bank, 181 Ala. 388, 61 So. 930.

The defendant law firm interposed its claim, which is in the nature of a cross-complaint, and properly to be so designated (33 Corpus Juris 459), and demurrer interposed thereto was overruled. All parties treat this ruling as also here properly presented for review, and we will likewise so consider it.

In the cross-complaint the law firm has set out in full its engagement contract with the parties, and subsequent contract in relation to such engagement. The firm represented under this contract several of the heirs of Margaret Cox, deceased. This litigation, however, concerns only Robertha and Albert E. Steele.

A short while after such employment, one William Cox, Jr., made claim as the sole heir and next of kin of Margaret Cox, deceased, and instituted an ejectment suit against Robertha and Albert E. Steele, and the other heirs of Margaret Cox to recover all the realty belonging to her estate. After this suit, and after it became apparent that William Cox, Jr., was claiming the entire estate, the firm entered into another written contract with these same heirs providing for a fee on a contingent basis. In this contract it is expressly stated that these heirs recognize that their right to any property of Margaret Cox, deceased, is being disputed and will be litigated, and they fully understand that the administrators, who had then been appointed, had employed the same firm, and for such services in the administration of the estate and defending certain specified suits, the firm should be paid from assets of the estate. The contract then continues, to use its language:

"However, the fight which you will have with Willie Cox, Jr., is, of course, primarily for our benefit as the heirs at law of Margaret Cox, deceased, and inasmuch as your services are to be on a contingent basis, and you are not to receive any fee for services rendered to us unless we realize something from this estate, we hereby agree with you that for such services as you render to us in the premises you are to receive a contingent fee equal to twenty-five per cent of the amount received by us," with other details unnecessary to note.

It is alleged that the firm has properly, carefully, and diligently performed all the duties imposed upon it by the contract of employment, and that on a partial settlement in the Margaret Cox estate matter decrees have been rendered in the probate court of Mobile county in favor of Robertha and Albert E. Steele for $4,200 each, being the respective amounts due them as heirs at law of Margaret Cox. Upon such decrees, the firm claims a lien for its attorney's fee.

There are also allegations to the effect that the validity of the contract had never been questioned until after the firm, as attorneys for the administrators, had successfully defeated a suit by the mother of Robertha and Albert E. Steele for $90,000 against said estate.

There are also averments as to the voluntary proportional reduction of the fee to be paid by reason of compensation from the administrators, but these are not material to the question in hand.

The argument in large part appears to rest upon the assumption the law firm represented only the administrators, and not these heirs, and that there is inconsistency in the representation of each. But the very contract entered into by the parties recognizes no inconsistency, and the employment...