Steele v. Louisville Co, No. 45

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSTONE
Citation323 U.S. 192,65 S.Ct. 226,89 L.Ed. 173
Decision Date18 December 1944
Docket NumberNo. 45
PartiesSTEELE v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. et al

323 U.S. 192
65 S.Ct. 226
89 L.Ed. 173
STEELE

v.

LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. et al.

No. 45.
Argued Nov. 14, 15, 1944.
Decided Dec. 18, 1944.

Page 193

Mr. Charles H. Houston, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Charles H. Eyster, of Decatur, Ala., for respondent Louisville and N.R. Co.

Mr. James A. Simpson, of Birmingham, Ala., for respondents brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen et al.

Mr. Chief Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., imposes on a labor organi-

Page 194

zation, acting by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty to represent all the employees in the craft without discrimination because of their race, and, if so, whether the courts have jurisdiction to protect the minority of the craft or class from the violation of such obligation.

The issue is raised by demurrer to the substituted amended bill of complaint filed by petitioner, a locomotive fireman, in a suit brought in the Alabama Circuit Court against his employer, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, an unincorporated labor organization, and certain individuals representing the Brotherhood. The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. 245 Ala. 113, 16 So.2d 416. We granted certiorari, 322 U.S. 722, 64 S.Ct. 1260, the question presented being one of importance in the administration of the Railway Labor Act.

The allegations of the bill of complaint, so far as now material, are as follows: Petitioner, a Negro, is a locomotive fireman in the employ of respondent railroad, suing on his own behalf and that of his fellow employees who, like petitioner, are Negro firemen employed by the Railroad. Respondent Brotherhood, a labor organization, is, as provided under § 2, Fourth of the Railway Labor Act, the exclusive bargaining representative of the craft of firemen employed by the Railroad and is recognized as such by it and the members of the craft. The majority of the firemen employed by the Railroad are white and are members of the Brotherhood, but a substantial minority are Negroes who, by the constitution and ritual of the Brotherhood, are excluded from its membership. As the membership of the Brotherhood constitutes a majority of all firemen employed on respondent Railroad, and as under § 2, Fourth, the members because they are the ma-

Page 195

jority have the right to choose and have chosen the Brotherhood to represent the craft, petitioner and other Negro firemen on the road have been required to accept the Brotherhood as their representative for the purposes of the Act.

On March 28, 1940, the Brotherhood, purporting to act as representative of the entire craft of firemen, without informing the Negro firemen or giving them opportunity to be heard, served a notice on respondent Railroad and on twenty other railroads operating principally in the southeastern part of the United States. The notice announced the Brotherhood's desire to amend the existing collective bargaining agreement in such manner as ultimately to exclude all Negro firemen from the service. By established practice on the several railroads so notified only white firemen can be promoted to serve as engineers, and the notice proposed that only 'promotable', i.e., white, men should be employed as firemen or assigned to new runs or jobs or permanent vacancies in established runs or jobs.

On February 18, 1941, the railroads and the Brotherhood, as representative of the craft, entered into a new agreement which provided that not more than 50% of the firemen in each class of service in each seniority district of a carrier should be Negroes; that until such percentage should be reached all new runs and all vacancies should be filled by white men; and that the agreement did not sanction the employment of Negroes in any seniority district in which they were not working. The agreement reserved the right of the Brotherhood to negotiate for further restrictions on the employment of Negro firemen on the individual railroads. On May 12, 1941, the Brotherhood entered into a supplemental agreement with respondent Railroad further controlling the seniority rights of Negro firemen and restricting their employment. The Negro firemen were not given notice or opportunity to be

Page 196

heard with respect to either of these agreements, which were put into effect before their existence was disclosed to the Negro firemen.

Until April 8, 1941, petitioner was in a 'passenger pool', to which one white and five Negro firemen were assigned. These jobs were highly desirable in point of wages, hours and other considerations. Petitioner had performed and was performing his work satisfactorily. Following a reduction in the mileage covered by the pool, all jobs in the pool were, about April 1, 1941, declared vacant. The Brotherhood and the Railroad, acting under the agreement, disqualified all the Negro firemen and replaced them with four white men, members of the Brotherhood, all junior in seniority to petitioner and no more competent or worthy. As a consequence petitioner was deprived of employment for sixteen days and then was assigned to more arduous, longer, and less remunerative work in local freight service. In conformity to the agreement, he was later replaced by a Brotherhood member junior to him, and assigned work on a switch engine, which was still harder and less remunerative, until January 3, 1942. On that date, after the bill of complaint in the present suit had been filed, he was reassigned to passenger service.

Protests and appeals of petitioner and his fellow Negro firemen, addressed to the Railroad and the Brotherhood, in an effort to secure relief and redress, have been ignored. Respondents have expressed their intention to enforce the agreement of February 18, 1941, and its subsequent modifications. The Brotherhood has acted and asserts the right to act as exclusive bargaining representative of the firemen's craft. It is alleged that in that capacity it is under an obligation and duty imposed by the Act to represent the Negro firemen impartially and in good faith; but instead, in its notice to and contracts with the railroads, it has been hostile and disloyal to the Negro firemen, has deliberately discriminated against them, and has sought

Page 197

to deprive them of their seniority rights and to drive them out of employment in their craft, all in order to create a monopoly of employment for Brotherhood members.

The bill of complaint asks for discovery of the manner in which the agreements have been applied and in other respects; for an injunction against enforcement of the agreements made between the Railroad and the Brotherhood; for an injunction against the Brotherhood and its agents from purporting to act as representative of petitioner and others similarly situated under the Railway Labor Act, so long as the discrimination continues, and so long as it refuses to give them notice and hearing with respect to proposals affecting their interests; for a declaratory judgment as to their rights; and for an award of damages against the Brotherhood for its wrongful conduct.

The Supreme Court of Alabama took jurisdiction of the cause but held on the merits that petitioner's complaint stated no cause of action.1 It pointed out that the Act places a mandatory duty on the Railroad to treat with the Brotherhood as the exclusive representative of the employees in a craft, imposes heavy criminal penalties for willful failure to comply with its command, and provides

Page 198

that the majority of any craft shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the class for collective bargaining with the employer, see Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 545, 57 S.Ct. 592, 598, 81 L.Ed. 789. It thought that the Brotherhood was empowered by the statute to enter into the agreement of February 18, 1941, and that by virtue of the statute the Brotherhood has power by agreement with the Railroad both to create the seniority rights of petitioner and his follow Negro employees and to destroy them. It construed the statute, not as creating the relationship of principal and agent between the members of the craft and the Brotherhood, but as conferring on the Brotherhood plenary authority to treat with the Railroad and enter into contracts fixing rates of pay and working conditions for the craft as a whole without any legal obligation or duty to protect the rights of minorities from discrimination or unfair treatment, however gross. Consequently it held that neither the Brotherhood nor the Railroad violated any rights of petitioner or his fellow Negro employees by negotiating the contracts discriminating against them.

If, as the state court has held, the Act confers this power on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. For the representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights. If the Railway Labor Act purports to impose on petitioner and the other Negro members of the craft the legal duty to comply with the terms of a contract whereby the representative has discriminatorily restricted their employment for the benefit and advantage of the Brotherhood's own members, we

Page 199

must decide the constitutional questions which petitioner raises in his pleading.

But we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a labor union,...

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958 practice notes
  • International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, No. 78-38
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1979
    ...L.Ed.2d 237 (1978). II This Court first recognized the statutory duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), a case arising under the Railway Labor Act. Steele held that when Congress empowered unions to bargain ex......
  • Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., Civ. No. 72 S 243.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • May 31, 1977
    ...membership in a fair manner as mandated by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). See Steele v. Louisville & N. L. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944). Relying upon Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L. R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962) and Local Union No. 12 United......
  • International Association of Machinists v. Street, No. 4
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1961
    ...on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining.' Steele v. Louisville Page 760 & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 200, 65 S.Ct. 226, 231, 89 L.Ed. 173. 'Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those posses......
  • Local Division 519 v. LaCrosse Municipal Trans., No. 77-C-292.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Western District of Wisconsin
    • March 8, 1978
    ...such a right. The first question had been answered affirmatively in a related case, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), in which an employee had brought suit in a state court. On review in Steele, the Supreme Court of the United St......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
952 cases
  • International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, No. 78-38
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1979
    ...L.Ed.2d 237 (1978). II This Court first recognized the statutory duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), a case arising under the Railway Labor Act. Steele held that when Congress empowered unions to bargain ex......
  • Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., Civ. No. 72 S 243.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • May 31, 1977
    ...membership in a fair manner as mandated by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). See Steele v. Louisville & N. L. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944). Relying upon Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L. R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962) and Local Union No. 12 United......
  • International Association of Machinists v. Street, No. 4
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1961
    ...on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining.' Steele v. Louisville Page 760 & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 200, 65 S.Ct. 226, 231, 89 L.Ed. 173. 'Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those posses......
  • Local Division 519 v. LaCrosse Municipal Trans., No. 77-C-292.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Western District of Wisconsin
    • March 8, 1978
    ...such a right. The first question had been answered affirmatively in a related case, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), in which an employee had brought suit in a state court. On review in Steele, the Supreme Court of the United St......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • The South Counterattacks: the Anti-Naacp Laws
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 12-2, June 1959
    • June 1, 1959
    ...U.S. 147 (1948).The progress in judicial enforcement of employment rights should also be noted: Steelev. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Graham v.Brotherhood of Firemen, 33......
  • Race, Labor, and the Twentieth-Century American State
    • United States
    • Politics & Society Nbr. 32-4, December 2004
    • December 1, 2004
    ...Tomlins,The State and the Unions; and Van WezelStone, “The Legacy of IndustrialPluralism.”65. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The decision focusedon the National Railway Act, a statute with parallel language to that of the NLRA. I discussSteele in greater lengt......
  • DEMOCRACY, DISTRUST, AND PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITIES.
    • United States
    • Constitutional Commentary Vol. 36 Nbr. 2, September 2021
    • September 22, 2021
    ...toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf...." (quoting Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (114.) While Professors Amar and Kail focus primarily on efficacy concerns, they also connect these accountability dots. Amar & Kalt, s......
  • The Supreme Court and State Civil Liberties
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 14-4, December 1961
    • December 1, 1961
    ...that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, 43 321 U.S. 649 (1944).44 Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 Page 830 above. 835 legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints whichare normally exerted on legislation ......

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