Steele v. Mattis

Decision Date10 August 2018
Docket NumberNo. 16-5236,16-5236
Citation899 F.3d 943
Parties Brett STEELE, Appellant v. James MATTIS, Secretary of Defense, Appellee
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Donna Williams Rucker argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, Shanna L. Cronin, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Derrick W. Grace, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Griffith, Millett, and Pillard, Circuit Judges.

Millett, Circuit Judge:

The Department of Defense hired Dr. Brett Steele to teach at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs. During his probationary first year of instruction, the College decided to terminate his contract. Dr. Steele filed suit, asserting that his contract was ended because of his age. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department of Defense. Because the Department has failed to provide a consistent and sufficient explanation for Dr. Steele’s discharge, and because Dr. Steele has come forward with evidence that a supervisor directly involved in the decisionmaking process made repeated discriminatory remarks, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I
A

As applied to the federal government, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. , requires that "[a]ll personnel actions affecting [federal] employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age * * * shall be made free from any discrimination based on age," id. § 633a(a). The Act’s protection includes employees in "military departments." Id. Congress enacted the ADEA to protect older individuals "from arbitrary and stereotypical employment distinctions[.]" General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline , 540 U.S. 581, 587, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004).

To establish a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff can rely on direct evidence of discriminatory intent, as well as indirect evidence from which a discriminatory motive for the employment decision could be inferred. For the latter, a plaintiff can state a prima facie case of age discrimination in a termination decision by coming forward with evidence showing that he (i) was 40 or older, and so falls within the ADEA’s protective reach; (ii) was otherwise qualified for the position in which he was working; (iii) was terminated; and (iv) was replaced by someone younger. Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n , 119 F.3d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Once a plaintiff makes that showing, the burden of production shifts to the employer to come forward with a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. DeJesus v. WP Company , 841 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2016). If the employer does so, the burden-shifting paradigm disappears, and the "sole remaining issue [i]s discrimination vel non ." Reeves , 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At all times, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that age discrimination occurred. To obtain reinstatement or backpay, the plaintiff must show that age discrimination was the but-for cause of the discharge. Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc. , 557 U.S. 167, 177–178, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ; Reeves , 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097. In litigation against federal governmental defendants under 29 U.S.C. § 633a, the plaintiff may obtain "declaratory and possibly injunctive relief" only if he proves that age was "a factor" in the discharge. Ford v. Mabus , 629 F.3d 198, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

B

In August 2010, the Department of Defense hired Dr. Brett Steele to serve as an associate professor at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs. The College is a Department component that offers educational programs for professionals on interagency and international security matters. Dr. Steele was 47 years old when he was hired. The Department hired him for a three-year term, but the first year was probationary.

Halfway through his probationary year, a dispute arose between Dr. Steele and his supervisors, including Dean Querine Hanlon and Dr. Alejandra Bolanos, over Dr. Steele’s teaching methods and curriculum decisions. In particular, the supervisors expressed concern that he strayed from the required syllabus and used an "unapproved concept" in teaching one of his subjects. Steele v. Carter , 192 F.Supp.3d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2016). Dr. Steele met with Dean Hanlon and Dr. Bolanos and agreed to bring his instructional methods into conformity. Within roughly a month, supervisors' complaints about Dr. Steele’s teaching resurfaced, and led to a "heated" "academic debate" between Dr. Steele, Dean Hanlon, Dr. Bolanos, and the College’s Chancellor. Id. at 160.

Around that same time, the College was hit with budgetary cuts. After its request for a waiver of the funding losses was denied, the College decided that it would have to terminate three faculty positions, and that it would choose them only from among its six probationary faculty. In May 2011, the College made the decision to terminate Dr. Steele, Dr. Art Westneat, and Seth Malaguerra, effective three months later at the end of the summer semester. According to Dr. Steele, he was never informed of the reason for his termination. Dr. Steele later resigned on the eve of his termination date to avoid "getting the horrible black mark of being terminated from a Government position" and in the hope of obtaining other employment opportunities in the future. J.A. 729.

According to evidence put forward by Dr. Steele, Dr. Bolanos had made comments directly to him stating that young colleagues "are such a breath of fresh air," "eager to please," and the "kind of * * * people who are making [the College] marvelous," while older employees are "stubborn" and "difficult to work with." J.A. 264, 881. Dr. Steele further alleged that Dr. Bolanos told him that the College had become "much better" because "all these younger people" were hired. J.A. 173. Dr. Bolanos denied making those statements. Steele , 192 F.Supp.3d at 165.

During the Fall semester, three other faculty members took over Dr. Steele’s teaching responsibilities. One of them was under 40 years of age at the time; the other two were over 40. Shortly after his termination, the College hired two new associate professors, both of whom were under the age of 40. They each taught different subjects than Dr. Steele had. Within a year of Dr. Steele’s discharge, the College brought on board a third younger professor who took over the teaching of most of Dr. Steele’s courses. J.A. 171–172, 798.

C

In July 2011, Dr. Steele filed an informal equal employment opportunity complaint with the Department alleging that he was being improperly terminated because of his age. When that complaint was not resolved favorably, Dr. Steele filed a formal complaint with the Department of Defense’s equal employment opportunity office in November 2011. Eighteen months later, the Department denied his complaint.

Dr. Steele then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging unlawful age discrimination, retaliation for exercising his statutory rights, a hostile work environment based on his age, and constructive discharge, all in violation of the ADEA.

The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The district court first concluded that Dr. Steele failed to provide any direct evidence of age discrimination, concluding that the comments Dr. Bolanos made were just "stray remarks," and were not relevant because Dr. Bolanos did not make the actual termination decision. The court also found insufficient indirect evidence of age discrimination, concluding that the government had offered a legitimate, lawful explanation for Dr. Steele’s termination—budgetary cuts—and that Dr. Steele had failed to show that the government’s explanation was pretextual. Finally, the district court dismissed Dr. Steele’s claims of retaliation and hostile work environment on the ground that they were unsupported by relevant evidence.1

II

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. On summary judgment, the court may neither "make credibility determinations [nor] weigh the evidence." DeJesus , 841 F.3d at 531 (quotation marks omitted). Instead, summary judgment is proper only when, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff] and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly," "no reasonable jury could find in [the plaintiff’s] favor." Evans v. Sebelius , 716 F.3d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Looking at the record as a whole, the district court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could disbelieve the government’s proffered explanation for the discharge and rule in Dr. Steele’s favor. Dr. Steele came forward with evidence both discrediting the government’s asserted basis for its decision and supporting a reasonable inference of discriminatory motivation. That is not to say that Dr. Steele will necessarily prevail. At the summary judgment stage, we hold only that Dr. Steele has created genuinely disputed facts that are material to the question of whether age was the true reason for his discharge. Which side of that factual dispute is correct is for a jury to decide.

A

The district court held, and the Department does not dispute, that Dr. Steele made out a prima facie case of age discrimination. Steele , 192 F.Supp.3d at 167 ; Government Br. at 13. We need not decide whether Dr. Steele adequately made out a prima facie case because...

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