Steele v. Renn

• Decision Date: 01 January 1878
• Citation: 50 Tex. 467
• Parties: R. G. STEELE ET AL. v. B. RENN ET AL.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

50 Tex. 467

R. G. STEELE ET AL.

v.B. RENN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1878.

APPEAL from Cherokee. Tried below before the Hon. R. S. Walker.

The case is stated in the opinion.

Bonner, Priest & Priest, for appellants.--This was a suit by the heirs of Casper Renn against Lucy Steele, wife of R. G. Steele, and John C. Carter for certain lots in Rusk occupied by defendants, said defendants claiming the same under deed to R. G. Steele from H. K. Joice and wife.

Plaintiffs claim that this property belonged to Casper Renn at his death, about the 24th of December, 1864, and now belongs to plaintiffs, as the heirs of Casper Renn.

Defendants claim that R. G. Steele, under whom they claim, acquired the property from H. K. Joice and wife by purchase, and that his title is good, he having been an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration, paid without notice of any defect in the title or adverse claim to the property. This is the issue in this cause.

The facts show that Casper Renn made a will just before his death, in December, 1864, which will was duly probated in January, 1865, and it stood as the probated will of Renn, uncontested for nearly two years, till the fall of 1866. By the terms of this will the lots now in dispute were devised to H. K. Joice and wife, and by them sold and conveyed to R. G. Steele, long before any contest of said will or notice thereof, for a valuable consideration; and the main question in this cause is this: Is Steele's title protected, he having been an innocent purchaser for value without notice? We think so, and respectfully refer to the following authorities: Kerr on Fraud and Mis., pp. 312-318; 2 Sugd. on Vend., 507, 508, 513, 515, 516, 533; 1 Story's Eq., 381, 385, 386, 387, 399-410; 1 Jarman on Wills, note on top of page 23.

The facts show that B. Renn, one of the heirs, acting for himself and said other heirs, was in Rusk in August, 1865, and there remained, standing still until long after Steele purchased, without asserting his claim, and the law will not allow him now to assert it to the prejudice of defendants claiming under Steele's title. As he was silent when he should have spoken, he is not permitted by law to speak now, to the prejudice of defendants having a superior equity. (2 Sugd., 515, 516, and notes, and 121, 533, 534.)

The court below in his charge held that the authorities for the protection of innocent purchasers for value without notice have no application in this cause; an exception without authority of law, and consequently erroneous. Therefore it is respectfully submitted that the charges and rulings of his honor on the trial below demand a reversal of the judgment.

Here was a judgment of a competent court probating and recording the will in January, 1865; no appeal and no proceedings to contest the will till November, 1866; a stranger in the country, R. G. Steele, in the face of this judgment and relying thereon, buys the lots in dispute and pays for them. If he is not entitled to protection, who is? By what rule of metaphysics is he placed without the pale of protection in his rights that apply to all purchasers in good faith for value without notice?

The action of the District Court of Anderson county annulling the will and probate could not prejudice these defendants, not being parties nor privies thereto, nor could such proceedings impair vested rights. (9 Tex., 25;13 Tex., 267, 268;16 Tex., 413; 1 Will. on Exec., 240, 241, 251, and notes, and 488, 490, 492, 494.)

That R. G. Steele was an innocent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, paid without notice, there can be no question.Whitaker & Robertson, also for appellants.--Is an innocent purchaser without notice, under a forged will, protected in his purchase, the same having been made after probate of the will and before suit instituted to set it aside?

What is the effect of a probate as long as it stands unrevoked?

It is a principle of law so well settled that authority is not needed to sustain it, nor can it be controverted, that the acts of a court of competent jurisdiction have binding effect upon the whole world as long as they stand, and until they are vacated by a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose. In the present case it cannot be denied that the court of probate was exercising its lawful jurisdiction, the will presented for probate, although forged, being that of a deceased person, over which the court could have jurisdiction. (See authorities in Paschal's Dig., note 463.)

Now, taking it for granted that the Probate Court of Cherokee county had jurisdiction in the matter, and that the will was duly probated, then we advance the proposition that the acts of a party deriving his authority from the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction are valid and binding, and that the law will protect a person in all rights acquired or deeds done, in dealing with such party, under the sanction of a court of competent authority or in acting in accordance therewith.

This principle controls the whole question here discussed, and to state it distinctly, in the language of a very eminent American law writer, it is this: “That when the law requires or sanctions a thing to be done, it also protects the doer in the doing. This is but the branch of that great truth upon which all true government is based, that protection to the subject is commensurate with his duty to the government. It is one of those fundamental things which God wove at the creation in the frame-work upon which human society was by him placed.” (Bishop's First Book of the Law, sec. 99.)

The application of this reasoning to the present case is that the appellants acted in a case where their information was derived from the lawful act of a competent authority, which they could not dispute or deny, and therefore their action in dealing with the executors or those holding under them was in deference to the judicial act probating the will of Casper Renn and in conformity with the terms of the probate and will.

It is true that the appellants in this case did not deal directly with the executors of the will of Casper Renn; but, what is the same, they dealt with those holding in privity with them, according to the terms of the will; and for the reason that they are further removed from the perpetrators of the forgery, the will still standing unrevoked, they would less probably be affected with notice, which would make it reasonable that the equity would be stronger in their behalf. However, the discussion of the principles of law laid down will be as applicable to them as to an original purchaser or devisee under the will.

In support of this proposition, we invite the attention of the court to two cases, both very similar to the present, and both holding different views of the same question, yet the latter overruling the former and pointing out its errors. First case: “In the year 1706 there was decided in England a case wherein an executor of a will sued a man for a sum of money due the deceased in his lifetime. This defendant pleaded to the suit that he had already made payment to another executor, authorized, as this one was, by the Ecclesiastical Court. The fact appeared that the executor to whom payment was made set up a forged will allowed in the Ecclesiastical Court; then he had taken the money from the defendant; then the Ecclesiastical Court had annulled the probate of this will and had admitted to probate the true will, of which the plaintiff was executor, named therein as such by the testator. Upon these facts the court decided that the defendant was under legal obligation to pay the money a second time, not being permitted to avail himself of the payment made to the executor under the forged will.” (See Bishop's First Book of the Law, sec. 102.)

Second case: “In 1789, when the above decision had stood eighty-three years in the English books as apparently the unquestioned law, the same question came up again, and the court decided it the other way, and expressly overruled the above case as not being in fact, what it was in appearance, the law of England.” (Anonymous, 1 Comyn's, 150.)

In Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R., (Durnf. & E.,) 125--and to the same effect see 15 S. & R., 39, appeal of Pebles--the chief justice, in giving the judgment of the court, starts with a basis for the structure of his opinion which is clearly erroneous, and so shown in the latter case. It is this, quoting from the opinion: “An executor derives all his authority from the testator himself, and he of himself, as being executor, without anything more, has the power of disposing of the estate for the testator, &c.; * * * for the probate of the will gives no authority at all to him, (the executor,) and, therefore, if he is not the rightful executor he takes no authority at all; and it would be unreasonable that a person who has not authority should dispose of the interest of another.”

Now, this is the exact position taken by the judge in the court below in his charge to the jury, and relied upon by the appellees, and constitutes the basis of the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court thereon. It is true, we admit, that no estate passes under a forged instrument, such as a forged deed or will, not probated; (see Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, p. 51;) but the position we assume is, that the estate passes not under the will, but under the judicial act probating it. Now, the above reasoning in the first case may, slightly considered, seem very plausible and the decision well sustained; but its error was pointed out by a course of legal reasoning, or rather statement of legal principles, by the last case, which set forth the true law, that the authority of an executor is not derived from the will itself, but from the judicial act probating the will, and that rights of parties acquired under said probate, while in force, will be protected. The first proposition seems reasonable, in this: that the testator names ...