Steele v. Thomas

Decision Date19 October 2016
Docket NumberCA 16-0006-KD-C
PartiesJOHN HARRY STEELE, AIS 284155, Petitioner, v. WILLIE THOMAS, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

John Harry Steele, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is challenging the validity of his May 16, 2012 murder conviction in the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, Alabama; he was sentenced to a forty-year term of imprisonment on June 6, 2012. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Steele's conviction and sentence by unpublished memorandum opinion issued on February 1, 2013. See Steele v. State, 159 So.3d 794 (Ala.Crim.App. 2013) (table). Because Steele did not seek rehearing or petition the Alabama Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of final judgment of affirmance on February 20, 2013. (Compare Doc. 7, Exhibit A, at 2 with Doc. 10, Exhibit A.) Steele filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, Alabama collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence on January 31, 2014. (Doc. 7, Exhibit H, PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 32 OF THE ALABAMA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at 1.) The trial court denied Steele's collateral petition following a December 10, 2014 evidentiary hearing. (Compare Doc. 7, Exhibit H, March 5, 2015 ORDER with id., Evidentiary Hearing Transcript.) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment by unpublished memorandum decision issued on September 25, 2015. (Doc. 7, Exhibit L.) Petitioner's application for rehearing was overruled on October 16, 2015. (Doc. 7, Exhibit G, at 2.) Steele's petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was denied on December 4, 2015, and the certificate of final judgment issued that same date. (Id.)

In his petition before this Court, filed December 22, 2015 (Doc. 1, at 13), Steele raises the following issues which he claims entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief: (1) the record contains insufficient evidence to sustain his murder conviction; and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Respondent contends, for various reasons, that this Court is procedurally barred from reaching the merits of all of petitioner's claims. (Doc. 7, at 8-14).

This cause is before the Court on the petition (Doc. 1), respondent's answer with attachments (see Doc. 7), and petitioner's response (Doc. 10) to the undersigned's April 5, 2016 show cause order (Doc. 9). A careful review of the record has been completed and it is determined that it contains sufficient facts upon which the issues under consideration may be properly resolved. Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is required. Compare Means v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 433 Fed.Appx. 852, 855 (11th Cir. July 12, 2011) ("[W]here 'the record refutes [a petitioner's] factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.'") (citation omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1580, 182 L.Ed.2d 198 (2012) with Allen v. Secretary, Florida Dep't of Corrections, 611 F.3d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 2010) ("A district court isnot required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the claims 'are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics,' . . . or 'if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief[.]'"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2898, 179 L.Ed.2d 1192 (2011).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 18, 2011, the Choctaw County 911 service received a call from Mary Leddon reporting the stabbing of a man she identified only as "B.J." by her common-law husband, John, and requesting assistance. (Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. 40-41 & 69-70; see also id. at 41 (911 call was published to the jury by being played).) Sergeant Charles Breland of the Choctaw County Sheriff's Office arrived first on the scene (T.T. 105-106 & 112); he observed a white male lying face-up on the ground, a man sitting cross-legged by the man lying on the ground, a woman sitting on the porch, a woman "behind the man that was laying on the ground[,]" and a large knife stuck in the ground near the body of the man lying on the ground (T.T. 107-108). Sergeant Breland identified the man sitting cross-legged as the defendant, John Steele, and State's Exhibit 15 as the knife he saw stuck in the ground. (Id. at 108-109.) As Breland was walking up to the scene, Steele made comments to the effect that he "hate[d] it[]" and he "wish[ed] it hadn't happened." (Id. at 109.) Breland then asked Steele if he "d[id] this[]" and Steele immediately responded in the affirmative. (Id.) Breland instructed Steele to stand up and put his hands on his head; Steele complied and he was placed under arrest. (Id. at 109-110 & 113.)

When the Sheriff of Choctaw County, Tom Abate, arrived on the scene he began taking photographs and, as well, removed the knife from the crime scene. (T.T. 114-117.) Sheriff Abate gave the knife to his Chief Deputy (compare T.T. 117 with T.T. 120-121), whotook it to the county coroner, Rocky Bumpers, so that "it could be transported with the body to the crime lab in Mobile." (T.T. 121). The parties stipulated that "Rocky Bumpers was in the chain of custody on this weapon, and that it is in the same or substantially the same condition as it was when he received it." (Id. at 121-122.) Dr. Eugene Hart, a forensic pathologist/medical examiner with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, performed an autopsy on the victim, William M. Aston, III, on March 21, 2011. (T.T. 79-81.) Dr. Hart determined that the manner of death was homicide and that the cause of death was a stab wound of the chest (id. at 81-82), more specifically, a stab wound that hit the heart and left lung (id. at 84-85; see also id. at 85 ("[T]ypically, with an injury to the heart as seen in this photograph, the victim would collapse within ten to fifteen seconds after the oxygen stored in the brain has been used[] and he . . . would die within minutes afterwards.")). According to Hart, he examined the knife that accompanied the body and determined that it was the weapon that caused Aston's death. (Id. at 85-86 & 89-90.) Hart also testified that the knife broke through Aston's anterior left sixth rib, indicating that the knife was used with considerable force. (Id. at 87-88.) Hart's autopsy report was admitted into evidence (T.T. 91) and because the forensic pathologist had ordered toxicological studies on blood, urine, and vitreous samples taken from the victim (T.T. 95) and discussed the toxicology report in his autopsy report (T.T. 96-98), the court allowed the defense to examine Hart regarding the substances found in each of the three specimens take from the victim's body (T.T. 99-101). In the blood, ethanol (that is, drinking alcohol) was found at 0.189 grams per 100 milliliter, as was Cyclobenzaprine (that is, Flexeril, a muscle relaxant), and metabolites of cocaine and marijuana (T.T. 99-101); in the urine, 0.254 per 100 milliliters of ethanol was found (see T.T. 101); and foundin the vitreous fluid was 0.212 grams per 100 milliliters of ethanol (id.). On re-direct examination, Hart testified that the ethanol was a sedative drug, as was the Cyclobenzaprine (T.T. 102); that he did know how to classify the marijuana (T.T. 103); and that the Benzoylecgonine (an inactive cocaine metabolite) "should have no effect." (T.T. 102; see also id. at 100.) On re-cross examination, the witness "couldn't say[]" whether the drinking of alcohol at the level indicated by the specimens could have an effect other than a calming effect. (T.T. 103; see also id. ("I mean, when I drink alcohol, I tend to become calm.").) The trial court sustained objection to the following question and would not allow Hart to answer it: "So, you can't sit here and say, on a specific individual, whether this variety of substance of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol would have a calming effect or not have a calming effect?" (T.T. 103-104.)

Because the foregoing evidence indisputably establishes that Steele killed Aston by stabbing him with a knife, the defendant and his attorneys early on determined to argue that the killing was justified under the theory of self-defense (see, e.g., T.T. 8 ("One of the issues is going to be self-defense in this case.")), a defense which Steele to this day believes absolves him of Aston's murder (compare, e.g., Doc. 10, at 4 ("[]Steele[] claims he Acted in Self-Defense[.]") with Doc. 7, Exhibit B, June 6, 2012 Sentencing Transcript, at 168 ("[M]e and my wife tried to do everything we could to avoid this. But, it just happened. I understand their pain. I do. But, we tried to do everything we could to try to follow the law from the first moment up until now. And nothing I say will take their pain away from them. But, I mean, I'm sorry that it had to happen. I wish it never did. I wish something else would have happened, or I would have just walked in my room, just something. I just don't know what.")). And, in order to place this defense before the jury,the defense did not in any manner object to the State subpoenaing Steele's common-law wife, Mary Leddon, the only other eyewitness to the events leading to the stabbing death of Aston.1 (See T.T. 42.)

Leddon testified that Aston spent the night at the house she shared with Steele and their two sons on March 17, 2011, and that the victim and her husband spent the day together on March 18, 2011. (See id. at 46-47.) Leddon worked on March 18, 2011, arriving back home around 3:00 p.m. (Id. at 44-45.) When Leddon arrived home, her husband and Aston were watching television in the living room; however, they soon left to pick up Aston's "check from Ezell's." (Id. at 47.) The two men arrived back at the house around 7:00 p.m. (id. at 48); Leddon noted th...

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