Steele v. United States
Decision Date | 09 April 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-705 |
Parties | JOHN K. STEELE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Litkovitz, M.J.
Plaintiff John Steele, proceeding pro se, originally filed this action in the Hamilton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas on July 25, 2019. (Doc. 1-3; see also Doc. 4). He named as defendants the United States, "assessment officer" Benjamin F. Ray, Department of Justice (DOJ) witness Rebecca Pomatto, United States District Court Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, and United States Attorney General William P. Barr. The United States removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442.1 This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 8), plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 10), and defendants' reply memorandum (Doc. 11).
The undersigned summarized the allegations of plaintiff's complaint in a Report and Recommendation issued on December 10, 2019 as follows:
Plaintiff sums up his allegations and claims as follows:
Defendants contend that plaintiff's tax-related claims against the United States and its officers are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; plaintiff cannot pursue a Bivens4 action against the United States or the individual federal officers for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while acting under color of federal law; plaintiff cannot bring a claim against the United States under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 to recover damages in this matter; and plaintiff is barred from seeking injunctive relief by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421. (Doc. 8). Defendants further assert that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Judge Van Tatenhove, and he is entitled to judicial immunity from monetary damages. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff is barred from relitigating claims related to his federal tax liability for the years 2000 through 2010 under the doctrine of res judicata.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must construe all factual allegations as true and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005)). Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. "[T]he statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Keys, 684 F.3d at 608 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The "[f]actual allegationsmust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). The plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can present a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A facial attack on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint "merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading." Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). When resolving a facial challenge, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. A.D. Roe Co., Inc., 186 F.3d 717, 721-22 (6th Cir. 1999). If the motion presents a factual challenge, the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to...
To continue reading
Request your trial