Steele v. Watts
| Decision Date | 16 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 13-00399-WS-N |
| Parties | WILLIAM JAMES STEELE, (AIS # 126537) Plaintiff, v. FRANK WATTS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R), and is now before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 24, 25, 27). For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant Frank Watts, and the claims presented by Plaintiff William James Steele be dismissed with prejudice.
Following a robbery conviction in May of 2013, Plaintiff Steele was arrested and booked into the Marengo County, Alabama Detention Center ("Marengo Jail") on June 5, 2013,1 and he was subsequently transferred toLimestone Correctional Facility on June 18, 2013. (Doc. 27-1 at 3). This complaint arises from Steele's incarceration at the Marengo Jail. In his brief complaint,2 Steele alleges that on June 16, 2013, he was housed in a cell without running water, and despite suffering from the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), he was denied medical treatment. (Doc. 7 at 5-6). Steele is suing the Administrator of the Marengo Jail, Frank Watts,3 forthese alleged Eighth Amendment violations and seeks monetary relief in the amount of $700,000.00. (Doc. 7 at 7).
Defendant Watts has answered the complaint and filed a special report (Docs. 24, 25, 27), which the Court has converted into a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57), and after a thorough review of the record, the Court finds the motion is ripe for consideration.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) ().
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based upon the discovery instruments outlined in Rule 56(c), that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (). Once this initial demonstration is made, the "responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue . . . [of] material fact." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Allen, supra, at 1314 () internal citations omitted); see Comer v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) () (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Forbidding reliance upon pleadings precludes a party from "choos[ing] to wait until trial to develop claims or defenses relevant to the summary judgment motion." . . . This effectuates the purpose of summary judgment which "'is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" . . . Thus, "mere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts" will not prevent the award of summary judgment upon a court's determination that no genuine issue for trial exists.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp., 516 U.S. 817, 116 S. Ct. 74, 133 L.Ed.2d 33 (1995); see also LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) (). In other words, there is no genuine issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Comer,supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ().
In considering whether Watts is entitled to summary judgment in this action, the undersigned has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Steele. Comer, supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ().
The requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party's favor extends only to "genuine" disputes over material facts. A genuine dispute requires more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." A "mere scintilla" of evidence is insufficient; the non-moving party must produce substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Garczynski, supra, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations omitted). In addition, "[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment." Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 43 F.3d at 599.
Plaintiff Steele alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution against Mr. Frank Watts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his alleged failure to provide adequate medical care and sanitaryconditions at the Marengo Jail. (Doc. 7 at 5). Defendant has asserted the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity for the allegations against him in his official capacity.
The Eleventh Amendment protects Defendant in his official capacity from Steele's claims. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) ; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[S]tate officials sued in their official capacity are []protected by the mendment." . In addition, "a state agency[] and a state official sued in his official capacity are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983, thus damages are unavailable..." Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)). A sheriff and, by extension, his staff are considered departments of the state and are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Given that Watts nor the state of Alabama has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 100; Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990), Steele may not sue Defendant Watts in his officialcapacity.
Watts, however, is not absolutely immune from suit in his individual capacity, but is protected by qualified immunity, and Watts has raised such a defense. (Doc. 24 at 1). Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages unless they violate a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time the alleged violation took place. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009); Amnesty Int'l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1184 (11th Cir. 2009). "The purpose of [qualified] immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit 'all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.'" Lee[ v. Ferraro], 284 F.3d [1188,] 1194 [(11th Cir. 2002) ](citation omitted) (quoting Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)). Qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability, but also from suit. See Id.
"Under the well-defined qualified immunity framework, a 'public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.'" Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194). Once the official...
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