Steen v. Denny's Restaurant

• Decision Date: 18 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25853.,25853.
• Citation: Steen v. Denny's Restaurant, 16 P.3d 910, 135 Idaho 235 (Idaho 2000)
• Parties: Roseann STEEN, Claimant-Appellant, v. DENNY'S RESTAURANT and Idaho People First, Inc., Employers, and Idaho Department of Labor, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

16 P.3d 910

135 Idaho 235

Roseann STEEN, Claimant-Appellant, v. DENNY'S RESTAURANT and Idaho People First, Inc., Employers, and Idaho Department of Labor, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 25853.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, September 2000 Term.

December 18, 2000.

Roseann Steen, Idaho Falls, appellant, pro se.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent Idaho Department of Labor.

Stoel Rives, LLC, Boise, for respondents Denny's Restaurant and Idaho People First, Inc. Gregory C. Tollefson argued.

SILAK, Justice.

NATURE OF CASE

This is an appeal from an Idaho Industrial Commission (Commission) ruling that the claimant, Roseann Steen, (Steen) is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

Steen worked as a server at Denny's Restaurant (Denny's) for three-months from November 1998 until February 1999. Steen was terminated after a third disciplinary report was filed for shortages in the cash register used during her shift and her mishandling of a customer's payment by placing it into her apron pocket in violation of company policy. Other servers who had used the cash register also received disciplinary reports. Denny's policy is to discharge an employee after a third violation of the same rule in a six-month period. Steen was not only aware of this policy, but the second disciplinary report she received informed her that the next violation of the rules would result in termination.

B. Procedural Background.

Steen filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL). The IDOL determined Steen was discharged for employee misconduct, and denied unemployment benefits pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-1366(5). Steen appealed this determination to the IDOL Appeals Bureau.

The Appeals Examiner conducted a telephone hearing and reversed the initial eligibility determination, finding Steen was not discharged for employee misconduct, and was eligible for unemployment benefits. Denny's general manager appealed this decision to the Commission. Steen was sent a notice of this appeal.

The Commission reviewed the record and reversed the Appeals Examiner's decision, concluding Steen was discharged for employee misconduct, and was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Steen filed a request for reconsideration, which the Commission denied stating the request provided no basis to reopen the case.

Steen appeals the Commission's decision.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The following issues are presented on appeal:

A. Whether Denny's brief was filed in a timely manner.

B. Whether the Commission erred in granting Denny's appeal.

C. Whether the Commission's ruling is supported by substantial and competent evidence.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free review of the Commission's legal conclusions, but will not disturb findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. See IDAHO CONST. ART. V, § 9; I.C. § 72-732; Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 Idaho 752, 754, 932 P.2d 875, 877 (1996).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Denny's Brief Was Filed In A Timely Manner.

This Court rejects Steen's assertion that Denny's brief, which was filed one day late, was not filed in a timely fashion because Denny's was given an oral extension by the Clerk of the Court to file its brief. The brief was filed within the time allowed by the extension and is therefore timely.

B. The Commission Did Not Err In Allowing Denny's Appeal From The Appeals Examiner's Decision.

Steen asserts the Commission was without jurisdiction to review the Appeal Examiner's decision because Dawn Thomas (Thomas), who filed the appeal, was not a licensed Idaho attorney. We disagree. While it is true that an attorney would be required to represent Denny's had a hearing actually been held, one is not required to file a notice of appeal. It is sufficient, under the rules adopted by the Commission, for an officer of the corporation to file an appeal.

Section 72-1368(7) of the Idaho Code provides that "[t]he Commission shall decide all claims for review filed by any interested party in accordance with its own rules of procedure not in conflict herewith." The Commission has the authority to promulgate and adopt reasonable rules and regulations involving judicial matters. See I.C. § 72-508. Pursuant to this authority, the Commission adopted the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Employment Security Law (RAPP). RAPP Rule VIII, entitled "Representation of Parties Before Commission," requires employers who are corporations to be represented by an attorney. This rule is based on decisions of this Court, holding that "representation of another person before a public agency or service commission constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, where the proceedings before those tribunals are held for purposes of adjudicating the legal rights or duties of a party." Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 271, 707 P.2d 378, 382 (1985) (citing Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672, 676, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1981); Weston v. Gritman Memorial Hosp., 99 Idaho 717, 720, 587 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1978)) (citations omitted).

RAPP Rule VIII and Idaho case law clearly demonstrate that only an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho can represent a corporation before the Idaho Industrial Commission. However, RAPP Rule VIII also allows a corporate officer to file a notice of appeal with the Commission on behalf of the corporation.

This Court has recognized the right of a corporate officer to appeal to the Commission. In Kyle, the Court upheld the Commission's decision that an attorney must represent a corporation, and quoted the Commission's conclusions of law stating, "[t]he Commission could grant that part of Beco Corporation's motion that asks for a rehearing (with the requirement that the corporation would be represented by an attorney) . . . ." 109 Idaho at 271, 707 P.2d at 382. The Court went on to conclude Beco Corporation's president and sole shareholder could not cross-examine witnesses and present closing arguments at a Commission hearing because it would constitute representation, but he could petition the Commission for a rehearing, which is an appeal. See id. This holding is in accordance with RAPP Rule VIII(D) that allows for a corporate officer to file a notice of appeal.

To ensure the proper procedure is followed on appeal, the Appeals Examiner includes this statement as part of his or her decision: "TO EMPLOYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: If you file an appeal with the Idaho Industrial Commission, the appeal must be signed by an officer or designated representative, and the signature must include the individual's title." (emphasis in original).

Here, Denny's appeal to the Commission conformed to the rules, as it was signed by Thomas and indicated her title as general manager. The appeal was accepted by the Commission, which has "sole discretion" to hold an additional hearing or to simply review the record of the Appeals Examiner. See I.C. § 72-1368. The Commission determined that "the interests of justice do not require a new hearing" and reviewed the record de novo. Since there was no hearing, there was no need to have an attorney represent Denny's.

Accordingly, this Court holds the Commission did not err by allowing Denny's appeal from the Appeals Examiner's decision.

C. The Commission's Ruling That Steen Was Discharged For Employee Misconduct Is Supported By Substantial And Competent Evidence.

The Commission concluded Steen "was discharged for misconduct in connection with employment" and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Steen asserts the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence due to conflicting evidence in the record. Section 72-1366(5) of the Idaho Code provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits if he or she is discharged for misconduct in connection with employment. See Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 132 Idaho 881, 884, 980 P.2d 545, 548 (1999). This Court has defined misconduct in connection with employment as:

(1) a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or (3) a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees.

Quinn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 321, 955 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1998) (citations omitted).

Whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct is a factual determination that this Court will not disturb solely on the basis of conflicting evidence. See Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 434-35, 974 P.2d 78, 80-81 (1999). We will disturb the Commission's findings of fact only where they are not supported by substantial and competent, even if conflicting, evidence. See Teevan v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 130 Idaho 79, 82, 936 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1997). In Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927 (1985), this Court described the appropriate test for substantial and competent evidence for the purposes of judicial review of an administrative agency's action as follows:

The "substantial evidence rule" is said to be a "middle position" which precludes a de novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity. Such a review requires more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence in support of the agency's determination, though "something less than the weight of the evidence." "Put simply," . . . "the substantial [competent] evidence rule requires a court to determine `whether [the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable.'"

110 Idaho at 260, 715 P.2d at 930 (citations omitted).

In this case, the conflicting evidence involves a discrepancy regarding the dates on the disciplinary action reports....