Steensland v. Hoppmann

• Decision Date: 09 January 1934
• Citation: 252 N.W. 146,213 Wis. 593
• Parties: STEENSLAND ET AL. v. HOPPMANN, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

213 Wis. 593

252 N.W. 146

STEENSLAND ET AL.

v.HOPPMANN, CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 9, 1934.

Proceeding on the petition of Edward B. Steensland and Lorenzo D. Atkinson against the Circuit Court for Dane County and August C. Hoppmann, Judge thereof, for leave to commence an original action by mandamus in this court to compel respondent, August C. Hoppmann, as Judge of the Circuit Court for Dane County, to grant a motion of the petitioners to permit them to inspect the minutes of a grand jury of the County of Dane, impaneled for the September, 1933, term of that court.

Petition denied.

Gilbert, Ela, Heilman & Raeder, of Madison, for petitioners.

Lawrence W. Hall, of Madison, for respondent.

FAIRCHILD, Justice.

[1] The petitioners asked the circuit court to permit them to inspect the minutes of the grand jury, each assigning as his reason therefor that “such inspection and right to make copies are necessary in order that the defendant may properly prepare for and make his defense herein, and in order that the defendant may be properly advised as to what pleas and motions to enter herein to properly protect all his rights in this action.” The indictment sets forth eight counts, in substance charging both defendants on a certain date, being then officers of the Union Trust Company of Madison, a banking company, with having unlawfully and feloniously issued, circulated, and published, or caused the same to be done, misleading advertisements intending to induce investors to purchase trust agreement securities from the Union Trust Company, “then and there well knowing that the said trust agreement securities offered for sale by the said Union Trust Company” did not satisfy the representations so made, and that the money of the investors in said trust agreements was not invested in the securities therein represented; it being charged in the indictment in effect as to each count thereof: “* * * that the said defendant, Edward B. Steensland, and the said defendant, Lorenzo D. Atkinson, then and there well knew that on the date of the said false, misleading, and deceiving advertisement, and for a long time prior thereto, the investors in Union Trust Company Trust Agreements were not assured of a five per cent income thereon, and that the money of the investor in said trust agreements was not put to work in real estate first mortgages, in that the money invested in trust agreement securities with the said Union Trust Company, a corporation, then and there, and for a time prior thereto, had been by the said Union Trust Company, a corporation, invested in bonds, notes, and real estate mortgages, many of which had been and then were in default on the day and date of their investment either as to principal, interest, or taxes, contrary to the provisions of chapter 189, 1931 Wisconsin Revised Statutes. * * *”

The petitioners show no adequate reason for permitting them to inspect the minutes of the grand jury. The grounds assigned by them are not sufficient to arouse such power as the court possesses over the proceedings and minutes of that body. There are cases to be found in the books treating with occasions where the power to inspect minutes of a grand jury has been exercised and situations may arise where, in the interests of justice, it is necessary for the court to pass behind the indictment to learn whether or not any proof existed to establish the offense charged. We are cited to the case of People v. Molineux, 27 Misc. 60, 57 N. Y. S. 936. This case is typical of many others which recognize as existing in the courts a power of control over the proceedings of a grand jury. In the case just referred to, Molineux was indicted after he had been a witness at a coroner's inquest at which he was not allowed to furnish testimony explaining that which was adverse to him. The motion to inspect the minutes was supported by an affidavit that the evidence was insufficient in law to sustain an indictment, and the decision proceeds on the theory, over which there cannot be much difference of opinion, that a humane interpretation of the law is that a grand jury is forbidden to find an indictment without sufficient legal evidence. In the case of People v. Restenblatt, 1 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 268, decided in February, 1855, the court was moved to go behind the indictments and take judicial notice of this want of proof for the purpose of setting them aside. The court in that case considered the question both new and important, and said: “The criminal books afford almost no authority for the exercise of such a power * * * nor yet is there any decision involving a principle of law or rule of criminal procedure going to interdict such innovation when prudently resorted to for the attainment of truth and the administration of that justice which is the right of all men.” In that case, the evidence before the grand jury was established by stipulation between the district attorney, representing the prosecution, and the defendant, and on that evidence the court declared that “there was no lawful evidence whatever before the grand jury to negative the truth of the pretences alleged.”

Without further reference to cases in other jurisdictions we will examine the decisions in this state. In Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 102 N. W. 1087, it was ruled that the testimony of grand jurors and of the district attorney as to statements made before the grand jury, and the minutes of the grand jury's proceedings, are admissible as original evidence, if not objectionable under the ordinary rules of evidence, whenever the court deems it necessary for the ascertainment of truth and the furtherance of justice. In that case, the defendant claimed immunity because of the testimony which he had given before a grand jury some years before. That doctrine was adhered to by this court in Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N. W. 116, 118, 4 Ann. Cas. 1052, and Mr. Justice Siebecker, speaking for the court, said: “It is urged that the plaintiff in error was entitled to inspection of such records in so far as they relate to the testimony given by plaintiff in error before the grand jury concerning the transaction involved upon this trial, and that such...