Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-4328,81-4328
• Citation: 694 F.2d 413
• Parties: STEERE TANK LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 413

694 F.2d 413

STEERE TANK LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America Respondents.

No. 81-4328.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 27, 1982.

Hugh T. Matthews, Dallas, Tex., for petitioner.

Laurence H. Schecker, I.C.C., Robert B. Nicholson, James H. Laskey, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Leroy Hallman, Dallas, Tex., for intervenor Chemical Exp.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Before RUBIN, RANDALL and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

The issue presented on this appeal is what meaning must be accorded the words "reasonably broaden" in section 6 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10922(h)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 464 (5 Cir.1981), clarified and enforced through mandamus, 669 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. July 16, 1982) (No. 82-86), we held that " 'reasonable' implies that the broadening must be rational, logically supportable and fair," but the application of this test in the context of a specific case remains a problem of first impression. ¹

Common motor carriers under the jurisdiction of the Commission have always been required to obtain certificates of "public convenience and necessity" for every route they serve. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10922(b)(1). Since existing carriers were entitled to intervene in any application for a new certificate, thereby rendering the proceedings time-consuming and expensive, the most practical option for a new carrier--or for an old one desiring to expand its operations into a new market--was to reach an informal accommodation with competitors. ² The great majority of the certificate applications under the pre-1980 scheme were therefore unopposed. But a price was nonetheless exacted. In return for being allowed to proceed without opposition, a carrier had to apply for as narrowly drawn a certificate as possible: certificates were commonly granted for the transport of one product (e.g., "silica gel catalyst, in bulk") from one factory or small town (e.g., Lake Charles, Louisiana) in one direction to another small town (e.g., to but not from Scottsbluff, Nebraska). Chemical Express Carriers, Inc., No. MC-124236, Sub. 39, at 13 (ICC Div. 1 Dec. 2, 1974). The result of this system was, in the judgment of many, a patchwork-quilt of illogically drawn certificates and inefficient service. ³

To remedy this problem, section 6 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 provided for certain "restriction removals," so that, for example, the above certificate for the transport of silica gel catalyst in bulk from Lake Charles to Scottsbluff could arguably be "reasonably broadened" to provide authorization for shipment of "commodities in bulk" roundtrip "[b]etween points in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, on the one hand and, on the other, points in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska." Chemical Express Carriers, Inc., No. MC-124236, Sub. 111, at 7 (ICC June 12, 1981) (abbreviations expanded). Steere Tank Lines, Inc., which opposes the foregoing restriction removal, vigorously argues that the statutory provision for "reasonable" broadening ⁴ does not authorize the Commission to turn a certificate for "silica gel catalyst" in bulk into one for the carriage of any "commodity in bulk," even though the carrier holds numerous other certificates for a variety of commodities in bulk. The Commission, in this instance on behalf of Chemical Express Carriers, Inc., just as vigorously urges that the statute contemplates precisely this kind of restriction removal. For the reasons set out below, we agree with the Commission and so affirm its order.

I

Steere is a relatively large Dallas-based carrier that specializes in bulk transport throughout the southwest. Chemical Express, on the other hand, appears to be a smaller carrier whose primary strength is in the Texas intrastate market.

Chemical Express began these proceedings on April 3, 1981, when it filed a restriction removal application with the Interstate Commerce Commission. It sought to change fifty-six narrowly drawn certificates into certificates for the carriage of three broad categories of goods--building materials, commodities in bulk, and chemicals and related products. Notice of the application was duly published in the Federal Register, 46 Fed.Reg. 24,019 (1981), and Steere filed its objections within the prescribed time. Chemical Express argued that the requested restriction removals were necessary to carry out the statutorily mandated goals of the Motor Carrier Act, namely, improved service to the public, greater energy efficiency, and better use of existing equipment and facilities. Steere argued just as vigorously that Chemical Express would take business away from Steere, thereby reducing efficiency and perhaps eliminating service to small towns entirely.

The Commission's Restriction Removal Board decided on June 12, 1981, that Chemical Express's application should be granted in its entirety, Chemical Express Carriers, Inc., No. MC-124236, Sub. 111 (ICC June 12, 1981), and Steere responded by filing the present suit on August 21, 1981. The case comes directly to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2321, 2341-2349 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The parties have essentially agreed that the facts are not in real dispute and that the outcome of the case depends upon the meaning that we are to give to the applicable provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. We therefore turn first to the statute and then to the record in this case.

II

We begin, of course, with the statutory command that the Commission shall "reasonably broaden" existing certificates. MCA Sec. 6, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10922(h)(1)(B)(i). Although we held in American Trucking that "reasonable" in this context means "rational, logically supportable and fair," we also conceded that "[t]he very use of this broad qualitative measure indicates that the effort to redefine it may result only in semantic rephrasings of the problem." 659 F.2d at 464. We therefore look to the enacted declarations of "Congressional Findings" and "National Transportation Policy" and to the legislative history for further guidance in interpreting the statute.

According to the text of the Act, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act because it found that "historically the existing regulatory structure has tended in certain circumstances to inhibit market entry, carrier growth, maximum utilization of equipment and energy resources." MCA Sec. 3(a), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10101 n. (Supp. IV 1980) (section entitled Congressional Findings). Congress thus clearly hoped to replace the existing system with a more logical one based on good sense and sound transportation policy. Still, as Steere has repeatedly reminded us, the Act effected a compromise between those with an interest in keeping the then present system and those who wanted complete deregulation. The institution of the new was not to mean the total abolition of the old. The enacted text also warned the Commission that "legislative and resulting changes should be implemented with the least amount of disruption to the transportation system consistent with the reforms enacted." MCA Sec. 3(a), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10101 n. (Supp. IV 1980). This balance between the old and the new, between continued regulation and deregulation, is also reflected in the Act's first permanent addition to the United States Code: section 4 states, on the one side, that competition and efficiency are the main goals of the Act, and on the other side, that existing carriers are still to be protected so that they may continue to "earn adequate profits." MCA Sec. 4(3), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10101(a)(7). We could not, with any fairness to the litigants before us today, claim that these equivocal and partly conflicting statements are enough to dispose of the case.

We therefore look to the legislative history for further help in determining the meaning of the words "reasonably broaden." We do so with certain misgivings. This court has already had occasion to remark upon the need for caution in relying on the legislative commentary found in the history of this Act. See American Trucking, supra, at 459. We think, however, that the history sheds enough light on the case to enable us to rule in favor of the Commission.

Insofar as the present case is concerned, the original bill presented by President Carter to Congress provided for complete deregulation. Truckers were to be allowed to transport any commodities they wished, no matter how restrictive their original certificates. See Trucking Competition and Safety Act of 1979, S. 1400, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 102 (1979), Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearings before the [Senate] Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation ... on ... S. 1400, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 262 (1979). This radical solution to the problem was, however, quickly abandoned.

The next proposal, which was ultimately enacted, was a carefully worked out compromise between those who opposed complete deregulation and those who favored it. See, e.g., Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearings before the [Senate] Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation ... on S. 2245, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 1450 (1980) (introductory remarks of Sen. Cannon, co-sponsor of the bill). Both the House and the Senate versions contained identical restriction removal provisions. The bill originally provided the Commission with the authority to "broaden the categories of commodities authorized by the carrier's certificate," S. 2245, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 6 (1980), 126 Cong.Rec. S3576, S3579-80 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1980), but the Senate committee reporting the bill amended it to read, "reasonably broaden the categories of commodities authorized by the carrier's certificate or permit." Id. (noting the two...