Steerman v. Moats
| Decision Date | 12 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action Nos. 1:13-2769 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | JASON KENT STEERMAN, Plaintiff, v. ALAN D. MOATS, et al., Defendants. |
On February 15, 2013, Plaintiff, acting pro se and in confinement at Stevens Correctional Center in Welch, West Virginia, filed his Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Complaint claiming entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.1 (Document Nos. 1 and 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff names the following as Defendants: (1) Alan D. Moats, Circuit Court Judge; (2) Leckta Poling, Prosecuting Attorney; (3) Allison C. Iapalucci, attorney for Mountaineer Legal Services; (4) Dennis Foreman, Commissioner of West Virginia Parole Board; and (5) Jim Rubenstein, Commissioner of the Division of Corrections. (Document No. 2, p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he was place on "supervised bond" from September 2, 2010, until September 27, 2011. (Id., p. 5.) Plaintiff explains that his "supervised bond" required the placement of a "SCAM monitoring bracelet." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on September 27, 2011, Judge Moats took Plaintiff off bond supervision and sentenced him to "regular home confinement." (Id.) Plaintiff claims that "Judge Moats granted him all his time while on bond for home confinement." (Id.) Plaintiff states that hishome confinement was revoked on January 10, 2012, and Plaintiff was taken to the Regional Jail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Judge Moats granted him credit for time served on home confinement in the Revocation Hearing Order dated February 1, 2012. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, complains that Judge Moats only granted him credit from September 27, 2011 until February 1, 2012. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that Judge Moats should have granted him credit starting from the date he was placed on bond (September 2, 2010). (Id.) Plaintiff, therefore, argues that "Judge Moats has subjected him to false imprisonment making the Plaintiff serve time twice, and by making the Plaintiff serve another year in prison for the time he had already had credit for serving." (Id., p. 6.) Next, Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Moats conspired with the prosecutor to "wrongfully convict and maliciously prosecute the plaintiff." (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Prosecutor Leckta Poling subjected him to malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. (Id.)
Third, Plaintiff complains that Attorney Allison Iapalucci provided ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id., p. 7.) Plaintiff contends that Attorney Iapalucci's ineffective representation caused Plaintiff to be falsely imprisoned and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.)
Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that Dennis Foreman and the Parole Board have subjected him to discrimination, embarrassment, humiliation, and harassment. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was denied parole because he "did not have enough time in." (Id.) Plaintiff, however, complains that other inmates with "very little DOC time" were granted parole. (Id.) Plaintiff, therefore, contends that Defendant Foreman subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by denying him parole. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Defendant Foreman and the Parole Board are using the prison system as a homeless shelter and are responsible for the over crowding problem within the prison. (Id., p. 8.)
Finally, Plaintiff complains that Jim Rubenstein has allowed him to be subjected cruel andunusual punishment. (Id., p. 8.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that he has been subjected to food deprivation, inadequate ventilation, unsanitary living conditions, excessive noise, sleep deprivation, and exposure to insects and rodents. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rubenstein "does not acknowledge grievances and grievance procedures filed by inmates." (Id., p. 8.) As relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages. (Id., p. 9.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen each case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. On screening, the Court must recommend dismissal of the case if the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A "frivolous" complaint is one which is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). A "frivolous" claim lacks "an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id., 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id., 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted factually when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
"[F]ederal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by theConstitution and laws [of the United States]." Thus, Section 1983 provides a "broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Generally speaking, to state and prevail upon a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must prove that (1) a person acting under color of State law (2) committed an act which deprived him of an alleged right, privilege or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1996), requires that inmates exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing civil actions though the administrative process may not afford them the relief they might obtain through civil proceedings.2 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382-83, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002)(The Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1820,149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001)("Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing the inmate's complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not make specific provision for monetary relief."). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is also required when injunctive relief is requested. Goist v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 2002 WL 32079467, *4, fn.1 (D.S.C. Sep 25, 2002),aff'd, 54 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1047, 123 S.Ct. 2111, 155 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2003). "[T]here is no futility exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement." Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999). But the plain language of the statute requires that only "available" administrative remedies be exhausted. A grievance procedure is not "available" if prison officials prevent an inmate from using it. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003)(inmate lacked available administrative remedies for exhaustion purposes where inmate was unable to file a grievance because prison officials refused to provide him with the necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)(allegations that prison officials failed to respond to his written requests for grievance forms were sufficient to raise an inference that inmate had exhausted his available administrative remedies.)
If an inmate exhausts administrative remedies with respect to some, but not all, of the claims he raises in a Section 1983, Bivens or FTCA action, the Court must dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed with the exhausted ones. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 913, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007)( ) It appears to be the majority view as well that exhausting administrative remedies after a Complaint is filed will not save a case from dismissal. See Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2001)(overruled on other grounds), a Section 1983 action, citing numerous cases. The rationale is pragmatic. As the Court stated in Neal, allowing prisoner suits to proceed, so long as the inmate eventually fulfills the exhaustion requirement, undermines Congress' directive to pursueadministrative remedies prior to filing a complaint in federal court. Moreover, if during the pendency of a suit, the administrative process were to produce results benefitting plaintiff, the federal court would have wasted its resources adjudicating claims that could have been resolved within the prison grievance system at the outset. Neal, 267 F.3d at 123. In Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999), the Court stated: Thus, the PLRA requires that available administrative remedies must be exhausted before the filing of a suit in Federal Court. It is further clear that the...
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