Steffanos v. State
| Decision Date | 20 July 1920 |
| Citation | 86 So. 204,80 Fla. 309 |
| Parties | STEFFANOS v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Criminal Court of Record, Dade County; J. Emmet Wolfe Judge.
William Steffanos was convicted of statutory rape, and he brings error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Information for statutory rape not bad, because omitting word 'unlawful.' An information charging a male person with having carnal intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse was under the age of 18 years, and such offense is alleged to have been committed at a time subsequent to the passage of chapter 7732, Laws of Florida 1918, is not bad because it omits the word 'unlawful' just preceding the words 'carnal intercourse.'
Indictment should not be quashed for defects in form, unless prejudicial. An information should not be quashed on account of any defects in form, unless it is so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused, and embarass him in the preparation of his defense, or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense.
Unchastity of prosecutrix prior to alleged offense is material. In the prosecution of a male person under chapter 7732, Laws of Florida, Extra Sess. 1918, for having unlawful carnal intercourse with an unmarried female person of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse was under the age of 18 years, evidence of acts of unchastity on the part of such female committed prior to the date of the alleged offense is material, and should not be excluded.
Exclusion of further evidence for defense before argument held error. In a criminal prosecution, where the parties have announced that there is no more evidence to be introduced upon either side, it is reversible error for the court to prohibit the defendant from offering additional evidence material to his defense, when this offer is made in good faith, and there is no evidence of dilatoriness or negligence on the part of the defense in not offering it earlier, and the arguments of counsel have not been made and the cause not submitted to the jury under the court's charge.
State's counsel should not comment on defendant's failure to testify. In a criminal prosecution, counsel for the state should make no comment upon the defendant's failure to testify, when such is the case.
Gautier & Riley, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Van C. Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and D. Stuart Gillis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was informed against in the criminal court of record for Dade county upon the charge of having carnal intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character, who was at the time of such intercourse under the age of 18 years, 'contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.' The plaintiff in error was convicted and sentenced to hard labor in the state prison, and seeks a reversal of the judgment on writ of error.
Motions to quash the information and in arrest of judgment were made and denied, and such rulings constitute the basis of the first and second assignments of error.
It is contended that the information which follows the language of Acts 1915, chapter 6974, section 3521, General Statutes 1906, instead of the language of Acts Extra Sess. 1918, chapter 7732, which repealed the former acts upon the subject, should have been quashed, or the judgment arrested, because the offense was alleged to have been committed after the passage of the act of 1918.
In the case of Shields v. State, 83 So. 391, the indictment was drawn under Acts Extra Sess. 1918, chapter 7732, and alleged the offense to have been committed in July, 1918, or before the passage of the latter act. Section 3521, General Statutes 1906, was then in force, because chapter 6974, Acts of 1915, which undertook to amend the section of the General Statutes, was invalid, in that the subject of the act was not expressed in the title, as required by section 16, article 3, of the Constitution. Now section 3521, General Statutes, is materially different in terms from Acts 1918, chapter 7732, in that the former denounced as a felony the act of having carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under the age of 18 years, while Acts Extra Sess. 1918, chapter 7732, adds the further qualification of previous chaste character in the description of the female with whom it shall be a felony for a male person to have carnal intercourse.
In the Shields Case the judgment was reversed, because the indictment was expressly and in terms predicated upon a statute which was enacted after the offense charged was alleged to have been committed.
If the indictment in the Shields Case had been based upon section 3521, General Statutes, a different case would have been presented.
Now Acts 1915, chapter 6974, which is deemed to be void because of a defective title omits the word 'unlawful' in denouncing the offense of carnal intercourse with any unmarried female of previous chaste character, while the language of Acts Extra Sess. 1918, chapter 7732, is as follows:
'Any male person who has unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried female person of previous chaste character,' etc.
The information in this case omits the word 'unlawful' in charging the defendant with the act of having 'carnal intercourse' with the unmarried 'female' of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse was under the age of 18 years. The word 'person' is also omitted, but is contained in the act of 1918 after the word 'female,' and omitted from the act of 1915, and not the language ipsissimis verbis of the act of 1918.
As the crime was alleged to have been committed after the passage of the act of 1918, the information should have been drawn under that act. But the question is: Does the omission of the words 'unlawful' and 'person' from the information vitiate it as a pleading under the act of 1918? We think that such omission of the quoted words does not render the information bad, because the information was not so vague indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused, and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense, or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger...
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State v. Daggett
...appellant was dilatory in moving to reopen as his motion was made prior to closing arguments and jury instruction. See Steffanos v. State, 80 Fla. 309, 86 So. 204 (1920). We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the appellant's request. When in doubt, While our rulings......
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State v. DiGuilio
...34 So. at 243 (citations omitted). The holding that such comments were not per se reversible was made more explicit in Steffanos v. State, 80 Fla. 309, 86 So. 204 (1920), where we During the argument of counsel the prosecuting attorney commented upon the failure of the accused to testify in......
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Singleton v. State
...in which this statutory right has been protected by the Courts of this State. Dabney v. State, 119 Fla. 341, 161 So. 380; Steffanos v. State, 80 Fla. 309, 86 So. 204; Pinckney v. State, Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 144; Suarez v. State, Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 367; Kolsky v. State, Fla.App.1966,......
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Donaldson v. State
...case will be reversed if the motion was timely and a proper showing has been made as to why the evidence was omitted. Steffanos v. State, 80 Fla. 309, 86 So. 204 (1920) (holding that the case should be reopened where "the cause ha[s] not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would [be] ......