Steffen v. Ohio
Decision Date | 29 February 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-5323,87-5323 |
Citation | 485 U.S. 916,99 L.Ed.2d 250,108 S.Ct. 1089 |
Parties | David Joseph STEFFEN v. OHIO |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 485 U.S. 1030, 108 S.Ct. 1587.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. But even if I did not hold this view, I would grant this petition in order to address the important unresolved issue whether an instruction that reduces a jury's sense of responsibility over a death sentence is nonetheless per se constitutional if it is accurate and nonmisleading, even when the instruction serves no legitimate state penological interest.
In this case, petitioner was sentenced to death in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The trial court had instructed the jury:
The Ohio Supreme Court characterized this as an "instruction to the jury that their recommendation of death would not be binding on the court, and that the final responsibility for the imposition of the death penalty rests with the court." 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 509 N.E.2d 383, 387 (1987). The Ohio Supreme Court then rejected petitioner's argument that "such an instruction impermissibly reduces the jury's sense of responsibility and increases the likelihood of a recommendation of death," ibid., State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986), a prior Ohio Supreme Court case that had rejected the same challenge to a substantially similar instruction. Although Buell went out of its way to "emphatically emphasize [that] the better procedure would be to have no comment by the prosecutor or by the trial judge on the question of who bears the ultimate responsibility," the court concluded that the instruction was neither an inaccurate nor a misleading statement of Ohio law and held that the instruction was thus constitutional. Id., at 144, 489 N.E.2d at 813.
I have no cause to second-guess the conclusion that this instruction accurately reflects the state of Ohio law, as authoritatively construed by the Ohio Supreme Court itself. I note, however, that although an Ohio jury's recommendation of death is not binding on a trial court, a trial court cannot impose the death sentence when the jury recommends life imprisonment. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.03(D)(2) (1987). Ohio's statutory scheme thus contemplates that juries will bear a crucial responsibility in deciding whether Ohio will impose a death sentence: making their recommendation necessary, if not sufficient, to any sentence of death. The question this case presents is whether an instruction stressing the preliminary nature of a jury's decision can so minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for its decision and so increase the likelihood of a recommendation of death as to be unconstitutional despite the accuracy of the instruction. This question is particularly sharpened here, where the state court evidently concedes that the instruction serves no valid state interest and in- deed "emphatically emphasize[s]" that the instruction should not be given.
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), this Court laid down a general prohibition against trial comments that minimize a jury's sense of responsibility for a death sentence. We stated: "This Court has always premised its capital punishment decisions on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility.' " Id., at 341, 105 S.Ct., at 2646. The Eighth Amendment was thus violated, we concluded, when the State attempted "to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death," ibid., by suggesting that the sentencing jury was not ultimately responsible because appellate review would be available. Such a...
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...of our prior cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. See State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 123, certiorari denied (1988), 485 U.S. 916. is the seventh capital case considered by this court in which the death penalty was imposed. We have examined our prior capital cases,......
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...524 A.2d 188, 275-77 (1987); State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 125, 509 N.E.2d 383, 396 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 916, 108 S.Ct. 1089, 99 L.Ed.2d 250 (1988); State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 169, 359 S.E.2d 275, 279, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 982, 108 S.Ct. 496, 98 L.Ed.2d 495 (1987); Sta......
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