Steffes' Estate, Matter of, 77-171

• Citation: 290 N.W.2d 697,95 Wis.2d 490
• Decision Date: 08 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 77-171,77-171
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Virgil A. STEFFES, Deceased. Mary Lou BROOKS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Terry V. STEFFES, personal representative, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Page 697

290 N.W.2d 697

95 Wis.2d 490

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Virgil A. STEFFES, Deceased.

Mary Lou BROOKS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Terry V. STEFFES, personal representative, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 77-171.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Dec. 3, 1979.

Decided April 8, 1980.

F. J. Antoine (argued), and Peterson, Antoine & Peterson, Prairie du Chien, on brief, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas T. Schrader, Lancaster (argued), for plaintiff-respondent; McIntyre, Kinney, Urban & Schrader, Lancaster, on brief.

ABRAHAMSON, Justice.

The question on appeal is whether the plaintiff, who engaged in an adulterous relationship with the deceased, may recover from the estate for unpaid salary, wages, or other compensation for personal services rendered to the deceased within the two-year period preceding his death. ¹

Virgil Steffes died without a will on July 17, 1976. His gross estate was valued at $733,644.65. Steffes was survived by a son, who is an heir and the personal representative of the estate, and children of a deceased son, who are heirs. The plaintiff, Mary Lou Brooks, filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $29,200.00 for personal services rendered to the deceased during the last two years of his life (July 17, 1974 July 17, 1976). The estate refused to pay the claim and this litigation ensued. The trial court rendered judgment allowing the claim against the estate in the amount of $14,600.00.

There is no dispute that plaintiff rendered services for Steffes on the farm and in his home and that she gave him excellent nursing care during his lengthy last illness. Steffes' son had been a guest in his father's home before his father's death, and he testified that he had eaten meals cooked by the plaintiff, that his father's home was kept in good condition, and that the plaintiff took good care of his ill father.

The son, as personal representative, appeals the judgment on three grounds: (1) that the facts do not sustain the trial court's findings that the plaintiff rendered services at the request of and with the knowledge of the deceased and with the expectation of compensation; (2) that any services rendered are presumed to be gratuitous because plaintiff lived for more than six years as a member of Steffes' household and that the requirement that there be an express promise to pay for such services was not met; and (3) that the plaintiff cannot recover compensation for the work she performed in the house and on the farm, because Steffes and the plaintiff had engaged in sexual intercourse.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

The facts are not in dispute. Mary Lou Brooks, the plaintiff, met Virgil Steffes, the deceased, in 1969, while the plaintiff was working in a tavern, and soon thereafter she moved to Steffes' farm home where she resided until his death. Plaintiff and Steffes were each married to other persons. Plaintiff knew Steffes was a married man, and he continued to be married until his wife died in 1974. The plaintiff had been married in 1963 and had two children. She continued to be married while she lived in the deceased's house, initiating divorce proceedings after Steffes' death. Plaintiff admitted having sexual relations with Virgil Steffes until about a year before Steffes' death. Plaintiff and numerous witnesses testified that neither plaintiff nor Steffes had represented her as Mrs. Virgil Steffes.

According to the plaintiff's undisputed testimony she performed the following chores in the house and on the farm: she cleaned the house, did the cooking, washing, and ironing; she helped fix farm fences; she picked the corn crop; she ran the combine and loaded the corn into a "semi" during late 1974; she chased animals which escaped from the pasture; from the end of October until May (1974-1975) she loaded silage; she aided the deceased in pouring concrete walls around the feedlot; she aided the deceased in remodeling his home by "tearing out partitions" and by setting forms, pouring concrete, and pulling the forms; she wrote all the deceased's checks (with one or two exceptions) under the deceased's direction over the two-year period in question, signing his name along with her initials; and she cleaned and prepared machinery for the April 1975 farm sale. The amount of work performed by the plaintiff may be gauged by the size of the farming operation. In July, 1974, there were 80 head of Charolais cattle and approximately 20 registered Morgan horses on the farm. There were also 325 acres of corn on the farm in the spring of 1975.

The plaintiff also described the nursing care she gave Steffes. In the fall of 1974, his health began to deteriorate. He suffered from headaches and dizzy spells. In March, 1975 he was hospitalized and tests revealed a brain tumor; surgery was performed. Plaintiff stayed in a chair beside Steffes' bed for four days and nights while he was in the hospital. For twenty-eight consecutive days after Steffes' surgery, plaintiff drove him to the hospital for cobalt treatments. Steffes' condition continued to worsen during 1976 and plaintiff's care continued. Plaintiff's testimony relating to the care she gave Steffes during his illness was summarized by the estate's counsel as follows:

". . . In the summer of 1975 after surgery, Virgil still had headaches and had so much pressure from the tumor. He went blind in his left eye. I took him for eye tests and he got a little weak in his right side in 1976. In the fall of 1975 there was only horses left. . . . The remodeling of the house was completed in April, 1976. The slight stroke or weakening of Virgil Steffes was when we were working in the house about three weeks before we moved in. We moved in around April 1st. He called me. He couldn't use his leg it was so weak and his arm. We were still working there. Laudel Culver and Don Urbanek and Bill and Daisy Crubaugh, we were all in the house working that evening and Virgil and I went up to the other place. He said he did not know what was wrong, his legs seemed weak and that. Then I exercised his leg and his arm by working his leg up and down, back and forth, trying to keep the strength in it and his arm. I took him back to La Crosse for a checkup and they took x-rays and the doctor showed me the x-rays where the tumor was coming back and I told him about Virgil's leg and that and he says to exercise it, and so I did and that's when they put him on some pills and he had to have them every four hours. They were to keep the pressure off where the tumor was coming back. Virgil got kidney infection and I took him back, and they gave him pills. They wanted to use a catheter and he said no. I bought a urinal and sat beside him. If he could, for awhile he could help himself when he had to use it and then he got that he couldn't use it. If he wet himself I changed his clothes and if he had an accident in bed, I would change the bed in the middle of the night. This went on during June, 1976. After March, 1976 he had a stroke that affected the whole one side of him and so then in order for him to walk I would slide my foot under his and pick his foot up and walk him that way. He was going to the doctor and the hospital during this time. I took him for his checkups. I would lift him out of the chair and then I would slide my foot under his and put my arm around him, put my arm around him and he would lean on me and we would get to the car that way. Be the same thing at the hospital. If I had to park some place out in the parking lot too far away, then I would go and get or Greg Gebhard might go with me. Sometimes Mike Urbanek rode along and they would run in and get a wheel chair and bring it out and then I would wheel him into the hospital and wheel him out to the car. Then towards the last when his whole side went I couldn't even walk him no more. I went into Bohlman's Drug Store and rented a wheel chair for at the house too. . . . Mr. Steffes died July the 17th '76."

Plaintiff testified that she received the following items from the deceased during this two-year period: food and lodging; approximately $7,200.00 from the sale of horses and cows which deceased had given to plaintiff to take care of; $3,200.00 towards a $4,544.00 Pontiac which was purchased June 22, 1976 and titled in the plaintiff's name.

The trial court summarized the plaintiff's efforts as follows: "Now this lady although she was not a mason (she) did cement work, and although she was not a carpenter she did carpentry work, and although she wasn't an accountant she did bookkeeping work, although she was not a nurse she rendered nursing services."

Plaintiff testified that she expected to receive something for the services she performed for Virgil Steffes during the last two years of his life. The deceased's brother-in-law and friends of both the plaintiff and the deceased testified that Steffes had indicated that he wanted to provide for the plaintiff and that he wanted her to have the house and farm on his death. However, Steffes did not execute a will and sold part of the farm on land contract and gave the purchasers an option to purchase farm property.

II.

The trial court found that the plaintiff went into the deceased's home as a housekeeper, that the housekeeping, farming and nursing services "rendered by her were performed at the instance and with his knowledge of the decedent;" and that the plaintiff expected compensation for these services over and above room and board and the gratuities she received from Mr. Steffes. ² These findings are significant because this court, in a long line of cases, has held that where services are performed at the special instance of the deceased and with his knowledge and are performed by the claimant with expectation of reasonable compensation, recovery may be allowed on the basis of a contract to pay, implied in fact or law. ³ The trial court concluded that a contract for services can be implied from the facts and can also...