Steffke's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 29 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 224,224
• Citation: 222 N.W.2d 628,65 Wis.2d 199
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Wesley A. STEFFKE, Deceased. ESTATE of Wesley A. STEFFKE, by Wisconsin Valley Trust Co., et al., co-exrs., et al., Appellants, v. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 628

222 N.W.2d 628

65 Wis.2d 199

In re ESTATE of Wesley A. STEFFKE, Deceased.

ESTATE of Wesley A. STEFFKE, by Wisconsin Valley Trust Co.,

et al., co-exrs., et al., Appellants, v. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 224.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 29, 1974.

Schmitt, Nolan & Hansen, Merrill, for appellants.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., James P. Altman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondent.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

The order of the trial judge concluded that Priscilla Baker Lane Steffke was not, for the purposes of heirship prooceedings, the legal wife of Wesley A. Steffke, because her prior marriage to Crockett Warren Lane was not effectively terminated, for the reason that a Mexican divorce in 1966 granted to Priscilla Baker Lane was invalid under the law of the State of Wisconsin. Priscilla Baker Lane was the principal named beneficiary of the will of Wesley A. Steffke. Hence, her right to take from the estate of Steffke is unquestioned. Estate of Steffke (1970), 48 , Wis.2d 45, 179 N.W.2d 846.

The practical effect of the order of the probate court was to require that the inheritance tax be computed at the rates applicable to beneficiaries who are strangers to the deceased, rather than at the rates applicable to widows.

The appeal is taken by the Wisconsin Valley Trust Company and Priscilla Baker Lane Steffke as coexecutors of the estate, and by Priscilla Baker Lane Steffke in her own right.

We conclude that the trial court's order holding that the Mexican divorce was not valid in the State of Wisconsin, that the only heirs at law of the decedent Steffke were his daughters, and that 'stranger' rates and not those applicable to the widow of a decedent is correct and must be affirmed.

Priscilla Baker Lane was married to Crockett Warren Lane on November 11, 1944. In October of 1963, Priscilla Baker Lane and Crockett Warren Lane entered into a property settlement agreement and at the same time Lane signed a waiver submitting to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the City of Juarez, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico. He also executed an entry of appearance and power of attorney in order that a divorce might be granted in accordance with the applicable laws of Chihuahua, Mexico. Wesley A. Steffke was divorced from his first wife in Wisconsin in 1965. Subsequently, in June of 1966, Priscilla Lane and Wesley Steffke went to Mexico together to secure Priscila's divorce. Counsel for appellants correctly summarizes the facts in their brief:

'She and her husband were lifelong residents of Wisconsin. She went to Mexico for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from Lane. She appeared personally in the First Civil Court of Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico. Her husband, Lane, appeared generally by attorney appointed by him through power of attorney. . . . He never was in Mexico.

'It is undisputed she did not take up residence in Mexico but she complied with the laws of the State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico which gave the court jurisdiction. . . . After her appearance in the Mexican Court she returned to her home in Wisconsin.

'Judgment of divorce was entered in the above court June 9, 1966.

'Mrs. Lane married Wesley A. Steffke July 3, 1967.'

The Mexican court granted the divorce for 'incompatibility of temperaments,' a ground not recognized by Wisconsin law. It is undisputed that the divorce was technically bilateral and that the Mexican court had jurisdiction over both the parties. The validity of that divorce in Mexico is unquestioned. Accordingly, had the divorce been granted under the same circumstances in the United States, the decree would be entitled to 'full faith and credit' and would be enforceable anywhere in this country. The constitutional mandate of 'full faith and credit' is not applicable, however, where a decree or judgment is obtained in a jurisdiction outside of the United States. Leflar, American Conflicts Law, sec. 74, page 172, points out:

'. . . there is no compulsion on any American state to recognize or enforce judgments from foreign countries. An American court can deny effect to a foreign judgment because it does not like the kind of service employed even though the service was valid, or because the foreign judgment is on a kind of cause of action that the forum court for any reason dislikes.'

On page 202, Leflar writes:

'When a court is not bound by constitutional compulsions, it may properly employ local public policy as a reason for refusing to entertain suits n objectionable foreign causes of action. Since the full faith and credit clause does not apply to the judgments of other nations, the states are left free to refuse enforcement of them on the local public policy ground.'

Essentially then, since there is no compulsion constitutionally for the state of Wisconsin to recognize the Mexican decree, it will be recognized only on the principles of comity. The doctrine of comity, as applied in Wisconsin, was well stated in Hughes v. Fetter (1950), 257 Wis. 35, 39, 42 N.W.2d 452, 454, rev'd (1951), 341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup.Ct. 980, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (reversal on grounds not pertinent to the instant case): ¹'In this state the courts will generally enforce the law of the place where the injury occurred, unless to do so is contrary to the law, morals, or policy of the state where the action is sought to be maintained. However, if the policy of the forum has been expressed positively in a statute, that policy must prevail. 'When the legislature speaks upon a subject, upon which it has the constitutional power to legislate, public policy is what the statute . . . indicates.' . . . By virtue of the doctrine of comity, rights acquired under statute enacted or judgment rendered in one state will be given force and effect in another, unless, as said, against policy or laws of the state, prejudicial to interests of its citizens or against good morals and natural justice; comity being a rule of practice, however, and not a rule of law. . . . The doctrine of comity results in recognition of a decree of a different state not entitled to full faith and credit. It is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and good will, but is recognition which one state allows within its territory to legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another, having due regard to duty and convenience and to rights of its own citizens.'

Two Wisconsin statutes are controlling and preclude this court from recognizing the Mexican decree as a matter of comity. Sec. 247.21, Stats., provides:

'247.21 Foreign decrees; comity of states; divorce abroad to circumvent laws. Full faith and credit shall be given in all the courts of this state to a judgment of annulment of marriage, divorce or legal separation by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territory or possession of the United States, when the jurisdiction of such court was obtained in the manner and in substantial conformity with the conditions prescribed in s. 247.05. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit the power of any court to give such effect to a judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, by a court of a foreign country as may be justified by the rules of international comity. No person domiciled in this state shall go into another state, territory or country for the purpose of obtaining a judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation for a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this state, or for a cause...