Steffler v. Belleque
| Decision Date | 17 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | 3:09-cv-01371-MA |
| Parties | SCOTT BRIAN STEFFLER, Petitioner, v. BRIAN BELLEQUE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
PATRICK J. EHLERS
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Attorney for Petitioner
Attorney General
JONATHAN W. DIEHL
Assistant Attorney General
Oregon Department of Justice
Attorneys for Respondent
Petitioner, an inmate at Two Rivers Correctional Institution, brings this habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner's habeas corpus petition is denied.
On August 15, 1999, petitioner Scott Brian Steffler murdered Sheila Theeler on a hill outside Roseburg, Oregon by stabbing her over thirty times and cutting her throat. Over the next two days, petitioner made telephone calls to his father during which he confessed to the murder. On August 17, petitioner's father notified Roseburg Police that petitioner had murdered a female neighbor, later confirmed to be Ms. Theeler. Roseburg Police discovered that petitioner was on a southbound Greyhound bus. At approximately 9:55 pm on August 17, petitioner was arrested by Sacramento Police at a Sacramento bus terminal. Detectives from Roseburg flew down to Sacramento that night and, shortly after their arrival in the early morning hours of August 18, guestioned petitioner about the murder. Petitioner confessed to killing Ms. Theeler and extensively discussed the details of the murder. A search of his belongings turned up a broken, bloody knife. Roseburg Police later found Ms. Theeler's body in the location described by petitioner.
In the late evening of August 18, the detectives drove petitioner back to Roseburg. During the drive, petitioner shared more details of the murder with detectives, including showing them the rest stop where he disposed of some of Ms. Theeler's personal items. Shortly after arriving in Douglas County, petitioner accompanied detectives to the scene of the crime and reenacted the murder. Later that day, petitioner again recounted his story to Dr. Colistro, a state psychiatrist.
On July 12, 2001, a jury convicted petitioner of Murder and Aggravated Murder. Resp.'s Exh. 101. Petitioner avoided a potential death penalty by stipulating to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Resp.'s Exh. 120. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed, without opinion, by the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Steffler, 200 Or.App. 291, 114 P.3d 1157, rev. denied, 339 Or. 544 (2005), cert. denied 548 U.S. 926 (2006).
Petitioner subsequently sought state post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief on all grounds, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Steffler v. Bellegue, 230 Or.App. 248, 214 P.3d 853, rev. denied, 347 Or. 290 (2009).
In the instant proceeding, petitioner raises six grounds for relief. Respondent moves to deny habeas relief on the basis that ground four is procedurally defaulted, grounds one and five fail tostate a basis for habeas relief, and grounds two, three, and six fail on the merits.
Generally, a § 2254 petitioner must exhaust his available state remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal court. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989). A state prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by "fairly presenting" his claims to the appropriate state courts at all appellate stages afforded under state law. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2004). Raising a claim in a procedural posture in which its merits will not be considered, absent special and important reasons, does not constitute a fair presentation. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351; but see Casey, 386 F.3d at 918 n.23 ().
When a state prisoner fails to exhaust his federal claims in state court, and the state court would now find the claims barred under applicable state rules, the federal claims are procedurally defaulted. Casey, 386 F.3d at 920; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.l (1991). Habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for theprocedural default and actual prejudice, or that the failure to consider the claims will result in a miscarriage of justice. Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
In petitioner's fourth ground for relief, petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by admitting hearsay evidence of his father's phone calls to the police.1 Respondent argues that this ground is procedurally defaulted because petitioner did not raise the issue at trial. In response, petitioner argues that an intervening change in the law (Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)), and his supplemental briefing on direct appeal constitutes a fair presentation of the issue for exhaustion purposes.
At trial, petitioner stipulated to the admission of his father's statements to police. Tr. 571-72. After trial, but while petitioner's appeal was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford (). In response to Crawford, petitioner successfully moved the Oregon Court ofAppeals for leave to file supplemental briefing arguing that the introduction of his father's telephone calls to the police violated the Confrontation Clause. See Resp.'s Exh. 105. Petitioner again raised the issue in his petition for review to the Oregon Supreme Court. Resp.'s Exh. 107.
Because petitioner stipulated to the admission of his father's statements at trial, the Confrontation Clause issue necessarily was raised on direct appeal as "plain error." Under Oregon law, "[n]o matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claim of error was preserved in the lower court . . . provided that the appellate court may consider an error of law apparent on the face of the record." Or. R. App. P. 5.45(1). Determining whether to review an unpreserved error involves a two-step process. State v. Gornick, 340 Or. 160, 166, 130 P.3d 780 (2006).
First, the appellate court must determine whether the error is (1) one "of law"; (2) obvious and not reasonably in dispute; and (3) appears on the face of the record, i.e., the reviewing court need not go outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences. Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or. 376, 382, 823 P.2d 956 (1991); Gornick, 340 Or. at 166-67. Second, the state court must decide whether to exercise its discretion to consider the claim, taking into account "the competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case;how the error came to the court's attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of error have been served in the case in another way." Mies, 312 Or. at 382 n.6; State v. Fults, 343 Or. 515, 522, 173 P.3d 822 (2007).
The decision to consider a claim as plain error is in the Court of Appeals' discretion, which is to be exercised with "utmost caution" and only in "rare and exceptional cases." Gornick, 340 Or. at 166 (internal quotations omitted). Presentation of a claim to the Oregon Court of Appeals on a plain error basis, therefore, is not a fair presentation for exhaustion purposes because the claim's merits will not be considered absent special and important reasons to do so. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. Accordingly, I conclude that petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim was not fairly presented to the Oregon courts on direct appeal, and the claim is now procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Moore v. Mills, No. 07-cv-1805-HU (#40), 2010 WL 3656061 at *2-*4 (D. Or. May 21, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 3656056 (D. Or. Sep. 15, 2010); Smith v. Hill, No. 09-CV-1020-MO (#41), 2011 WL 1085263 at *4-*5 (D. Or. Mar. 22, 2011); Newcomb v. Bellegue, No. 09-cv-936-HU (#53), 2012 WL 1758639 at *5-*6 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1755678 (D. Or. May 15, 2012); Karnes v. Thompson, No. 10-cv-238-PK (#43), 2012 WL 707084 at *7-*8, *12 (D. Or. Feb. 8, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 707078 (D. Or. Mar. 5, 2012).
Petitioner argues that any procedural default was cured because the Court of Appeals considered his Confrontation Clause claim on the merits by granting his motion for leave to file supplemental briefing. See Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 n.18 (). The Court of Appeals' only action, however, was to allow petitioner to submit supplemental briefing on this point, not to consider the merits. Under Oregon law, the Court of Appeals could not exercise its discretion to review for plain error without expressly articulating its reasons for doing so. Mies, 312 Or. at 382. Because the Court of Appeals did not expressly address the issue, it did not consider petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim on the merits.
Further, petitioner has made no showing of cause and prejudice to excuse his default, or that a miscarriage of justice will result if his defaulted claim is not considered. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986). Thus, habeas review of petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim is barred.2
In ground one, petitioner claims that the trial court's introduction of certain evidence violated his Fourth and Fourteenth...
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