Stegall v. Res. Tech. Corp.

Decision Date02 February 2023
Docket Number341197
PartiesCLEVELAND STEGALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RESOURCE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, doing business as BRIGHTWING, and FCA US, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2016-155043-CD

Before: JANSEN, P.J., GLEICHER, C.J., and BORRELLO, J.

ON REMAND

JANSEN, P.J.

This case returns to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court. Plaintiff filed this action asserting a claim under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., and a claim that he was discharged in violation of public policy, in regard to his perception of an issue regarding asbestos insulation at his worksite. The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants, Resource Technology Corporation, doing business as Brightwing, and FCA US, LLC, under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In an unpublished opinion, a majority of this panel affirmed. Stegall v Resource Technology Corp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 24, 2019 (Docket No 341197) (Stegall I), rev'd in part &remanded, lv den in part 976 N.W.2d 667 (Mich, 2022). Our Supreme Court has now reversed in part this Court's judgment and remanded for further consideration of plaintiff's public-policy claim. Stegall v Resource Technology Corp, 976 N.W.2d 667 (Mich, 2022) (Stegall II). On remand, this Court is directed to further consider "whether plaintiff has established a prima facie claim that he was discharged in violation of public policy, whether plaintiff's public-policy claim is nonetheless preempted by either state or federal law, and whether arguments that the claim has been preempted are preserved." Id. at 668. Our Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in all other respects. Id.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In Stegall I, the majority of this panel summarized the underling facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

In 2013, FCA employed information technology (IT) support persons at its Sterling Heights Assembly Plant (SHAP) on both first and second shift. FCA employed some IT support persons directly; others were hired through staffing agencies as contract workers. Plaintiff began working at SHAP through Brightwing, a staffing agency. In April 2016, plaintiff complained to his superiors about what he perceived to be an issue with asbestos insulation in one of his work areas in the plant. Plaintiff e-mailed photographs of the suspected problem area to his supervisor, and plaintiff's supervisor sent the photographs to the plant's health and safety manager. The safety manager consulted with an outside expert who determined that there was no asbestos issue.

Around May 2016, FCA formally announced that it was ending production of the Chrysler 200 sedan, and that the second shift at SHAP would be eliminated. In light of this announcement, on June 3, 2016, Rick Spondike, plaintiff's superior, sent an e-mail to human resources personnel at FCA indicating that on June 17, 2016, he planned to transfer two of plaintiff's coworkers to another FCA plant and that plaintiff would be released.

Following plaintiff's termination, Kerri Kacanowski, a manager at Brightwing, instructed plaintiff to update his resume and informed plaintiff that Brightwing would search for a new employment opportunity for him. Then, on July 6, 2016, plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MiOSHA), naming defendants in the complaint. Subsequently, Brightwing sent plaintiff an "Offboarding Survey" on two separate occasions and Brightwing's 401(k) provider, Principal Bank, sent plaintiff a letter indicating that his "former employer" had closed his 401(k) account.

Plaintiff then commenced this lawsuit, alleging that FCA and Brightwing were his joint employers and that both employers violated the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he was "about to report Defendants' violations of the law." Plaintiff, however, later withdrew his WPA claim against FCA. Plaintiff also alleged that both alleged employers violated public policy by discharging him. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of both defendants and dismissing plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. This appeal followed. [Stegall I, unpub op at 1-2.]

On appeal, the majority of this panel rejected plaintiff's argument that the trial court had erred in granting summary disposition to defendants regarding the public-policy claim. Id. at 2. Plaintiff's public-policy claim asserted that defendants, his joint employers, had "wrongfully terminated him because of his failure or refusal to violate the law in the course of his employment at SHAP." Id. at 3. That is, plaintiff contended that "his complaint about potential problems with asbestos at the plant and his demand for safety equipment amounted to a 'refusal to violate a law' while he was at SHAP and that FCA and Brightwing terminated him as a result." Id. The majority disagreed because (1) "there is no Michigan caselaw extending the public policy exception to discharges in retaliation for internal reporting of alleged violations of the law"[1] and (2) "there was no genuine issue of material fact to support that either FCA or Brightwing wrongfully terminated plaintiff in retaliation for his refusal to violate the law because there is no evidence that anyone actually violated any law or regulation." Id. Given its resolution of this issue, the majority determined that there was no need to address plaintiff's argument that the trial court had "erred in holding that his public policy claims were preempted by the WPA." Id. at 3 n 1.

Next, the majority rejected plaintiff's argument that the trial court had erred by dismissing his WPA claim against Brightwing. Id. at 4. The majority stated it was undisputed that plaintiff engaged in protected activity under the WPA by filing a wrongful termination complaint with MiOSHA. Id. at 5. Also, given the letters sent to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Brightwing terminated its relationship with plaintiff, which would amount to an adverse employment action. Id. But plaintiff had failed to establish a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment action because more than a mere temporal relationship is required to establish a causal connection. Id. at 5.[2]

Following the issuance of this panel's opinion affirming the grant of summary disposition to defendants, plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court. On November 29, 2021, the Court entered an order directing that oral argument was to be held on the application and that the parties were to file supplemental briefs addressing whether this Court had erred in holding that defendants were entitled to summary disposition on the public-policy claim. Stegall v Resource Technology Corp, 508 Mich. 986 (2021). The parties filed supplemental briefs, and oral argument was held.

On July 15, 2022, the Supreme Court entered its order reversing in part this Court's judgment and remanding the case to this Court for further consideration of plaintiff's public-policy claim. Stegall II, 976 N.W.2d at 667. The Court stated that this Court had erred by holding that plaintiff's public-policy claim fails because the public-policy exception does not extend to discharges in retaliation for internal reporting of alleged violations of the law. In this case, plaintiff did not argue for an addition to the public-policy exceptions that are recognized in Suchodolski v Mich. Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich. 692; 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982). Instead, plaintiff grounds his claim on two of the well-recognized Suchodolski exceptions-that he was discharged both because he exercised a right conferred by well-established legislative enactment and because he failed or refused to violate the law. Suchodolski, 412 Mich. at 695696. It bears noting that these are two separate exceptions under Suchodolski. It is irrelevant to the former exception whether plaintiff reported an actual or alleged violation of the law; that plaintiff relies on the exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 USC 651 et seq., is sufficient. The Court of Appeals majority erred by considering the requirements of the two Suchodolski exceptions together. [Stegall II, 976 N.W.2d at 667-668.]

Our Supreme Court further explained why it is improper to preclude a public-policy claim merely because it is asserted on the basis of only internal reports:

To the extent that the Court of Appeals majority held that a public-policy claim fails when only internal reports are made, the Court of Appeals has previously held that a plaintiff could support a public-policy claim on the basis of internal reporting. Landin v Healthsource Saginaw, Inc, 305 Mich.App. 519, 531-532; 854 N.W.2d 152 (2014). We see no reason why limiting public-policy claims to external reports would serve the welfare of the people of Michigan, especially where the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., might otherwise preempt claims that involve reports to public bodies. See MCL 15.362; Anzaldua v Neogen Corp, 292 Mich.App. 626, 631; 808 N.W.2d 804 (2011). In this case, plaintiff had a good-faith belief that there was a violation of asbestos regulations at his workplace and followed proper internal reporting procedures. His internal report was thus sufficient to state a public-policy claim. [Stegall II, 976 N.W.2d at 668.]

In a footnote of its order, the Court addressed a dissenting statement written by Justice Zahra and joined by Justice Viviano:

We do not take a position on whether there
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT