Steger v. State
Decision Date | 18 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. ED 101703,ED 101703 |
Citation | 467 S.W.3d 887 |
Parties | Ramon Steger, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Timothy J. Forneris, 1010 Market Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for appellant.
Robert J. Bartholomew, Jr., P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.
Ramon Steger (Movant) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Charles County denying his Rule 24.0351 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Movant contends the motion court erred in denying his motion because his counsel was ineffective for misadvising him: (1) that if he did not enter an Alford2 plea and proceeded to trial, he would be found guilty of multiple charges and sentenced to ten years in prison; and (2) that he was very likely to receive a harsher sentence if he proceeded to trial than the sentence he received in exchange for his plea. We affirm.
The State charged Movant with one count of the Class D felony of aggravated stalking. After plea negotiations with the State, Movant's counsel informed the court that Movant wanted to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).3 The plea court sentenced Movant according to the plea agreement.
At the plea hearing, Movant was advised of the charges against him. The State indicated if the case proceeded to trial the following evidence would be presented: Movant called victim's telephone approximately twenty times and told victim he was going to kill him. Movant talked to the police and after threatening to put a hollow point in victim's head, stated The State explained other evidence would show Movant had a gun and fired it in his own home and at a vehicle. The State stated the range of punishment for aggravated stalking and noted “the maximum penalty could be four years in the Department of Corrections....” The State's plea recommendation was a four-year suspended sentence and five years' supervised probation.
Movant testified he understood the nature of the charge against him. He confirmed he understood the range of punishment, his constitutional rights to a trial and believed the evidence was likely to convict him. Moreover, Movant testified he had not been threatened, coerced in any way, or promised anything in order to get him to plead guilty.
The court asked Movant if he had discussed the strengths and weaknesses of his case and “all of [his] options with [his] lawyer.” Movant responded “Yes, sir.” The court then made the following inquiry:
The court found Movant's plea was freely and voluntarily entered with an understanding of the range of punishment. It accepted Movant's plea. Movant was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections, given a suspended execution of sentence and placed on probation for five years.
More than seven years later, Movant appeared on a probation violation. At the revocation hearing, the State presented evidence Movant had absconded from probation for approximately six years. The court revoked Movant's probation and executed his sentence.4
Movant timely filed his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, asserting two claims. Movant alleged counsel was ineffective for misadvising him: (1) if he did not enter an Alford plea and proceeded to trial, he would be found guilty of multiple charges and sentenced to ten years in prison; and (2) he was very likely to receive a harsher sentence if he proceeded to trial than the sentence he received in exchange for his plea. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing.
Movant testified by deposition, Movant alleged at the time of his plea he did not know what the maximum sentence was for aggravated stalking and had “no clue” what his plea meant. Movant also alleged he took the plea because counsel “threatened” him. Movant claimed counsel told him if he didn't plead guilty, he would get ten years.
Plea counsel testified at an evidentiary hearing. He explained he advised Movant before he pleaded guilty of the range of punishment for aggravated stalking and told him the most he could receive on this charge was a four-year sentence. Plea counsel stated he discussed the consequences of not pleading guilty with Movant. He testified he informed Movant if he went to trial and was found guilty on the aggravated stalking charge he could still receive probation.
Further, plea counsel testified he advised Movant if he went to trial the State might file additional charges against him. The additional charges involved weapons and threats. Plea counsel testified he was told by the prosecutor that, as part of the plea agreement, no additional charges would be filed if Movant pleaded guilty to the aggravated stalking count. He stated he advised Movant of the “maximum range of punishment for each and every combination of cases.” He explained to Movant that one possible combination of charges involved two D felonies and two A misdemeanors and could result in a maximum of ten years. He added that he told Movant “nothing was guaranteed” if he proceeded to trial.
The motion court denied Movant's Rule 24.035 motion. The motion court found Movant was not a credible witness. It concluded Movant's plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily made with an understanding of the range of punishment and the consequences of pleading guilty. Movant now appeals.
We review the denial of a post-conviction motion to determine whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k). The findings and conclusions are deemed clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Swallow v. State, 398 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013). “In reviewing a motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 24.035, an Alford plea is not treated differently from a guilty plea.” Lynn v. State, 417 S.W.3d 789, 796 (Mo.App.E.D. 2013).
In Movant's two points on appeal, he contends the motion court erred in denying his motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing because his plea counsel was ineffective for misadvising him. Specifically, Movant asserts plea counsel incorrectly advised him that: (1) if he proceeded to trial, he would be found guilty of multiple charges and sentenced to ten years in prison; and (2) he was very likely to receive a harsher sentence if he went to trial than the sentence he received in exchange for his plea. We disagree.
To succeed on a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; see also Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 572–73 (Mo. banc 2005). By pleading guilty, a movant waives “any claim that counsel was ineffective except to the extent that the conduct affected the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made.” Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 573. To demonstrate prejudice when challenging a guilty plea, a movant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would have pleaded not guilty and demanded a trial. Id.
In his first point on appeal, Movant argues counsel was ineffective for misadvising him that if he did not enter a guilty plea and proceeded to trial, he would be found guilty of multiple charges and sentenced to ten years in prison. Specifically, Movant contends plea counsel's advice was incorrect for the following three reasons: (1) he was only charged with the Class D felony of aggravated stalking, which carried with it a maximum of four years in the penitentiary; (2) the State did not agree to refrain from filing other charges as part of the plea agreement; and (3) the only other charge the State could have filed in addition to aggravated stalking was the Class D felony of unlawful use of a weapon with a maximum sentence of four years—which could not have resulted in a ten-year sentence even if Movant was found guilty of both counts and served the maximum sentences consecutively.5 In response, the State argues Movant did not present credible evidence to support his claim that counsel had been ineffective or that he had been prejudiced.
“A plea must be a voluntary expression of the defendant's choice and a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the act.” Roberts v. State, 276 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Mo. banc 2009). A defendant's guilty plea is not voluntary “if the defendant is misled, or is induced to plead guilty by fraud or mistake, by misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the holding out of hopes which prove to be false or ill founded.” Id. (quotation omitted). When considering whether a defendant pleaded guilty based on mistaken belief about the sentence and plea agreement, the test is whether a reasonable basis exists in record for such belief. Brown v. Gammon, 947 S.W.2d 437, 440–41 (Mo.App.W.D. 1997). A reasonable mistake exists only if defendant's belief was based upon positive representations upon which he was entitled to rely. Id. at 441.
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