Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1909 |
| Docket Number | 34,69 |
| Citation | 74 A. 215,225 Pa. 348 |
| Parties | Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 4, 1909
Appeal, No. 34, Jan. T., 1909, by the Jaeger Automatic Machine Company, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Phila. Co June T., 1906, No. 4,964, on verdict for plaintiff in case of George Stehle, a minor, by his father and next friend, George Stehle, and the said George Stehle, father of the said George Stehle, minor, in his own right, v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Company. Affirmed.
Appeal No. 69, Jan. T., 1909, by George Stehle, father of George Stehle, minor, in his own right, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Phila. Co., June T., 1906, No. 4,964, on verdict for defendant in case of George Stehle, father of George Stehle, minor, in his own right, v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Company. Reversed.
Assumpsit to recover damages for personal injuries to a boy under fourteen years of age. Before CARR, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Verdict and judgment for George Stehle, Jr., for $3,500, and for the defendant as against George Stehle, Sr.
Error assigned in No. 34 was refusal of binding instructions for defendant.
Error assigned in No. 69 was in admitting the evidence as to the statement of the factory inspector as set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court, and in refusing judgment for George Stehle, Sr.
Francis Shunk Brown and Alexander Simpson, Jr., for the Jaeger Automatic Machine Company, appellant. -- The Act of May 2, 1905, P.L. 352, is unconstitutional: Com. v. Samuels, 163 Pa. 283; Com. v. Hoopes, 15 Pa. Dist. Rep. 894.
The act of May 2, 1905, imposes no imputed negligence upon the defendant in this case, because the minor employee was not injured while doing the work for which he was employed: Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311; Robb v. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins., etc., 186 Pa. 456.
William F. Brennan, for George Stehle, Jr, cited: The Act of May 2, 1905, P.L. 352; Clarion County v. Clarion Twp., 222 Pa. 350; Com. v. Beatty, 15 Pa.Super. 5; Com. v. Jones, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 362; Com. v. Charity Hospital, 198 Pa. 270.
It has been held in many cases that "The failure to do an act commanded, or the doing of an act prohibited, is negligence per se:" Brower v. Locke, 31 Ind.App. 353 (67 N.E. Repr. 1015); Owens v. Hannibal, etc., R.R. Co., 58 Mo. 386; Smith v. Milwaukee Builders', etc., Exchange, 91 Wis. 360 (64 N.W. 1041); Kelley v. Anderson, 15 S.D. 107 (87 N.W. 579); American Car & Foundry Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509 (73 N.E. Repr. 766); Narramore v. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 96 Fed. Repr. 298.
William F. Brennan, for George Stehle, Sr. -- The jury, having found a verdict in favor of the injured boy, should have found a verdict in favor of the father, because the right of each to recover was based upon the same law and facts.
No authority has been found to support appellee's excuse for its failure to comply with the act; the excuse is so poor that it has never been seriously raised. Surely, it is no defense for a breach of a clear and positive law that an officer of the law told the offender that he could commit the violation: Pitcher v. Lennon, 12 A.D. 356.
Before BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.
When this case was before us in 220 Pa. 617, the judgment was reversed because the court below in its instructions had failed to give effect to the Act of May 2, 1905, P.L. 352 regulating the employment of children in industrial establishments. The second section of this act in express terms makes it unlawful to employ any child under fourteen years of age, in any "establishment" as defined in the act. It was not disputed then, nor is it now, that the plaintiff was under fourteen years of age, and that the place where he was employed, and where he received his injuries, was such an establishment as the act contemplates. In the opinion delivered by our Brother ELKIN, it was held that if the plaintiff's injury "resulted by reason of the employment prohibited by law, there can and should be a recovery in the case." On the second trial the court was asked to instruct specifically in accordance with the view here expressed. The plaintiff's twelfth point was as follows, "If the jury find from the evidence that the injuries to the boy, George Stehle, resulted by reason of his employment, prohibited by law, there can and should be a recovery in this case, and the verdict should be for the plaintiff." The point was affirmed without qualification. It is now insisted that the trial judge should have qualified it, by explaining to the jury that the mere employment of the plaintiff could not be regarded as the cause of the injury received, if the boy was in no way engaged in the duties of his employment at the time, or if the injury was sustained in consequence of the boy's own inadvertence. The plaintiff was injured in attempting to clean a pipe in which there was a rapidly revolving wheel. By means of this pipe and wheel the loose materials which resulted from the mechanical operation in the polishing room were carried by force of suction without the building. Plaintiff inserted his hand in a hole in the intake pipe some ten inches from the wheel; the suction drew it against the wheel, and both hand and arm were lacerated and broken in consequence. The effort on part of the defense was to show that not only cleaning the pipe through this hole was no part of plaintiff's duty, but that he had been specially warned not to attempt it, and much evidence was offered and admitted on this branch of the case. Let it be that these were the established and admitted facts. That they would be conclusive against an adult's right of recovery is unquestioned; but we are not dealing here with the case of an adult. The plaintiff is within a class of persons whom the law seeks to protect in the matter of their employment, because as a rule they are not able to adequately protect themselves. There can be no doubt that one of the chief purposes of the law in forbidding their employment in industrial establishments, was to prevent their exposure to the danger of personal injury from the machinery used therein. If the danger in their case were only such as the adult is exposed to, there would be little justification for the law. It contemplates a special danger to persons of this class in connection with such employment, because of the characteristics incident to the immaturity of youth -- imprudence, lack of judgment, heedless curiosity and playfulness -- and so it makes their employment unlawful. When a child has been employed in violation of law and is injured in the place where he is employed, to allow the employer to escape liability because the injury resulted from the imprudence or negligence of the child, would be to defeat the purpose of the law and render it absolutely futile. It was because a child under fourteen years of age is likely to be imprudent and negligent, and is therefore exposed to...
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