Steiber v. Bridgeport
| Decision Date | 17 June 1958 |
| Citation | 143 A.2d 434,145 Conn. 363 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | RICHARD I. STEIBER, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF JOSEPH GRAHAM) v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT ET AL. |
James V. Joy, Jr., with whom was John H. Shannon, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James J. Maher, with whom, on the brief, was Adrian W. Maher, for the appellee (defendant Platt and Company), and with whom were Hugh C. Curran and, on the brief, John J. McGuinness, for the appellee (named defendant).
This action was brought to recover damages from the city of Bridgeport and Platt and Company, an abutting owner, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff's decedent as a result of a fall on a public sidewalk. The decedent fell on a cellar door or hatchway, owned by Platt and Company, which was located on the sidewalk and was alleged to be dangerously slippery when wet. He fell about 10 p.m. on December 23, 1947, during a snowstorm which had started about 6:10 o'clock that morning and which continued until December 25. The cellar door or hatchway was repaired sometime later, but there was no evidence of the date of the repairs.
The only question involved in this appeal is a ruling on evidence. To establish the dangerous condition of the sidewalk and notice thereof, the plaintiff presented as an expert witness an engineer who inspected the sidewalk and hatchway for the first time about three and one-half months after the decedent's fall. The plaintiff proposed to show through this witness that the condition of danger must have existed for a considerable period of time. The witness was asked a series of questions relating to the conditions he found at the time of his inspection. The court excluded the questions on the ground of remoteness and lack of proof that the conditions observed by the witness were substantially the same as those existing at the time the decedent fell. The court concluded further that there was no proof that the cellar door was, at the time of inspection by the witness, in the same condition as it was in at the time of the fall or that it was the same cellar door.
The plaintiff cites and relies on two cases. They do not support his position. In Reynolds v. Land Mortgage & Title Co., 114 Conn. 447, 159 A. 282, the court in the exercise of its discretion permitted expert witnesses to testify to conditions they found some two months after the accident. The opinion in the case (p. 451) points out that counsel did not seriously claim that there had been a material change in conditions prior to the examinations of the experts. In Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126 Conn. 221, 224, 10 A.2d 600, we held it to be an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to permit a clearly qualified expert to testify to a relevant fact which was within his knowledge, in answer to a question which incorporated certain described conditions. Here the interrogation of the witness never reached that stage. He was not asked to testify on the basis of conditions described to him. He was being interrogated about the conditions he himself found when he made his inspection more than three months after the episode. Whether the conditions at that time were substantially the same as at the time of the incident involved in the suit was earnestly disputed. No offer was made to connect his testimony with evidence to be presented subsequently to show that there had been no material change in conditions. The court made it clear that it was excluding the testimony on the ground of a change in conditions and remoteness. Without a showing or an offer to show that there had been no material change in conditions, especially...
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State v. Taylor
...the main case was fulfilled by the state, and the box was properly before the court as part of the overall case. Steiber v. City of Bridgeport, 145 Conn. 363, 366, 143 A.2d 434. These facts are in a train of events in evidence which the court could consider. It is fundamental that 'circumst......
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Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co.
...discretion, may conditionally admit evidence upon representations that its relevancy will later be established. Steiber v. Bridgeport, 145 Conn. 363, 366-67, 143 A.2d 434 (1958); C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (1976) § 3.4(d). At trial, the court did admit evidence ......
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State v. Schaffer
...if the conditions are of such a permanent character that a lapse of time would not make a material difference.' Steiber v. Bridgeport, 145 Conn. 363, 367, 143 A.2d 434, 436; see also Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 276, 278 A.2d From the testimony and photographic evidence, the court coul......
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Zitomer v. Palmer, 1158
...and determination of the matter in contention." Holden & Daly, Connecticut Evidence § 67d, p. 217; see Steiber v. Bridgeport, 145 Conn. 363, 366, 143 A.2d 434 (1958). We cannot hold, in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneo......