Steigler v. Anderson, No. 173.

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)
• Writing for the Court: LAYTON
• Citation: 360 F. Supp. 1286
• Parties: Herbert F. STEIGLER, Petitioner, v. Raymond W. ANDERSON, Warden, Delaware Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. 173.
• Decision Date: 06 June 1973

360 F. Supp. 1286

Herbert F. STEIGLER, Petitioner,
v.
Raymond W. ANDERSON, Warden, Delaware Correctional Institution, Respondent.

No. 173.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

June 6, 1973.

360 F. Supp. 1287

William E. Taylor, Jr., Wilmington, Del., for petitioner.

Richard R. Wier, Jr., Delaware State Prosecutor, Wilmington, Del., for respondent.

OPINION

LAYTON, District Judge.

Petition for Habeas Corpus. Denied.

During the early morning hours of October 19, 1968, the home of the petitioner in Deerhurst, New Castle County, Delaware, caught fire, firemen were summoned by petitioner's wife and the blaze not extinguished before three members of the family, petitioner's daughter, his mother-in-law and father-in-law had burned to death. During the fire, containers filled with gasoline, rugs saturated with gasoline, burnt matches and the like were found in the house. Since the fire was clearly set by an arsonist, the police were called in and the investigation lasted for some days thereafter resulting in interrogations of petitioner by Sergeant Bramble of the State Police on three occasions without his being given Miranda warnings.

Eventually, petitioner was indicted and convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of Delaware on three counts of murder in the first degree and one count of assault with intent to commit murder. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, Steigler v. State, 277 A.2d 662 (Del.Supreme Ct. 1971). On the same day as its landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the United States Supreme Court in a brief order granted certiorari, vacated the sentence of death imposed

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on the murder convictions and remanded the case. 408 U.S. 933, 939, 92 S.Ct. 2872, 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972). This petition for a writ of habeas corpus followed

Three grounds are specified:¹ one, that certain statements taken by the police of this petitioner were improperly admitted into evidence in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights because no Miranda warnings were given; the second, because certain physical evidence (the containers filled with gasoline, etc.) found in the home at the time of the fire were improperly admitted into evidence in further violation of petitioner's constitutional rights because no search warrant had issued; and the third, that petitioner's conviction was based, at least in part, upon perjured police testimony.

My examination of the record indicates that the findings of the Delaware Supreme Court related at pages 663-666 of 277 A.2d, insofar as they pertain to the points here raised, are fully sustained by the evidence.

FAILURE TO GIVE MIRANDA WARNINGS

The first statement was made by petitioner to Sergeant Bramble of the Delaware State Police at the home of petitioner's neighbors where they had taken refuge at 6:30 A.M., on the same morning as the fire. Apparently, Bramble and the petitioner alone were present. There was obviously no coercion for not only did the petitioner talk freely² but, within minutes after this interview with Bramble, he voluntarily repeated to a newspaper reporter the essence of what he had just told Bramble. During this interview, petitioner was neither under arrest, in custody, in any way deprived of his freedom nor was the investigation in any way "focused" on him because, other than the strong suspicion the fire was arson, police had no substantial evidence that petitioner was or might have been the perpetrator.

The second statement taken by Bramble was the next day, October 20, when Bramble asked petitioner by telephone if he and members of his family would come over to the police station and have their fingerprints taken. This was because, as Bramble stated to petitioner, if the containers of gasoline found in petitioner's house had actually come from petitioner's home, then the fingerprints of the family, or some of them, would undoubtedly appear on the containers. All members of the family drove to the police station for the fingerprinting and, thereafter, Bramble again interviewed petitioner. He showed the various containers to petitioner and as to some, petitioner thought they had been in the home prior to the fire and, as to others, was uncertain. Bramble also asked petitioner if he knew of any persons he suspected might have been the perpetrator of this crime and petitioner furnished Bramble with two names. By arrangement, the petitioner and his family then drove home followed by Bramble and another officer. They all descended to the cellar where both petitioner and his wife, under circumstances demonstrating not only voluntariness but a willingness to assist actively in the investigation, answered questions and pointed out shelves in the cellar where some of the containers had

360 F. Supp. 1289

been resting. Again, while during the first part of the interrogation petitioner was alone with Bramble in the police station (his wife and children were also obviously somewhere nearby in the police station), there was no arrest or taking of petitioner into custody or any of the circumstances laid down in Miranda v. Arizona

In the third interview, October 23, Bramble asked petitioner if he would again come over to the police station at Troop 1 for a further interrogation. At this time, petitioner again voluntarily drove to the police station and was questioned by Bramble alone. First, he was asked more about one of the suspects whom he had named on the 20th as a possible perpetrator of the crime; then about windows being open and a cellar door unlocked. Again, he repeated his actions the morning of the fire and gave information as to policies of insurance held by him and his family, his in-laws and the possible net worth of his in-laws, as well as the fact that the night of October 19th was to be the last night of his in-laws' visit. As of the opening of this interrogation, this petitioner was in no sense in custody, deprived of his freedom and, because of the meager facts then in the hands of the police, it could not be argued with any persuasiveness that the investigation had focused on him. Moreover, as in the two preceding interrogations, he was permitted to return home without any restraint on his movements.

On the next day, October 24, Bramble talked briefly with petitioner about a list of additional suspects which Bramble had asked him to prepare on the 23rd. Sometime around noon, Bramble dropped by petitioner's office to pick up this list but petitioner stated he had not finished it. At about 5:00 P.M., petitioner personally delivered the list to Bramble who looked it over and observed that one person named in it was dead. Petitioner then remembered one additional name which he furnished Bramble. I do not regard any conversations between Bramble and petitioner on October 24th even as interrogations, let alone requiring Miranda warnings.

It was not until 5 or 6 days later, on October 29, after all the subjects named by petitioner had been interviewed, the materials returned from Washington together with the reports of the F.B.I. concerning its examination of the physical evidence (jars, containers, pieces of rug, matches) and a number of other persons had been interviewed that the police actually charged petitioner. For instance, even subsequent to the third interrogation, the police were in the process of questioning some 80 gasoline station operators to ascertain whether suspicious persons had bought gasoline in containers the night prior to the fire. Also, the information that an unidentified person, probably a boy, had been seen carrying a gasoline can through the neighborhood the evening before the fire had to be investigated and evaluated.

The actual facts of this case differ substantially from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)³ and its three companion cases, Vignera v. New York (see Miranda at 493-494, 86 S.Ct. 1602); Westover v. United States (see Miranda at 494-497, 86 S.Ct. 1602) and California v. Stewart (see Miranda at 497, 86 S.Ct. 1602 et seq.). The facts also differ widely from Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1968). In Miranda, Vignera, Westover and Stewart, the interrogations were

360 F. Supp. 1290

clearly "in custody", led to eventual confessions and, even prior to the interrogations, there was direct evidence pointing to petitioner's guilt. In Orozco, the defendant was questioned in his bedroom at 4:00 A.M. by four policemen under circumstances demonstrating a clear deprivation of freedom and with prior direct evidence linking him to the crime

In the present case, there was no direct evidence pointing to petitioner prior to the interviews. Indeed, the only evidence ever obtained was circumstantial and it was not until all other alternatives were unsuccessfully explored that petitioner was finally charged. This did not occur until six days after the last interrogation. Moreover, throughout the whole investigative process, petitioner was apparently cooperating with the police. There was not the slightest suggestion of "in custody" atmosphere surrounding the giving of the first statement. While the second statement in part was at a police station, petitioner drove there voluntarily with his whole family, and the second part of the interview was in his own cellar in the presence of his wife, where both were actively assisting the police. As far as the record shows, when the police left the petitioner's home after examining the cellar, the petitioner was left free insofar as his future movements were concerned.

It may be argued that the third interview most nearly approaches a Miranda situation. It was at a police station where petitioner was alone with the police officer in charge of the investigation. But again, petitioner drove to the station voluntarily and was free to leave afterwards.

Even at the time of this third interrogation, however, it could...