Steigler v. Superior Court In and For New Castle County
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Writing for the Court | HERRMANN |
| Citation | 252 A.2d 300 |
| Parties | Herbert F. STEIGLER, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Delaware, IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY, andthe Honorable Andrew D. Christie, an Associate Judge of said Court, Respondents. |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1969 |
Page 300
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Delaware, IN AND FOR NEW
CASTLE COUNTY, andthe Honorable Andrew D.
Christie, an Associate Judge of said
Court, Respondents.
Page 302
Upon petition for writ of prohibition and motion to dismiss the petition. Motion denied; petition denied.
William E. Taylor, Jr., Wilmington, for petitioner.
Jerome O. Herlihy, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for respondents.
WOLCOTT, C.J.; CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
HERRMANN, Justice:
The petitioner, Herbert F. Steigler, was indicted for three murders in the first degree. His petition to be released on bail was denied by the Superior Court after a hearing held pursuant to the instructions of this Court. See In re Steigler, Del., 250 A.2d 379 (1969).
Two petitions to this Court ensued: Steigler first filed a motion for an order of this Court admitting him to bail or, alternatively, to reverse the order of the Superior Court refusing to admit him to bail. This Court denied that motion for the reasons herein reported. Thereupon, Steigler brought on a petition for a writ of prohibition. In support of that petition, Steigler contended (1) that the denial of bail violates his basic constitutional rights; and (2) that the indictment and warrant of arrest issued thereunder are fatally defective. Therefore, the petitioner urged, a writ of prohibition should issue to prohibit the Superior Court from attempting to exercise jurisdiction over him by trying him for the offenses alleged in the indictment; or, alternatively, to vacate the order of the Superior Court denying bail and to remand with instructions to admit the petitioner to bail on his own recognizance. The State moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that there is no jurisdictional basis for the writ.
Because of the nature of the application, we entered an order prior to written opinion, upon briefs and arguments and review of the record, denying both the motion to dismiss and the petition for prohibition. The reasons for that order are also reported herein.
I.
First, the application that this Court admit the defendant to bail:
Except for inherent powers, this Court has only such powers as are granted to it by statute or the Constitution, expressly or by necessary implication. There is no statutory or constitutional authority vested in this Court to grant bail prior to conviction. Generally, the courts of original criminal jurisdiction are given such bail powers (11 Del.C.Ch. 21; 10 Del.C.Ch. 33; 10 Del.C. §§ 1323, 1523, 1724) except that by recent enactment (11 Del.C. § 2103(b)) the Superior Court alone is authorized to admit to bail where a capital offense is charged.
By virtue of 11 Del.C. § 4502, this Court may grant bail after conviction and pending an appeal. 1 But we find no authority for the grant of bail prior to conviction. Accordingly, we denied the defendant's application for bail.
II.
As to the defendant's motion that we reverse the order of the Superior Court refusing to admit the defendant to bail:
Clearly, the motion amounts to an appeal from an interlocutory order in a criminal cause. Under Art. 4 Del.Const.
Page 303
§ 11(1)(b), Del.C.Ann., this Court lacks jurisdiction to receive such an appeal. Hodsdon v. Superior Court etc., Del., 239 A.2d 222 (1968); Norman v. State, 4 Storey 395, 177 A.2d 347 (1962). Accordingly, we denied the application to reverse the order below denying bail.III.
Turning now to the State's motion to dismiss the petition for writ of prohibition:
As the first ground for the petition, the defendant contended that the indictment and the warrant of arrest issued thereunder are fatally defective. If this were so, the Superior Court would lack jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of the defendant; and the writ of prohibition would lie to bar the Superior Court from proceeding with the trial. Bennethum v. Superior Court etc., 2 Storey 92, 153 A.2d 200 (1959); Raduszewski v. Superior Court etc., Del., 232 A.2d 95 (1967). Thus, this facet of the defendant's petition was proper.
The second ground of the petition was more questionable: The defendant contended that the Superior Court lost jurisdiction to enter the order denying bail because, in the process, the defendant's basic constitutional rights were violated.
The appellant thus invoked a comparatively lesser-known element of jurisdiction. In addition to the well-known elements of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person, jurisdiction of the court to enter a particular order or judgment is deemed equally essential to its validity. And an order may be void for want of jurisdiction by reason of extreme irregularities in the proceedings, other than lack of jurisdiction over the offense and the person, as where fundamental constitutional rights have been violated during the course of the proceedings leading to the order. See 39 Am.Jur. (2d) 'Habeas Corpus' §§ 29, 30. This element of jurisdiction is demonstrated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). There, the United States Supreme Court stated that compliance with a constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a court's authority to deprive a defendant of life or liberty; that a court's jurisdiction, though existent at the beginning of a proceeding, may be 'lost' in the course of the proceedings by deprivation of constitutional rights and, thereafter, the court 'no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.' See also United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969).
Accordingly, we concluded that a writ of prohibition may lie where the lower court has lost jurisdiction to enter the order in question, by reason of violation of a defendant's fundamental constitutional rights, provided that there is no other adequate legal remedy. Compare Matushefske v. Herlihy, Del., 214 A.2d 883, 886 (1965).
In the instant case, as indicated above, we have held that there is no right of appeal to this...
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Hunter v. State, 3557
...(juvenile defendant in custody, either for murder charge or, alternatively, for running away from home); Steigler v. Superior Court, 252 A.2d 300, 305 (Del.), Cert. denied sub nom., Steigler v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 2012, 23 L.Ed.2d 457 and Steigler v. Superior Court, 396 U.S. 88......
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Sanville v. State, 4559
...A.2d 588 (1974); State v. Lief, 4 Conn. Cir. 440, 234 A.2d 124 (1967); Steigler v. Superior Court, in and for New Castle Co., Del.Supr., 252 A.2d 300 (1969), cert. den. 395 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 2012, 23 L.Ed.2d 457 (1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 880, 90 S.Ct. 160, 24 L.Ed.2d 139 (1969); Montgome......
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State v. Cooley
...be clearly indicated by statute or constitutional amendment, which is not the case here. See Steigler v. Superior Court, Del. Supr., 252 A.2d 300 (1969). Cooley's cross-appeal must therefore be * * * APPEAL AFFIRMED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED. --------------- 1 10 Del.C. § 9902(a) gives the St......
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Family Court v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations
...been held that, where no right of an appeal exists, prohibition will lie to bar the lower court. Steigler v. Superior Court, Del.Supr., 252 A.2d 300, 303 (1969); Knight v. Haley, Supra, 6 W.W.Harr. at 377--378, 176 A. at It therefore appears to this Court that petitioner has a right to a wr......
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Hunter v. State, 3557
...(juvenile defendant in custody, either for murder charge or, alternatively, for running away from home); Steigler v. Superior Court, 252 A.2d 300, 305 (Del.), Cert. denied sub nom., Steigler v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 2012, 23 L.Ed.2d 457 and Steigler v. Superior Court, 396 U.S. 88......
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Sanville v. State, 4559
...A.2d 588 (1974); State v. Lief, 4 Conn. Cir. 440, 234 A.2d 124 (1967); Steigler v. Superior Court, in and for New Castle Co., Del.Supr., 252 A.2d 300 (1969), cert. den. 395 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 2012, 23 L.Ed.2d 457 (1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 880, 90 S.Ct. 160, 24 L.Ed.2d 139 (1969); Montgome......
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State v. Cooley
...be clearly indicated by statute or constitutional amendment, which is not the case here. See Steigler v. Superior Court, Del. Supr., 252 A.2d 300 (1969). Cooley's cross-appeal must therefore be * * * APPEAL AFFIRMED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED. --------------- 1 10 Del.C. § 9902(a) gives the St......
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Family Court v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations
...been held that, where no right of an appeal exists, prohibition will lie to bar the lower court. Steigler v. Superior Court, Del.Supr., 252 A.2d 300, 303 (1969); Knight v. Haley, Supra, 6 W.W.Harr. at 377--378, 176 A. at It therefore appears to this Court that petitioner has a right to a wr......