Steilberg v. Lackner

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: KANE; TAYLOR, P.J., and ROUSE
• Citation: 69 Cal.App.3d 780,138 Cal.Rptr. 378
• Decision Date: 17 May 1977
• Parties: Elizabeth STEILBERG, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerome A. LACKNER, etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 38890.

Page 378

138 Cal.Rptr. 378 69 Cal.App.3d 780 Elizabeth STEILBERG, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Jerome A. LACKNER, etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 38890. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California. May 17, 1977.
As Modified May 31, 1977.

[69 Cal.App.3d 783]

Page 380

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., John J. Klee, Jr., John Fourt, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Robert A. Goldstein, Thomas Schneider, Oakland, for plaintiff and respondent.

KANE, Associate Justice.

THE ISSUE

In this appeal we are called upon to interpret the meaning of, and the interrelationship between, sections 11152 and 11153.7 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ¹ The precise issue is whether an applicant who owns and uses a multiple dwelling as her home, a part of which she rents, is entitled to Medi-Cal benefits regardless of the value of the property (§ 11152) or whether in determining eligibility for such benefits the $5,000 assessed value limitation contained in section 11153.7 applies.

69 Cal.App.3d 784

FACTS

In June 1974, respondent Elizabeth Steilberg, born in 1896, applied for Medi-Cal ² benefits as a 'Medically indigent person' (§ 14051). ³ At the time of the filing of the application, respondent and her husband lived in their own home, which they had occupied for 52 years. The real property in

Page 381

dispute is a single parcel located on a steep lot in Berkeley, and consists of three buildings: two cottages and the main dwelling. The evidence is uncontradicted that while respondent and her husband lived in one unit in the main building, the two small cottages, two bedrooms, and the attic of the main dwelling which had been converted into an apartment, were rented. It is likwise uncontroverted that the Planning Department of the City of Berkeley found the real property in question to be an 'indivisible parcel'; and that the lot and improvements had an assessed value of $14,950 (market value $59,800). PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE

In July 1974, County of Alameda denied respondent's claim on the ground that the rental units exceeded the assessed valuation of $5,000. Respondent appealed the decision and requested a fair hearing in the matter. The referee ruled in respondent's favor by finding that the property owned by respondent was indivisible and that all of the rental units should be deemed a 'home' within the meaning of section 11152, and thus must be disregarded for the purpose of determining respondent's eligibility for Medi-Cal benefits. In January 1975, the Director of the California Department of Health (hereafter 'appellant' or 'Director') issued an alternate decision which, contrary to the order of the referee, found that the two cottages and the rented space constituted property other than a home, and as a result respondent fell within the restrictive provisions of section 11153.7. From the order denying her claim, respondent sought judicial review by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. On November 4, 1975, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate reversing the Director's decision on the ground that Medi-Cal benefits cannot be denied on the basis of respondent's interest in property constituting her home.

69 Cal.App.3d 785

DISCUSSION

Before we proceed to resolve the principal issue of the case, we set out the basic rules relating to interpretation of statutes.

Paramount among these rules are the following: In construing a statute, the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law (Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 732, 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672). In determining the legislative intent, the court turns first to the words used in the statute (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1). The words, however, must be read in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute (Johnstone v. Richardson (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 41, 46, 229 P.2d 9), and the statutory language applied must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the objective and policy of the law (City of L.A. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 253, 256, 330 P.2d 888). Statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be construed together and harmonized if possible (Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 687, 91 Cal.Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17; County of Placer v. Aetna Cas., etc., Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 188--189, 323 P.2d 753). Finally, in ascertaining legislative intent, the courts should consider not only the words used, but should also take into account other matters, such as the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times, legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction (Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. 110; Estate of Jacobs (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 152, 155, 142 P.2d 454).

When viewed and analyzed in the light of the foregoing principles, the statutory provisions regulating the property qualifications of public assistance applicants and recipients (§§ 11150--11158), of which the code sections at issue are but a part, evince the all-pervasive legislative intent that persons who otherwise would be eligible for public assistance may not be deprived of such benefits solely for the reason that they own real or personal property and that such persons may retain their property

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under the circumstances and to the extent allowed by the [69 Cal.App.3d 786] statute (§ 11150). ⁴ However, in regulating the property exemption of otherwise eligible public assistance applicants and recipients, the statute...