Steilberg v. Lackner

Decision Date17 May 1977
Citation69 Cal.App.3d 780,138 Cal.Rptr. 378
PartiesElizabeth STEILBERG, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerome A. LACKNER, etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 38890.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., John J. Klee, Jr., John Fourt, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant

Robert A. Goldstein, Thomas Schneider, Oakland, for plaintiff and respondent.

KANE, Associate Justice.

THE ISSUE

In this appeal we are called upon to interpret the meaning of, and the interrelationship between, sections 11152 and 11153.7 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 1 The precise issue is whether an applicant who owns and uses a multiple dwelling as her home, a part of which she rents, is entitled to Medi-Cal benefits regardless of the value of the property (§ 11152) or whether in determining eligibility for such benefits the $5,000 assessed value limitation contained in section 11153.7 applies.

FACTS

In June 1974, respondent Elizabeth Steilberg, born in 1896, applied for Medi-Cal 2 benefits as a 'Medically indigent person' (§ 14051). 3 At the time of the filing of the application, respondent and her husband lived in their own home, which they had occupied for 52 years. The real property in

dispute is a single parcel located on a steep lot in Berkeley, and consists of three buildings: two cottages and the main dwelling. The evidence is uncontradicted that while respondent and her husband lived in one unit in the main building, the two small cottages, two bedrooms, and the attic of the main dwelling which had been converted into an apartment, were rented. It is likwise uncontroverted that the Planning Department of the City of Berkeley found the real property in question to be an 'indivisible parcel'; and that the lot and improvements had an assessed value of $14,950 (market value $59,800).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE

In July 1974, County of Alameda denied respondent's claim on the ground that the rental units exceeded the assessed valuation of $5,000. Respondent appealed the decision and requested a fair hearing in the matter. The referee ruled in respondent's favor by finding that the property owned by respondent was indivisible and that all of the rental units should be deemed a 'home' within the meaning of section 11152, and thus must be disregarded for the purpose of determining respondent's eligibility for Medi-Cal benefits. In January 1975, the Director of the California Department of Health (hereafter 'appellant' or 'Director') issued an alternate decision which, contrary to the order of the referee, found that the two cottages and the rented space constituted property other than a home, and as a result respondent fell within the restrictive provisions of section 11153.7. From the order denying her claim, respondent sought judicial review by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. On November 4, 1975, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate reversing the Director's decision on the ground that Medi-Cal benefits cannot be denied on the basis of respondent's interest in property constituting her home.

DISCUSSION

Before we proceed to resolve the principal issue of the case, we set out the basic rules relating to interpretation of statutes.

Paramount among these rules are the following: In construing a statute, the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law (Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 732, 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672). In determining the legislative intent, the court turns first to the words used in the statute (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1). The words, however, must be read in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute (Johnstone v. Richardson (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 41, 46, 229 P.2d 9), and the statutory language applied must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the objective and policy of the law (City of L.A. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 253, 256, 330 P.2d 888). Statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be construed together and harmonized if possible (Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 687, 91 Cal.Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17; County of Placer v. Aetna Cas., etc., Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 188--189, 323 P.2d 753). Finally, in ascertaining legislative intent, the courts should consider not only the words used, but should also take into account other matters, such as the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times, legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction (Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. 110; Estate of Jacobs (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 152, 155, 142 P.2d 454).

When viewed and analyzed in the light of the foregoing principles, the statutory provisions regulating the property qualifications of public assistance applicants and recipients (§§ 11150--11158), of which the code sections at issue are but a part, evince the all-pervasive legislative intent that persons who otherwise would be eligible for public assistance may not be deprived of such benefits solely for the reason that they own real or personal property and that such persons may retain their property under the circumstances and to the extent allowed by the statute (§ 11150). 4 However, in regulating the property exemption of otherwise eligible public assistance applicants and recipients, the statute draws a definite distinction between property which serves as a Home for the applicant or recipient and one which is owned and utilized for the Sole purpose of generating income.

Motivated by the obvious purpose that aged and disabled persons may not be deprived of their home in which they have been living, section 11152 provides that 'An applicant or recipient May retain personal or real Property owned by him, or in combination with any other person, Without reference to its value, if it serves to provide the applicant or recipient With a home.' (Emphasis added.) Far from being unmindful of the type of situation here presented (i.e., when the home is a multiple dwelling, a part of which is utilized for rent), the statute further indicates that 'The basic home may be a multiple-dwelling unit if the units not occupied by the applicant or recipient are producing income for the support of the applicant or recipient consistent with their rental value.' (§ 11152; emphasis added.) The meaning and import of section 11152 is thus clear and unmistakable: one, it applies to property used for a home; Two, the exemption with regard to the property serving as a home is not limited or curtailed by the value of the property; Three, in case the home property consists of a multiple dwelling, the exemption obtains only if the units not occupied by the owner are utilized and produce a fair income consistent with their rental value.

By contrast, section 11153.7 addresses itself to a different kind of property, i.e., Property owned and used for the purpose of producing income. Since the primary concern of the exemption statute (§ 11152) is to preserve the ownership of the home for those aged and disabled persons who are in need and, but for the exemption, would be forced to sell their home to pay medical and hospital expenses, the statute grants a different degree of protection with regard to the home as opposed to other property. While the property used for a home enjoys a full-fledged exemption without regard to its value, and this exemption obtains even if part of the multiple unit home is rented (§ 11152), property utilized solely for income producing purposes has only a qualified exemption, i.e., only to the extent of $5,000 assessed value or $20,000 market value (§ 11153.7). 5

Our conclusion that sections 11152 and 11153.7 are mutually exclusive finds support not only in the language of the cited sections, but also in other statutory provisions pertaining to the same subject matter and the general rules of statutory interpretation. Thus, defining the purposes for which the poperty of a public assistance applicant or recipient may be held, section 11151 provides, in part, that 'An applicant or recipient shall be ineligible to receive public assistance unless the property he owns is Held for the follosing purposes: ( ) 1. The property is used to provide the applicant or recipient with a home and conforms to the provisions of Section 11152 of this code. ( ) 2. The property is producing income for the support of the applicant or recipient And conforms to the provisions of Section 11153.7 of this code.' (Emphasis added.)

Section 11153.7 as amended in 1976 serves as a further indication that the exemption provided by this section was intended to be an Addition to the property exemptions permitted by the other provisions of the statute. As amended in 1976, section 11153.7 reads, in part, that '(a) In addition to real property permitted by other provisions of this part, real property owned by the applicant or recipient, or in combination with his spouse, may be retained in an amount not to exceed a market value, less the amount of any encumbrance of record, of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), provided it is being adequately utilized or is producing income reasonably consistent with its value which is used for the support of the applicant or recipient.' (Emphasis added.) It is, of course, axiomatic that in interpreting statutes we may properly consider a subsequent expression of legislative intent regarding the construction of a prior statute or statutory language (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 590, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371; California Emp., etc., Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 213--214, 187 P.2d 702).

Finally, we attach...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 24 d1 Fevereiro d1 1986
    ...... (Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 272, 158 Cal.Rptr. 683; Steilberg v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.) .         [177 Cal.App.3d 901] The language of section 7.501, 4 we observe, ......
  • Galster v. Woods
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 24 d2 Setembro d2 1985
    ...... (Steilberg" v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 788, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.) 11 Respondents' practice simply ignores hardship. . 173 Cal.App.3d 545 . III .  \xC2"......
  • Robertson v. Wentz
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 16 d2 Dezembro d2 1986
    ...... (Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 272, 158 Cal.Rptr. 683; Steilberg v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.) The provision must be given "a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance ......
  • Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., DYNA-ME
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 2 d1 Novembro d1 1987
    ...... (California Mfrs. Assn., supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836; see also Steilberg v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.) A statute should be construed whenever possible so as to preserve its ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT