Steimel v. Board of Election Sup'rs of Prince George's County

• Citation: 357 A.2d 386,278 Md. 1
• Decision Date: 24 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 121,121
• Parties: Raymond J. STEIMEL et al. v. BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY et al.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Page 1

278 Md. 1

357 A.2d 386

Raymond J. STEIMEL et al. v. BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY et al.

No. 121.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 24, 1976.

James F. Vance, Camp Springs, for appellants.

Franklin Goldstein, Baltimore (Joseph S. Kaufman, Melnicove, Greenberg, Kaufman & Weiner, P.A., Baltimore, on the brief for Dart Drug Corp., Drug Fair, Inc., Frank's Hardware, Inc., Giant Food, Inc., The Hecht Company, Hechinger Company & Peoples Drug Stores, Inc.; William V. Meyers and Meyers & Billingsley, P.A., Riverdale, on the brief for Board of Election Supervisors of Prince George's County, for appellees.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES and LEVINE, JJ.

LEVINE, Judge.

In this appeal, we decide the validity of a law enacted by the General Assembly which is applicable solely to one charter county and which provides that the law be submitted to a referendum of the voters of that county. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Judge Robert B. Mathias) held that it was valid, and because of the manifest importance of the questions presented, we granted certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the Court of Special Appeals. Since we are in agreement with the circuit court, we shall affirm.

The enactment in question is Chapter 861, Laws of Maryland, 1975, which, subject to a referendum of county voters at the next general election, would have the effect of repealing Sunday closing restrictions applicable to retail and wholesale establishments in Prince George's County. ¹ Chapter 861 achieves this result by repealing those provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 534H, applicable solely to Prince George's County, which contain the restrictions. Prior to the enactment of § 534H by Chapter 421 of the Laws of 1968, Sunday sales in Prince George's County had been governed by the more restrictive provisions of § 521 of Art. 27, a public general law which, at one time, applied throughout the state. ² Although Prince George's County was not a charter county when Chapter 421 was enacted in 1968, it has enjoyed that status continuously since 1970. ³

Following passage of Chapter 861, appellants filed a bill of complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The thrust of their argument in the circuit court, as in this Court, was that the regulation of Sunday closings is within the powers delegated to charter counties by reason of Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 25A, commonly referred to as the 'Express Powers Act,' § 5(S), which authorizes county councils in charter counties to enact such ordinances 'as may be deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the county.' Therefore, they argued, the act violated the home rule provisions of the State Constitution, specifically Art. XI-A, § 4, which prohibits the General Assembly from enacting a local law for the City of Baltimore or any charter county 'on any subject covered by the express powers granted' to such geographical subdivisions.

At the conclusion of the circuit court hearing, Judge Mathias rendered an oral opinion detailing the reasons for his decision, as embodied in the comprehensive decree from which this appeal is taken. He ruled, for two reasons, that Chapter 861, though a public local law, violated neither the home rule provisions of the State Constitution nor the Express Powers Act. First, Sunday closing regulation was found not to be within any of the express powers conferred upon charter counties, and secondly, it was concluded that the General Assembly has fully occupied and preempted the field of Sunday closing regulation. Therefore, Chapter 861, though in the nature of a public local law, was a valid exercise of the legislative power by the General Assembly despite the prohibition contained in Art. XI-A, § 4 and the Express Powers Act. And since Chapter 861 was found to be a local law, it could be properly submitted to a local referendum.

In this Court, appellants make the same arguments which they advanced below: That Chapter 861 is a local law violating the home rule provisions of the Constitution and the Express Powers Act, and alternatively, that if deemed to be a public general law, the act is nevertheless invalid since such a law cannot be conditioned upon a referendum, either throughout the entire state or in a single political subdivision.

(1)

Whether Chapter 861 is a public general law or a public local law, therefore, emerges as a pivotal issue in this case, since our resolution of that question determines not only the validity of the referendum provision, but also the applicability of Art. XI-A, § 4, of the Constitution. It is beyond question that a public general law cannot be made subject to a referendum, either on a statewide level Brawner v. Supervisors, 141 Md. 586, 595, 119 A. 250 (1922), or in one county or the City of Baltimore, Levering v. Supervisors of Elections, 137 Md. 281, 289, 112 A. 301 (1920). It is equally well settled, however, that a public local law may be conditioned upon a referendum of voters in the area or political subdivision affected by the legislation. Steuart Petroleum Co. v. Board, 276 Md. 435, 446, 347 A.2d 854 (1975); Ness v. Baltimore, 162 Md. 529, 537, 160 A. 8 (1932); Bradshaw v. Lankford, 73 Md. 428, 430-31, 21 A. 66 (1891).

Our inquiry, then, focuses initially on the question whether, as found by the circuit court, Chapter 861 is a public local law. In Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 435, 240 A.2d 272 (1968), where we held that an act of the General Assembly which by amendment to public general law established a people's court system for Cecil County was a public local law, the test applied was whether the law, in subject matter and substance, was confined in its operation to prescribed territorial limits and was equally applicable to all persons within such limits. We thus distinguished the enactment there from public general law, 'which deals with the general public welfare, a subject which is of significant interest not just to any one county, but rather to more than one geographical subdivision, or even to the entire state.' Id.

Judged by this test, Chapter 861 is manifestly a public local law. As the title states, it is 'AN ACT concerning Prince George's County' and is 'For the purpose of permitting all businesses in Prince George's County to be open on Sunday . . ..' The text of the act is punctuated with references to Prince George's County. Clearly, then, Chapter 861, in subject matter and substance, is confined in its operation to prescribed territorial limits and is equally applicable to all persons within Prince George's County. Furthermore, the subject matter of Chapter 861 is of no significant interest beyond the boundaries of Prince George's County. In this regard, the case here is distinguishable from a group of earlier cases decided by this Court dealing with statutes which, though local in form, were held to be public general laws because they affected the interests of the entire state. See, e.g., Norris v. Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 681-82, 192 A. 531 (1937); Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 260-61, 183 A. 534 (1936); Gaither v. Jackson, 147 Md. 655, 128 A. 769 (1925); Bradshaw v. Lankford, supra, 73 Md. at 431-32, 21 A. 66.

Nor does the fact that Sunday closings formerly were governed exclusively in this state by public general law-a circumstance which prevails today in several counties-constitute Chapter 861 a public general law. As we have previously indicated, a statute taking the form of an amendment to public general law does not itself thereby become so constituted if its subject matter is exclusively local. Cole v. Secretary of State, supra, 249 Md. at 433, 240 A.2d 272; State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 425, 137 A. 39 (1927).

We hold, therefore, that Chapter 861 is a public local law and, consequently, is not invalidated by reason of the provision for a referendum of the voters of Prince George's County.

(2)

We turn, then, to the more vexing question whether Chapter 861 violates the constitutional prohibition against enactment of a public local law by the General Assembly 'on any subject covered by the express powers granted' to a charter county or the City of Baltimore. ⁴ From the outset, we remain mindful of the purposes underlying Art. XI-A, the 'Home Rule Amendment,' succinctly stated for the Court by Judge W. Mitchell Digges in State v. Stewart, supra, 152 Md. at 422, 137 A. at 41:

'. . . (T)hat a larger measure of home rule be secured to the people of the respective political subdivisions of the state in matters of purely local concern, in order that there should be the fullest measure of local self-government, and that these local questions should thus be withdrawn from consideration by the General Assembly, leaving that body more time to consider and pass upon general legislation, and to prevent the passage of such legislation from being influenced by what is popularly known as 'log-rolling'; that is, by influencing the attitude and vote of members of the General Assembly upon proposed general laws by threatening the defeat or promising the support of local legislation in which a particular member might be peculiarly interested. . . .'

Accord, Scull v. Montgomery Citizens, 249 Md. 271, 274, 239 A.2d 92 (1968).

In 1918, pursuant to § 2 of Art. XI-A, the General Assembly enacted Art. 25A, the Express Powers Act. In addition to enumerating in § 5 the powers expressly granted to charter counties, none of which mentions the regulation of Sunday closings, subsection (S) of § 5 provides in pertinent part:

'The foregoing or other enumeration of powers in this article shall not be held to limit the power of the county council, in addition thereto, to pass all ordinances, resolutions or bylaws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this article or the laws of the State, as may be proper in executing and enforcing any of the...