Stein v. Cnty. of Nassau, 17-CV-6055(SJF)(ARL)
| Citation | 417 F.Supp.3d 191 |
| Decision Date | 30 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | 17-CV-6055(SJF)(ARL) |
| Parties | Richard M. STEIN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, Defendant |
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York) |
Timothy F. Schweitzer, Hofmann & Schweitzer, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Pablo A. Fernandez, James R. Scott, Liora M. Ben-Sorek, County Attorney's Office, Mineola, NY, for Defendant.
I. Introduction
On October 17, 2017, plaintiff Richard M. Stein ("plaintiff" or "Stein") commenced this action against defendant County of Nassau ("defendant" or "the County"), pursuant to, inter alia , the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ; general maritime law; and N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 205-e, seeking to recover for personal injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the unseaworthiness of defendant's vessel and/or defendant's negligence. Pending before the Court is plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ; and defendant's application to dismiss plaintiff's claim pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 205-e.1 For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is denied and defendant's application is granted.
II. Background
On October 15, 2016, i.e. , the date of the accident, plaintiff was employed by the County as a member of the Nassau County Police Department ("NCPD"). (Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) ["Plf. 56.1"], ¶ 1; Defendant's Counterstatement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(b) ["Def. 56.1"], ¶ 1). Plaintiff's command was the Marine Bureau. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 1; see Plf. 56.1, ¶ 1).
On the date of the accident, plaintiff was assigned to a tour from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. at the Marine Bureau Base at Bay Park, located at the foot of First Avenue, in East Rockaway, New York, (Plf. 56.1, ¶¶ 2, 7; Def. 56.1, ¶¶ 2, 7), to work as a crew member on Vessel Marine 21, one of the NCPD's two (2) SAFE Boats, which was located at its berth in the boat basin at the NCPD Marine Bureau's Base at Bay Park. (Plf. 56.1, ¶¶ 3, 7; Def. 56.1, ¶¶ 3, 7). The County was the owner of the SAFE Boat to which plaintiff was assigned on that date, i.e. , Vessel Marine 21. (Plf. 56.1, ¶ 4; Def. 56.1, ¶ 4).
One of the means of access to the floating dock used by members of the NCPD's Marine Bureau to get to the vessels berthed at the Marine Bureau base was a wooden ladder affixed to a bulkhead. (Plf. 56.1, ¶ 6; Def. 56.1, ¶ 6). There is also a ramp or gangway on the east side of the dock which may be used by the Marine Bureau members to access the vessels. (Certification of Timothy F. Schweitzer, Esq. ["Schweitzer Cert."], Ex. 5 at p. 10).
On the date of the accident, at approximately 1:45 p.m., plaintiff was descending the wooden ladder to access the floating dock to get to the vessel to which he was assigned, when a rung near the bottom of the ladder broke, causing him to fall into the water between the dock and the bulkhead, striking the dock as he fell. (Schweitzer Cert., Ex. 1, ¶ 7; Ex. 5 at pp. 7-8; and Ex. 9). A "Supervisor's Report of Member's Action" (the "Supervisor's Report") indicates, inter alia , that plaintiff was acting within the scope of his official duties at the time of the accident; that he did not violate the Department Rules; and that he did not need to be trained or retrained. (Id . , Ex. 10). In addition, remarks by the commanding officer indicate, inter alia , "Environmental factor (ladder) was confirmed; remedial actions have been taken to prevent recurrence." (Id. )
On October 17, 2017, plaintiff commenced this action against the County, pursuant to, inter alia , the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ; general maritime law; and N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 205-e, seeking to recover for personal injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of defendant's negligence and the unseaworthiness of defendant's vessel. Issue was joined by the service of an answer on behalf of defendants on November 10, 2017.
Following the close of discovery, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its opposition to plaintiff's motion, defendant requests that plaintiff's state law claim under N.Y. Gen. Mun Law § 205-e be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Discussion
"Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " ING Bank N.V. v. M/V TEMARA, IMO No. 9333929 , 892 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ); accord Jaffer v. Hirji , 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must first "determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, raising an issue for trial." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp. , 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Ricci v. DeStefano , 557 U.S. 557, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L. Ed. 2d 490 (2009) ("On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts." (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]’ " Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc. , 805 F.3d 18, 25 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505 ).
In reviewing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial, the court must "construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay , 868 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2017) (quotations, alterations and citation omitted), and "resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Davis-Garett v. Urban Outfitters, Inc. , 921 F.3d 30, 45 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Hancock v. County of Rensselaer , 882 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 2018) () "A genuine issue of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Pollard v. New York Methodist Hosp. , 861 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505 ); accord Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. , 875 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2017). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Ricci , 557 U.S. at 586, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) ); accord Baez v. JetBlue Airways Corp. , 793 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 2015).
"The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact." CILP Assocs., L.P. v. PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP , 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotations, brackets and citation omitted); accord Jaffer , 887 F.3d at 114. "[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden[,] ... its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... [,]" Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. , 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 ), and must offer "some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful[.]" Miner v. Clinton County, N.Y. , 541 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotations and citation omitted). The nonmoving party can only defeat summary judgment "by adduc[ing] evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for that party." Lyons v. Lancer Ins. Co. , 681 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations, brackets and citation omitted). " ‘The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient’ to defeat a summary judgment motion[,]" Fabrikant v. French , 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505 ); and "[a] court cannot credit a plaintiff's merely speculative or conclusory assertions." DiStiso v. Cook , 691 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2012) ; see also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Moses , 913 F.3d 297, 305 (2d Cir. 2019) (); Flores v. United States , 885 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2018) (). Since "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party[,] ... [i]f the evidence is merely colorable, ... or is not significantly probative, ... summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (quotations and citations omitted).
"[L]liability based upon unseaworthiness is wholly distinct from liability based upon negligence ... [because] unseaworthiness is a condition, and how that condition came into being—whether by negligence or otherwise—is quite irrelevant to the owner's liability for personal injuries resulting from it." Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. , 400 U.S. 494, 498, 91 S. Ct. 514, 27 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1971).
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