Stein v. Isse Koch & Co., Chicago

Decision Date22 April 1953
Docket NumberGen. No. 45891
Citation112 N.E.2d 491,350 Ill.App. 171
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
PartiesSTEIN v. ISSE KOCH & CO., CHICAGO, Inc. et al.

Richard M. Weinberger, Chicago, for appellants.

Jesse H. Brown, Chicago, for appellee.

LEWE, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff, a salesman, filed a complaint in equity praying for an accounting for commissions alleged to be due him from defendants. The cause was referred to a master in chancery. On defendants' motion at the close of the plaintiff's case the master recommended dismissal of the complaint for want of equity. No evidence was offered by defendants. Exceptions filed to the master's report were sustained by the chancellor and defendants having elected to stand on their motion to dismiss, the chancellor entered a decree, in favor of plaintiff, from which defendants appeal.

In November 1934 defendant Isse Koch & Co., a manufacturer's representative, employed plaintiff as a salesman in certain western states. His compensation was fixed at five per cent of the total shipments of merchandise at the price of the factory to the customer. Commencing in 1941 plaintiff also sold furniture for Novelty Furniture Company. This firm later became known as Le Ross Company, Inc. Lester Rosenberg, president of both defendant companies, employed plaintiff.

Early in May 1942 when plaintiff was about to be inducted into the Armed Forces, Rosenberg asked plaintiff what he intended to do with his territory. Plaintiff stated he had planned to engage one John Shea, an experienced furniture salesman, while plaintiff was in the Army. According to plaintiff, Rosenberg told plaintiff the deal would be 'O. K.' with him 'so long as Shea was satisfied.' June 5, 1942 plaintiff was inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States. During the period from June 5, 1942 when plaintiff entered the Army until October 1943 defendants paid to plaintiff the commissions for sales made by Shea in the designated territory and plaintiff paid one-half of these commissions to Shea. After October 1943 defendants paid Shea directly the entire commission for merchandise sold.

Plaintiff's claim is for commissions on sales made by Shea from October 1943 until September 1945 when he resumed his employment for defendant Isse Koch & Co. in the same territory. Defendant Le Ross Company did not reinstate plaintiff.

Defendants contend that plaintiff's evidence shows that the contract of employment was not for a fixed term and therefore was terminable at will.

Plaintiff testified positively that his arrangement with Shea was for the 'duration' of his military service and that Rosenberg agreed to plaintiff's employment of Shea for this period. Rosenberg's testimony was vague and uncertain. He testified:

'I said that we would temporarily let him [plaintiff] carry on our lines through Mr. Shea who worked with him, provided he paid him a living wage, which he agreed to do. I don't think there was any definite agreement but it was understood that he was to pay him at least four or five per cent. I don't know whether I always remembered the conversation or not, We paid him for some of the time he was in the Army. I have no idea how long. I knew that Stein and Shea had an arrangement as to the division of commissions but didn't know what it was. I don't recall communicating in writing with Stein my decision to pay all the commission to Shea.'

Before entering the Army plaintiff had served defendants in the designated territory for about eight years. The master found that almost all of the business done by defendants in plaintiff's territory was obtained by plaintiff's own efforts. The uncontroverted evidence shows that defendant paid plaintiff his full commissions for almost two years after he entered the military service, and then, without any notice to plaintiff, sent the commission checks directly to Shea, thus disregarding Shea's agreement with plaintiff.

In Davis v. Englestein, 263 Ill.App. 57, at page 61, this court said:

'Obviously no set form of words or course of conduct is required to make the employment at will or for a specific period of time but each case must be determined on its own facts. All of the attendant conditions surrounding the agreement, as well as the terms of the contract itself, when the...

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11 cases
  • Koehler v. Packer Grp., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 28, 2016
    ...to make [an] employment at will or for a specific period of time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stein v. Isse Koch & Co., 350 Ill.App. 171, 175, 112 N.E.2d 491 (1953).¶ 120 The severance pay provision provided one year of salary and benefits, plus targeted incentive compensation, if ......
  • Peters v. Health and Hospitals Governing Commission of Cook County
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 22, 1980
    ...has not been deemed requisite to the avoidance of terminable at will contract status, however. For example, in Stein v. Isse Koch and Co. (1953), 350 Ill.App. 171, 112 N.E.2d 491, the terminable event was that plaintiff's discharge from the army, over which neither party had control. In Don......
  • Lake Forest Academy v. American Language Academy
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 27, 1991
    ...Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 413 F.2d 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1969) and Stein v. Isse Koch & Co., Chicago, 350 Ill.App. 171, 112 N.E.2d 491 (1st Dist.1953). But the rule announced in both those cases applies only if both the contract's duration and the manner in whi......
  • Lakeview Collection LLC v. Bank of Am., CASE NUMBER 09 C 3933
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • October 11, 2012
    ...duration, where the parties reasonably expected that the termination triggering event would occur); Stein v. Isse Koch & Co., Chi., 350 Ill. App. 171, 112 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953) (holding that a during "for the period of plaintiff's service in the Army" was "sufficient to fix the te......
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