Stein v. Stein, 17515

• Decision Date: 28 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 17515,17515
• Citation: 49 Conn.App. 536,714 A.2d 1272
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Mary Ellen STEIN v. Steven STEIN.

Page 1272

714 A.2d 1272

49 Conn.App. 536

Mary Ellen STEIN v. Steven STEIN.

No. 17515.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Briefs May 1, 1998.

Decided July 28, 1998.

Steven M. Stein, pro se, appellant (defendant), filed a brief.

Holly Abery-Wetstone, Farmington, and Linda C. Lehmann, filed a brief for appellee (plaintiff).

Before SCHALLER, SULLIVAN and DALY, JJ.

DALY, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the trial court's order terminating alimony claiming that the court ordered the plaintiff to refund an inadequate amount of alimony payments made by the defendant and refused the defendant interest, counsel fees and litigation costs.

The following background information is relevant to the disposition of this appeal. Pursuant to a stipulation, the trial court rendered a judgment of dissolution on June 24, 1994. The judgment provided: "The defendant shall pay the plaintiff $225 per week as alimony to the plaintiff until the youngest child is in school full-time or the plaintiff is employed full-time. Except as provided herein, said alimony shall be nonmodifiable as to term and modifiable as to amount only in the event the defendant or plaintiff dies, the plaintiff remarries or obtains full-time employment."

The defendant filed a motion on June 5, 1997, to open and modify the judgment regarding alimony and child support, claiming that there was a substantial change in circumstances and that the plaintiff falsified her financial affidavits on which the financial award was predicated. The motion does not refer to General Statutes § 46b-86 (a), which provides in part: "No order for periodic payment of permanent alimony or support may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the court may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a pending motion for modification of an alimony or support order from the date of service of notice of such pending motion upon the opposing party pursuant to section 52-50." The trial court rendered an order on July 30, 1997, that, inter alia, terminated alimony payments retroactive to June 14, 1997, and required alimony payments made since that date to be refunded to the defendant. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that alimony should have been terminated when the plaintiff admittedly obtained full-time employment in August, 1996. The plaintiff claims that the trial court properly applied § 46b-86 (a).

In Sweeny v. Sweeny, 9 Conn.App. 498, 500, 519 A.2d 1237 (1987), the trial court interpreted a separation agreement that had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. In that case, we held that "[w]here a judgment incorporates a separation agreement, the judgment and agreement should be construed in accordance with the laws applied to any contract.... The trial court's construction of the agreement is an issue of fact subject to review under the limited standard of whether it is clearly erroneous.... We will not disturb the actions of the trial court unless it abused its legal discretion in making this determination. The unquestioned rule is that great weight is due the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness....

"The interpretation of the agreement is a search for the intent of the parties.... This intent must be determined from the language of the instrument and not from any intention either of the parties may have secretly entertained.... The court must consider the agreement as a whole and give efficacy to each part where appropriate.... Intention is an inference of fact and the trial court's conclusion is not reviewable unless it is one which the trier could not reasonably make." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 500-502, 519 A.2d 1237.

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in interpreting contract provisions, "the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ... the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 110, 570 A.2d 690 (1990). With these principles in mind, w...