Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School

• Decision Date: 19 August 1976
• Docket Number: No. 61681,61681
• Citation: 41 Ill.App.3d 804,354 N.E.2d 586
• Parties: Robert I. STEINBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CHICAGO MEDICAL SCHOOL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 586

354 N.E.2d 586

41 Ill.App.3d 804

Robert I. STEINBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CHICAGO MEDICAL SCHOOL, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 61681.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Aug. 19, 1976.

Larry D. Drury and Aaron Z. Gryka, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Foran, Wiss & Schultz, Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

DEMPSEY, Justice:

In December 1973 the plaintiff, Robert Steinberg, applied for admission to the defendant, the Chicago Medical School, as a first-year student for the academic year 1974--75 and paid an application fee of $15. The Chicago Medical School is a private, not-for-profit educational institution, incorporated in the State of Illinois. His application for admission was rejected and Steinberg filed a class action against the school, claiming that it had failed to evaluate his application and those of other applicants according to the academic entrance criteria printed in the school's bulletin. Specifically, his complaint alleged that the school's decision to accept or reject a particular applicant for the first-year class was primarily based on such nonacademic considerations as the prospective student's familial relationship to members of the school's faculty and to members of its board of trustees, and the ability of the applicant or his family to pledge or make payment of large sums of money to the school. The complaint further alleged that by using such unpublished criteria to evaluate applicants the school had breached the contract, which Steinberg contended was created when the school accepted his application fee.

In his prayer for relief Steinberg sought an injunction against the school prohibiting the continuation of such admission practices, and an accounting of all application fees, donations, contributions and other sums of money collected by the school from its applicants during a ten-year period prior to the filing of his suit. He did not ask the court to direct the school to admit him, to review his application or to return his fee.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because no contract came into existence during its transaction with Steinberg inasmuch as the school's informational publication did not constitute a valid offer. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss and Steinberg appeals from this order.

The 1974--75 bulletin of the school, which was distributed to prospective students, represented that the following criteria would be used by the school in determining whether applicants would be accepted as first-year medical students:

'Students are selected on the basis of scholarship, character, and motivation without regard to race, creed, or sex. The student's potential for the study and practice of medicine will be evaluated on the basis of academic achievement, Medical College Admission Test results, personal appraisals by a pre-professional advisory committee or individual instructors, and the personal interview, if requested by the Committee on Admissions.'

In his four-count complaint Steinberg alleged, in addition to his claim that the school breached its contract (Count I), that the school's practice of using selection standards which were not disclosed in the school's informational brochure, constituted a violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Ill.Rev.Stat 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261, et seq.) and of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 311, et seq.) (Count II); fraud (Count III), and unjust enrichment (Count IV).

Since we are in accord with the trial court's decision that the complaint did not state a cause of action under Counts II, III and IV, we shall limit our discussion to Count I.

A contract is an agreement between competent parties, based upon a consideration sufficient in law, to do or not do a particular thing. It is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty. Rynearson v. Odin-Svenson Development Corp. (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 125, 246 N.E.2d 823. A contract's essential requirements are: competent parties, valid subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of obligation and mutuality of agreement. Generally, parties may contract in any situation where there is no legal prohibition, since the law acts by restraint and not by conferring rights. Berry v. De Bruyn (1898), 77 Ill.App. 359. However, it is basic contract law that in order for a contract to be binding the terms of the contract must be reasonably certain and definite. Kraftco Corp v. Koblus (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 635, 274 N.E.2d 153.

A contract, in order to be legally binding, must be based on consideration. Wickstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co. (1968), 99 Ill.App.2d 254, 240 N.E.2d 401. Consideration has been defined to consist of some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, disadvantage, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other. Riddle v. La Salle National Bank (1962), 34 Ill.App.2d 116, 180 N.E.2d 719. Money its a valuable consideration and its transfer or payment or promises to pay it or the benefit from the right to its use, will support a contract.

In forming a contract, it is required that both parties assent to the same thing in the same sense (La Salle National Bank v. International Limited (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 381, 263 N.E.2d 506) and that their minds meet on the essential terms and conditions. Richton v. Farina (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 697, 303 N.E.2d 218. Furthermore, the mutual consent essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered from the language employed by the parties or manifested by their words or acts. The intention of the parties gives character to the transaction and if either party contracts in good faith he is entitled to the benefit of his contract no matter what may have been the secret purpose or intention of the other party. Kelly v. Williams (1911), 162 Ill.App. 571.

Steinberg contends that the Chicago Medical School's informational brochure constituted an invitation to make an offer; that his subsequent application and the submission of his $15 fee to the school amounted to an offer; that the school's voluntary reception of his fee constituted an acceptance and because of these events a contract was created between the school and himself. He contends that the school was duty bound under the terms of the contract to evaluate his application according to its stated standards and that the deviation from these standards not only breached the contract, but amounted to an arbitrary selection which constituted a violation of due process and equal protection. He concludes that such a breach did in fact take place each and every time during the past ten years that the school evaluated applicants according to their relationship to the school's faculty members or members of its board of trustees, or in accordance with their ability to make or pledge large sums of money to the school. Finally, he asserts that he is a member and a proper representative of the class that has been damaged by the school's practice.

The school counters that no contract came into being because informational brochures, such as its bulletin, do not constitute offers, but are construed by the courts to be general proposals to consider, examine and negotiate. The school points out that this doctrine has been specifically applied in Illinois to university informational publications. People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern University (1947), 333 Ill.App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345. In Tinkoff, a rejected applicant sued to force Northwestern to admit him, claiming that the university had violated the contract that arose when he demonstrated that he had met the school's academic entrance requirements and had submitted his application and fee. His primary contention was that the school's brochure was an offer and that his completion of the acts, required by the bulletin for application, constituted his acceptance.

In rejecting this argument, the court stated:

'Plaintiffs complain Tinkoff, Jr. was denied the right to contract as guaranteed by the Illinois and United States constitutions. We need only say that he had no right to contract with the University. His right to contract for and pursue an education is limited by the right which the University has under its charter. We see no merit to plaintiff's contention that the rules and regulations were an offer of contract and his compliance therewith and acceptance giving rise to a binding contract. The wording of the bulletin required further action by the University in admitting Tinkoff, Jr. before a contract between them would arise.'

The court based its holding on the fact that Northwestern, as a private educational institution, had reserved in its State charter the right to reject any application for any reason it deemed adequate.

Although the facts of the Tinkoff case are similar to the present situation, we believe that the defendant's reliance upon it is misplaced. First, Steinberg is not claiming that his submission of the application and the $15 constituted an acceptance by him; he is merely maintaining that it was an offer, which required the subsequent acceptance of the school to create a contract. Also, it is obvious that his assertion that the bulletin of the school only amounted to an invitation to make an offer, is consistent with the prevailing law and the school's own position.

More importantly, Steinberg is...