Steiner v. County of Marshall

• Decision Date: 27 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 19854,19854
• Citation: 568 N.W.2d 627,1997 SD 109
• Parties: Arthur STEINER, Thomas L. Steiner, Donna Allen and James Pitzl Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. COUNTY OF MARSHALL, A Political Subdivision of the State of South Dakota, and the Board of County Commissioners of said County, MARION CUSICK, MAURICE ERICKSON, SHERMAN HALVERSON, LARRY JASPERS and LELA OLSON, Defendants and Appellees, and Marshall-Brown Crow Creek Landowners Assn., Inc., Intervenor and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 627

568 N.W.2d 627

1997 SD 109

Arthur STEINER, Thomas L. Steiner, Donna Allen and James

Pitzl Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. COUNTY OF MARSHALL, A Political Subdivision of the State of

South Dakota, and the Board of County Commissioners of said

County, MARION CUSICK, MAURICE ERICKSON, SHERMAN HALVERSON,

LARRY JASPERS and LELA OLSON, Defendants and Appellees,

and

Marshall-Brown Crow Creek Landowners Assn., Inc., Intervenor

and Appellant.

No. 19854.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued June 3, 1997.

Decided Aug. 27, 1997.

Drew C. Johnson of Fritz, Hogan & Johnson, Aberdeen, for Plaintiffs and Appellees.

John Simko of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for Defendants and Appellees.

Danny R. Smeins, Britton, for Intervenor and Appellant.

AMUNDSON, Justice.

¶1 Arthur Steiner, Thomas Steiner, Donna Allen, and James Pitzl (Landowners) sued Marshall County (County), seeking to enjoin County from obstructing the flow of water through County Highway 5 (Fort Road). Marshall-Brown Crow Creek Landowners Association, Inc. (Intervenor) filed a motion to intervene which was granted. Landowners and County eventually entered into a consent judgment which was approved by the trial court. The trial court dismissed the claims and defenses of Intervenor. Intervenor appeals and we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The land and water involved in this dispute are located in eastern Marshall County, and a portion of western Roberts County, South Dakota. The land includes property owned by Landowners, which is upstream, as well as property owned by Intervenor, which is downstream. All of this property is located near Cattail Lake, which is one of nine lakes in a chain referred to as the Glacial Lakes. This chain includes the following lakes, listed in succession consistent with the water flow: Lake Martha, North and South Buffalo Lakes, North and South Red Iron Lakes, Clear Lake, Roy Lake, Lost Lake, and Cattail Lake. Cattail Lake, however, generally remained dry until 1994 when unusual precipitation starting in 1993 caused the lake to fill. As a result of the unusual precipitation, flooding of private property located near Cattail Lake, on the east side of Fort Road (upstream), occurred in 1995.

¶3 The road involved in this dispute, Fort Road, is a north-south county road which was built around 1934 across the west end of Cattail Lake. In other words, the upstream side of the lake is the east side of Fort Road, and the downstream side of the lake is the west side of Cattail Lake. The road was originally built with a grade of approximately nine feet above the floor of the lake bed, and it contained a seventy-two-inch drainage structure. In 1961, Fort Road was raised another eight feet. At the same time, a seventy-two-inch culvert was replaced with a thirty-six-inch culvert.

¶4 In the fall of 1995, water rose over twenty feet and reached the east side of Fort Road. In other words, Fort Road was acting as a dam. The thirty-six inch culvert located at the natural outlet to Cattail Lake failed to keep up with the rising tide, trapping more water on the east side of Fort Road. As a result, private property, including the property owned by Landowners, was flooded in July of 1995.

¶5 On May 9, 1996, Landowners filed a complaint against County, seeking an injunction to restrain County from obstructing the flow of water through Fort Road. They claimed around 3,000 acres of their farm land were flooded. On May 14, 1996, Intervenor filed a motion to intervene as its downstream land located on the west side of Fort Road was threatened. Over County and Landowners' objections, the trial court granted Intervenor's motion. Intervenor then filed an answer and cross claim.

¶6 The first hearing was held on Landowners' request for a preliminary injunction on May 16, 1996. On May 31, 1996, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on the injunction issue. On August 22, 1996, a trial to the court was scheduled on Landowners' amended complaint and Intervenor's cross claim. ¹ On this day, Landowners and County agreed to a consent judgment which was presented to the trial court for approval. Over Intervenor's objections to the consent judgment, the trial court approved the judgment. In addition, the trial court dismissed the claims and defenses of Intervenor against Landowners and County on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court also awarded summary judgment to Landowners and County, stating any possible prescriptive easement rights had not yet ripened. Intervenor appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Whether the consent judgment may be approved by the trial court without consent from Intervenor.

II. Whether Intervenor has prescriptive rights precluding additional drainage by Landowners.

III. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Intervenor's defenses and claims as a matter of law.

DECISION

¶7 I. Consent Judgment

¶8 Intervenor contends the trial court erred in approving the consent judgment entered into between Landowners and County, because it was not agreed to by Intervenor. Such a determination is reviewed applying an abuse of discretion standard. See Kirkland v. New York St. Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1128 (2nd Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 997, 79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984).

¶9 The consent judgment provides the agreement that Landowners release County from any liability and, in return, County install another sixty-inch culvert on Fort Road where it crosses Cattail Lake as well as monitor the levels of water flow through the culverts. The agreement also includes the following: "This Consent Judgment is only for the benefit of [Landowners]. This Consent Judgment does not create rights for the benefit of any individuals or entities other than [Landowners]; nor does this Consent Judgment create any obligation to any individuals or entities other than [Landowners]."

¶10 In Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a consent judgment to which an intervenor objected. 478 U.S. 501, 528-30, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3078-79, 92 L.Ed.2d 405, 427-28 (1986). The consent judgment was submitted to the district court for approval by the firefighters (the plaintiffs) and the city of Cleveland (the defendant). The intervenor, a labor union, contested the approval of the consent judgment. Id. at 512, 106 S.Ct. at 3070, 92 L.Ed.2d at 417. After hearing objections from all parties, the district court approved the judgment.

¶11 On appeal, the intervenor argued "its consent was required before the court could approve a consent decree[,]" because the intervenor "was permitted to intervene as of right." Id. at 528, 106 S.Ct. at 3078-79, 92 L.Ed.2d at 427. The Court responded by stating:

A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that one party--whether an original party, a party that was joined later, or an intervenor--could preclude other parties from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objection heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent.

Id. at 528-29, 106 S.Ct. at 3079, 92 L.Ed.2d at 427-28 (emphasis added) (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392, 400, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1131, 1136, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1126).

¶12 Similar to Local Number 93, the Intervenor in this case participated in the consent judgment hearing and was permitted to submit its objections to the decree. ² After considering these objections, the trial court approved the consent judgment.

¶13 Local Number 93 provides a consent judgment cannot "impose duties or obligations on a third party, without that party's agreement." Id. at 529, 106 S.Ct. at 3079, 92 L.Ed.2d at 428. In other words, the consent judgment must not prevent Intervenor from litigating any possible legitimate claims. The language of the agreement in this case is clearly consistent with this notion, as it provides that no obligations to any parties other than Landowners and County are created by the judgment. ³ In addition to no obligations, Intervenor is not bound to anything under the agreement. In fact, all of Intervenor's claims differ from the issues addressed in the consent judgment. Intervenor's claim that it possesses a prescriptive easement is not even mentioned in the consent judgment.

¶14 Based on these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent judgment entered into between County and Landowners.

¶15 II. Prescriptive Easement

¶16 The trial court granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of County and Landowners as well as a summary judgment dismissing Intervenor's cross claim. Our standard of review of this decision is as follows:

A motion to dismiss under SDCL 15-6-12(b) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading, not the facts which support it. Estate of Billings v. Deadwood Congregation, 506 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1993) (citing Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 820 (S.D.1981)). For purposes of the pleading, the court must treat as true all facts properly pled in the complaint and resolve all doubts in favor of the pleader. Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 226 (S.D.1988); Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875, 877 (S.D.1985). "Our standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is the same as our review of a motion for summary judgment--is the pleader entitled to judgment as a matter of law?" Billings, 506 N.W.2d at 140 (citing Jensen Ranch, Inc. v. Marsden, 440 N.W.2d 762, 764 (S.D.1989)).

Stumes v. Bloomberg, 1996 SD 93, p 6, 551 N.W.2d 590, 592. Therefore, we are to determine whether...