Steinmann v. Steinmann

• Decision Date: 10 July 1936
• Citation: 186 A. 501,121 Conn. 498
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STEINMANN v. STEINMANN.

186 A. 501

121 Conn. 498

STEINMANN v. STEINMANN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 10, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

Action by Olga J. B. Steinmann against Paul Steinmann for a divorce upon the grounds of intolerable cruelty and habitual intemperance. The case was tried to the court. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

No error.

Where divorced husband threatened to leave country, trial court acted within its discretion in awarding wife lump sum for support of minor child.

Albert W. Hummel, of Waterbury, for appellant.

William W. Gager, of Waterbury, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, and BOOTH, JJ.

BANKS Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of the court awarding the plaintiff a divorce upon the ground of intolerable cruelty $7,500 alimony, and an allowance of $3,000 for the support of their minor child; also from an order of the court granting the plaintiff an allowance of $150 to defend the appeal proceedings. The defendant seeks a number of corrections in the finding. The evidence does not justify the making of any material changes in the finding which would affect the result.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1902, and have six children, all of whom are of age, except a daughter of 16. In 1923 plaintiff was on the verge of a nervous breakdown as a result of the defendant's ill treatment which consisted of " hectoring and nagging her," abusing her with vile, obscene, and profane language and calling her indecent names, particularly when intoxicated, threatening her with physical violence, and striking her upon at least one occasion. Because of such ill treatment the plaintiff went to California in October, 1923, returning in March, 1924. As a result of the defendant's ill treatment, the plaintiff from 1925 to 1931 was under the care of a doctor, who was of the opinion that continuation of her marital relationship would be dangerous to her health. In 1931 she was at a health farm for five months. In February, 1932, she left the defendant and went to live with a nurse, and later with her oldest daughter until March, 1933, when she returned to the defendant upon his request and promise that he would not again mistreat her. In spite of his promise, defendant's behavior became worse, he came home intoxicated, called the plaintiff vile names, and charged her with misconduct in the presence of the children, and in general subjected her to the most abusive treatment. From 1933 on, plaintiff and defendant occupied separate rooms, though, as a result of his insistent demands, plaintiff did at times prior to May 1, 1935, accord defendant his marital privileges. They continued to live in the same house until September, 1935, when the plaintiff required defendant to leave. Since he left, her health has improved and she has gained some 15 pounds in weight.

Upon these subordinate facts the court reached the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of intolerable cruelty toward the plaintiff justifying the granting of a divorce upon that ground. This is conclusive, unless it appears that it was illegally or illogically drawn from the subordinate facts. Though cruel acts may not be individually intolerable, yet, if they are manifestations of a persistent and consistent cruel conduct, they may in their cumulative effect become unbearable and intolerable and justify the termination of the marriage relation. Swist v. Swist, 107 Conn. 484, 490, 140 A. 820. The persistently cruel conduct of the defendant which the court has found justifies its conclusion that it created a situation that had become unbearable by the plaintiff. The defendant contends that the conclusion of the court that his conduct was intolerable is illogical and illegal, since by returning to live with him in 1933 she showed that she was both able and willing to tolerate it and condoned any acts of cruelty prior to that time. Be that as it may, the finding is that after her return in 1933 the behavior of the defendant was worse than before. Notwithstanding this, the plaintiff did continue to live in the same house with him until after the divorce action was instituted, though occupying separate rooms. From this the court might have drawn an inference that defendant's conduct was not such as to render the continuance of the marital relation unbearable by the plaintiff, but from all the subordinate facts in the case it concluded to the contrary, and we cannot say that it could not logically and legally so conclude. The determination whether there is a cause for divorce is to be made as of the time of the trial. Allen v. Allen, 73 Conn. 54, 46 A. 242, 49 L.R.A. 142, 84 Am.St.Rep. 135.

In the early years of their married life plaintiff and defendant were engaged in farming, and later converted their farm property into a real estate development. Before she went to California in 1923, plaintiff conveyed to the defendant a one-half interest in the property which they jointly owned for the purpose of facilitating his dealing in the property during her absence, and upon his promise to reconvey it to her upon her return. After her return defendant refused to reconvey, but after an action was brought by the plaintiff a compromise was effected by which the defendant agreed to assign to the plaintiff one-half of the mortgages held by him and one-half interest in all the real estate owned by him. As the result of a later settlement of their property interests the plaintiff...