Steinmetz v. Snead & Co.
| Citation | 9 A.2d 801 |
| Decision Date | 19 December 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 212.,212. |
| Parties | STEINMETZ v. SNEAD & CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Certiorari from Workmen's Compensation Bureau.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Margaret Steinmetz, claimant, opposed by Snead & Co., employer, to recover compensation for the death of claimant's husband. For review of an award of compensation in favor of claimant, the employer brings certiorari.
Writ dismissed.
Argued October term, 1939, before PARKER, BODINE, and PERSKIE, JJ.
Kellogg & Chance, of Jersey City (R. Robinson Chance, of Jersey City, of counsel), for prosecutor.
William T. Cahill, of Jersey City, for respondent.
We have recently held, in this workmen's compensation case, that the contract between the employer and employee was made in our state, arid that the death of the employee was the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Steinmetz v. Snead & Co., 123 N.J.L. 138, 8 A.2d 126.
By the writ, as limited, the single question we are called upon now to decide is whether the fact that deceased died as a result of an accident which occurred in Washington, D. C, and the further fact that the Congress had enacted a workmen's compensation act for the District of Columbia, D.C.Code 1929, T. 19, §§ 11, 12, without reference to our workmen's compensation act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 et seq., make the federal law thus enacted controlling no matter where the contract of employment was made? Or otherwise stated, was our workmen's compensation act unconstitutionally applied (Art. I, sec. 8, clause 17 and Art. VI, clause 2 of our Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A.) ?
Prosecutor contends that the Bureau was without jurisdiction to render the judgment under review; and that to the extent that our workmen's compensation act purports to give such jurisdiction, it is unconstitutional.
That contention runs in this vein: Because the Congress is given the power "* * * to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all Cases whatsoever * * * over the District of Columbia" (Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17 of our Federal Constitution), because the Congress has exercised that power and, without reference to our act, made provisions for compensation "* * * in respect to the injury or death of an employee [with exceptions not here pertinent] of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs * * *", (Act May 17, 1928, c. 612, § 1, 45 Stat. 600, D.C.Code 1929, T. 19, § 11), and because the accident which resulted in the death of the employee occurred in Washington, District of Columbia, then, irrespective of the place where the contract of employment was entered into (be it New Jersey or the District of Columbia) the federal law only, the supreme law of the land (Art. VI, clause 2 of our Federal Constitution), is controlling.
Is that contention sound? We do not think so. We think that it misconceives the true principle upon which jurisdiction was properly exercised.
While it is true that the legislative power of the Congress is exclusive over lands within a state purchased with its consent by the United States for a constitutional purpose (Cf. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 537, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264, 268; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 49 S.Ct. 227, 73 L.Ed. 447; Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315, 319, 54 S.Ct. 432, 78 L.Ed. 821, 824), and while it is true that in the exercise of their judicial functions state courts do not trench upon any of the many fields of exclusive federal jurisdiction, (Cf. for examples, Rounsaville v. Central R. R. Co., 90 N.J.L. 176, 101 A. 182 (interstate commerce); March v. Vulcan Iron Works, 102 N.J.L. 337, 132 A. 89 (admiralty), it is, however, equally true that when, as here, the contract of employment is made in our state, and the injury or death of the employee is the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment, we award compensation, under our workmen's compensation act, to the party entitled thereto notwithstanding the fact that the accident occurred while the employee was temporarily outside our state. See cases collated in Steinmetz v. Snead & Co., supra, 123 N.J.L. at page 143, 8 A.2d 126.
Bearing in mind that the respective parties under our workmen's compensation act occupy a definite statutory status or relation, which in...
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