Steinmeyer v. People of State

• Citation: 1880 WL 10047,95 Ill. 383
• Parties: FREDERICK STEINMEYER et al.v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Decision Date: 14 June 1880
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

95 Ill. 383

1880 WL 10047 (Ill.)

FREDERICK STEINMEYER et al.

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Mt. Vernon, Jun. 14, 1880.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. SNYDER, Judge, presiding. Mr. G. B. BURNETT, for the plaintiffs in error:

The verdict is contrary to the evidence, counsel referring to the evidence at some length, which is omitted.

The court erred in excluding proper evidence offered by the defendants. The people read in evidence a lease, from Jones to the Cobines, of land which they claimed to have in possession. This lease described the land by its numbers. It was therefore competent for the defendants to prove by Winnetka that the lease did not embrace the road, and they did prove that fact by him, and that the road was on his land, and that he had given the defendants permission to use it and to leave the gate and bars open when going through.

Defendants called George Leverett, a practical surveyor, who had made a survey of the premises, and offered to prove by him that the road was on Winnetka's land and not on the Jones tract, which the court refused to admit, saying, “You can not go into that. The owner could not give them a right to commit a breach of the peace or to commit a trespass.”

It was error to refuse this testimony on a point made vital by the instructions, and error for the court to assume, in the hearing of the jury, that defendants had committed a breach of the peace or a trespass.

It was also error for the court to say in the hearing of the jury that “these persons (Cobines) might go into the pasture and he (Winnetka) could not have evicted them. He must take possession legally by proceedings according to law. What he can not do he can not authorize another to do. They might have been wrongdoers; he had to proceed according to law to evict them.”

The court erred in limiting the time of counsel in their argument to the jury. The court limited counsel to two hours. Const. 1870, art. 2, sec. 9; The People v. Keenar, 13 Cal. 581.

The court gave improper instructions to the jury. The people's sixth instruction tells the jury that if they believe Henry Steinmeyer killed the deceased, then in order to find said Henry Steinmeyer not guilty, they must believe from the evidence that the killing was done in necessary self-defence. This is not the law of the case. If the defendant killed the deceased under a serious and well-grounded belief that he was at the time in danger of receiving great bodily harm, then he was justifiable, whether the danger was real or only apparent. Campbell v. The People, 16 Ill. 17.

This instruction tells the jury that to justify the killing they must believe from the evidence that it was done in necessary self-defence, or, in other words, they must believe the killing was necessary to save defendant's own life or prevent his receiving great bodily harm; whereas the law is, that if it appeared to him, as a reasonable man, that he was at the time in danger of losing his own life, or receiving great bodily harm, and that while acting under the influence of such belief he struck the blow, he is justifiable, although it should subsequently appear that he was in no danger whatever. Schnier v. The People, 23 Ill. 17.

It is perhaps sufficient to say that this instruction is in all respects like the one given for the prosecution in Schnier's case, and which this court held it to be error in the court below to give, but that would be doing injustice to the author of the latter, because it will be seen that while this instruction has all the objectionable features of the one given in Schnier's case, it is in many respects much more objectionable.

The instruction in this case is susceptible of but one construction, for it tells the jury in plain terms that before they can find the defendants not guilty, they, the jury, must believe from the evidence that the killing was done in necessary self-defence.

That the giving of this instruction was error, for which the judgment must be reversed, is shown by numerous decisions of this court. Campbell v. The People, 16 Ill. 17; Schnier v. The People, 23 Id. 17; Maher v. The People, 24 Ill. 241; Roach v. The People, 77 Id. 25. The court, on behalf of the defendants, instructed the jury that there could be no accessory before the fact to manslaughter, and although they should believe from the evidence that Frederick Steinmeyer stood by and assisted Henry Steinmeyer in inflicting the blow upon William Cobine, yet the jury could not convict Frederick Steinmeyer unless it was shown that he aided in striking the blow with his own hands.

On the part of the people the court instructed the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the fatal blow was given by Henry Steinmeyer, and that Frederick Steinmeyer stood by at the time and in any way aided or assisted, or in any way encouraged Henry Steinmeyer in striking the blow, then they should find Frederick guilty, or, if the jury believed from the evidence that defendants were engaged in an unlawful act with a common design to commit an unlawful act, and that while so engaged Henry Steinmeyer gave the fatal blow, then the jury should find both defendants guilty.

This court has said: “When instructions are conflicting, the verdict of the jury can not be regarded as settling any fact in the case, and no verdict they could render under the circumstances would be entitled to weight in the decision of the case.” Toledo, Wabash and Western R. R. Co. v. Morgan, 72 Ill. 155.

But the court is not satisfied with stating the law both ways on this point, but goes further in the latter clause of the instruction for the people, and tells the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the defendants were engaged at the time in the commission of an unlawful act (that of refusing to shut the gate or put up the bars), with a common design and purpose to commit the unlawful act, and that while so engaged the said Henry Steinmeyer gave William Cobine the fatal blow, then both the defendants are guilty.

Or, in other words, if the jury should believe that defendants were engaged in the unlawful act of refusing to shut the gate or put up the bars, and while so engaged Henry Steinmeyer struck William Cobine the fatal blow, then they should find both the defendants guilty. The latter clause of this instruction entirely ignores the question of self-defence, which was the important subject of the controversy, and tells the jury that if the Steinmeyers, in their opinion, were in the wrong, or were committing an unlawful act in refusing or neglecting to put up the bars or shut the gate, and that Henry Steinmeyer struck William Cobine the fatal blow, then both are guilty, regardless of what the conduct of the Cobines may have been in the premises.

It needs no argument to show the viciousness of this instruction, and how it was calculated to mislead and confuse the jury.

It is error to give instructions which tend to mislead the jury. Brown v. Graham, 24 Ill. 628; Herrick v. Grey, 65 Id. 101.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an indictment against Frederick Steinmeyer an...