Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel

Decision Date21 February 1907
Citation80 N.E. 564,226 Ill. 9
PartiesSTEINMEYER et al. v. SCHROEPPEL.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Appellate Court, Fourth District.

Action by Henry Steinmeyer and others against John Schroeppel, which was consolidated with a suit by Schroeppel against Henry Steinmeyer and others. From a decree of the Appellate Court, reversing a decree, canceling a contract between the parties, Henry Steinmeyer and others appeal. Affirmed.Warnock, Williamson & Burroughs (William G. Burroughs, of counsel), for appellants.

Hadley & Wheeler and C. H. Burton, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Appellants are in the lumber business at Collinsville, Ill., and appellee is a building contractor at the same place. On June 10, 1905, appellee was about to erect a building for himself, and left at the office of appellants an itemized list of lumber, containing 34 items, on which he desired them to give him a price. Appellants' bookkeeper set down upon that list, opposite each item, the selling price, but did not add up the column. If correctly added, the columnwould have footed up $1,867. One of the appellants made the addition, and, by mistake, made the total $1,446. The bookkeeper copied the list on one of appellants' billheads without the prices opposite the different items, and wrote at the bottom, ‘Above for $1,446,’ and delivered the paper to appellee the same evening. Appellee received bids for the lumber from two other firms, which were in the neighborhood of $1,890. On June 16th appellee called at the office of appellants and accepted their offer. He did not bring the paper with him, but the bookkeeper made another copy and at the bottom of it wrote the same memorandum, ‘Above for $1,446.’ One of the appellants signed it, and a memorandum was then written below to the effect that if delivery was made within 30 days the appellants were to have $20 more than the estimate, but if delivery was made after 30 days appellee was to have a rebate of $20 from the estimate, and this was signed by both parties. The same evening one of the appellants, looking over the bill, found that he had not added the amounts correctly, and the next morning one of them notified appellee by telephone of the mistake, and refused to furnish the lumber for less than $1,867. Appellants also sent appellee a notice that they had found an error of $421, and the estimate should read $1,867 instead of $1,446. Appellants did not furnish the lumber, and appellee purchased it at the next lowest bid from another firm, and sued appellants for the difference between what he paid for the lumber, and what they had agreed to furnish it for. Appellants then filed a bill to enjoin the prosecution of the suit at law, and to have the contract canceled on account of the mistake. The suits were consolidated and tried together without a jury. The circuit court entered a decree, canceling the contract, and restraining appellee from prosecuting his suit at law. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed the decree, and remanded the cause to the circuit court, with directions to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill for want of equity. Appellants applied to the Appellate Court for a certificate of importance, which was granted, and this appeal was prosecuted.

The jurisdiction of equity to grant the remedy of cancellation because of a mistake of fact by one party to a contract is well recognized. Mutual consent is requisite to the creation of a contract, and if there is a mistake of fact by one of the parties going to the essence of the contract, no agreement is, in fact, made. 2 Kent's Com. 477. If there is apparently a valid contract in writing, but by reason of a mistake of fact by one of the parties, not due to his negligence, the contract is different with respect to the subject-matter or terms from what was intended, equity will give to such party a remedy by cancellation where the parties can be placed in statu quo. The ground for relief is, that by reason of the mistake there was no mutual assent to the terms of the contract. 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 618. The fact concerning which the...

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66 cases
  • Frederich v. Union Electric L. & P. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 17 Abril 1935
    ...v. Heyward, 164 Fed. 107; Borden v. Ry. Co., 113 N.C. 570, 18 S.E. 392; Bibber v. Carville, 101 Me. 59, 63 Atl. 303; Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 8 N.E. 564; Currey v. Greffett, 115 Mo. App. 364, 90 S.W. 1166; Kirkpatrick v. Pease, 202 Mo. 493, 101 S.W. 657; Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 19......
  • Frederich v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 17 Abril 1935
    ... ... Heyward, 164 F. 107; Borden v. Ry. Co., 113 ... N.C. 570, 18 S.E. 392; Bibber v. Carville, 101 Me ... 59, 63 A. 303; Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, ... 8 N.E. 564; Currey v. Greffett, 115 Mo.App. 364, 90 ... S.W. 1166; Kirkpatrick v. Pease, 202 Mo. 493, 101 ... ...
  • Marriage of Agustsson, In re, 2-91-0134
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 8 Enero 1992
    ...The ground for relief is, that by reason of the mistake there was no mutual assent to the terms of the contract." (Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel (1907), 226 Ill. 9, 13, 80 N.E. 564.) More recently, the appellate court stated that rescission is a proper remedy for either a unilateral or mutual mi......
  • M. F. Kemper Const. Co. v. City of Los Angeles
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 28 Agosto 1951
    ...& Clarke Co. v. City of Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 20 S.Ct. 957, 44 L.Ed. 1108; see 59 A.L.R. at 818-824; cf. Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N.E. 564, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 114. The type of error here involved is one which will sometimes occur in the conduct of reasonable and cautious bu......
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