Steinour v. Oakley State Bank
| Citation | 49 Idaho 293,287 P. 949 |
| Decision Date | 02 May 1930 |
| Docket Number | 5411 |
| Parties | JOHN E. STEINOUR and DORA STEINOUR, His Wife, Appellants, v. OAKLEY STATE BANK, a Corporation, E. W. PORTER, Commissioner of Finance of the State of Idaho, OAKLEY REALTY COMPANY, a Corporation, and WM. N. GOODMAN and Mrs. WM. N. GOODMAN, His Wife, Respondents |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
STATUTES OF LIMITATION - TOLLING OF - PENDENCY OF LITIGATION - FRAUD.
1. Statutes of limitation apply both to equity and law cases. (C. S., secs. 6596, 6597, 6611, 6619.)
2. Trial court's findings of balance in plaintiffs' favor under accounting directed by supreme court to be taken pending appeal was not "judgment" for plaintiffs within statute permitting new action within one year after reversal (C. S., sec. 6626).
3. Allegations of fraud in initial complaint were abandoned as shown by waiver and withdrawal of specifications of error that court erred in striking them from complaint.
4. Three-year period for bringing action based on fraud was set in motion when fraud was discovered (C. S., sec. 6611, subd 4).
5. Statute as to action for fraud was not tolled pending litigation between parties seeking to have same matter adjudicated on another basis (C. S., sec. 6611, subd. 4).
APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District for Twin Falls County. Hon. W. A. Babcock, Judge.
Action to effect redemption of real property. Judgment for defendants. Affirmed.
Judgment affirmed; costs awarded to respondents.
Walters Parry & Thoman and J. R. Keenan, cite no authorities on points decided.
Ray D. Agee, for Respondent Oakley State Bank and E. W. Porter.
The defense of the bar of the statute of limitations applies strictly to the particular action to which it is pleaded, and hence if that suit is not brought within the statutory period, the bar of the statute cannot be avoided by showing that another action has been brought by the plaintiff against the defendant on the same cause of action within the period limited by the statute. The pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause does not toll the statute of limitations. (37 C. J. 1053, par. 474, 1083, par. 527, note 38; McCan v. Conery, 12 F. 315; Manuel v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 99 Va. 188, 37 S.E. 957; Whalen v. Gordon, 95 F. 305, 37 C. C. A. 70; Carroll v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 60 F. 549; Spees v. Boggs, 204 Pa. 504, 54 A. 346; Southern Express Co. v. Sinclair, 135 Ga. 155, 68 S.E. 1113; Arnett v. Howard, 156 Ky. 458, 161 S.W. 531; Cleveland State Bank v. Gardner, (Tex. Com. App.) 286 S.W. 174.)
Sweeley & Sweeley, for Respondent Oakley Realty Company et al.
Appellants' original action which was commenced in February, 1916, and terminated by the decision of this court in January, 1928, was based on fraud alleged to have been committed by the bank and the mistake of appellants as to their rights. They knew all the facts relating to these matters in December, 1912, but delayed more than three years in commencing their action. Their right to bring suit was controlled by C. S., sec. 6611, subd. 4, and expired in three years. (Williams v. Shrope, 30 Idaho 746, 168 P. 162; Sidener v. Galbraith, 63 Ind. 89; Walker v. Pogue, 2 Colo. App. 149, 29 P. 1017; James v. James, 75 Colo. 164, 225 P. 208; People v. Blankenship, 52 Cal. 619; Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 89; Morgan v. Morgan, 10 Wash. 99, 38 P. 1054; Kiener v. Hood, 126 Wash. 431, 218 P. 1; Lowenstein v. Sexton, 18 Okla. 322, 90 P. 410.)
Different phases of the controversy between appellants and respondent bank have twice previously been before this court. (Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 32 Idaho 91, 177 P. 843; Id., 45 Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052.) Brief repetition of the facts is necessary to a proper understanding and disposition of the present appeal.
Appellants, husband and wife, owned a tract of land in Twin Falls county which they mortgaged to one Edwards. On foreclosure, the property was bid in by an individual who assigned his certificate of sale to respondent bank. Period for redemption expired December 13, 1912. Tender of the amount due was made by appellants on the day following, and respondent bank refused to accept it. Sheriff's deed was later issued to the bank and appellants surrendered possession of the property. February 15, 1916, appellants filed a complaint against the bank, and later an amended complaint in the nature of an action to quiet title, containing also allegations of fraud. Judgment of the district court dismissing the action for failure of appellants to plead further, after the entry of orders sustaining a demurrer and motion to strike certain allegations of the amended complaint, was reversed on appeal under the citation first above. The effect of the decision mentioned was to remove from the amended complaint of appellants the allegations of fraud and to overrule the demurrer. Thereupon, appellants filed a second amended complaint in the usual form of an action to quiet title. The bank filed a cross-complaint of like import. On trial of the cause the district court entered a decree quieting title to the property in the bank. An appeal was again perfected, and this court held (45 Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052, 1056) that for failure of appellants to make tender of the amount due under the Edwards mortgage within the statutory period for redemption the right to redeem was lost, title vested in the purchaser at foreclosure sale, and appellants had no title to quiet. It was said in the opinion: "We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs (appellants) having failed to show title in themselves, their entire cause of action fails, and the action should be dismissed." The judgment of the district court in this respect was accordingly affirmed.
Within a month of the sending down of the remittitur under the decision last above referred to, appellants commenced the present action, a second amended complaint setting up the history of the transaction from its inception, alleging appellants were fraudulently dealt with by the bank in regard to a redemption of the property from foreclosure, offering to pay any and all amounts due under the mortgages or assessments against the property, asking for an accounting as to the rents and profits thereof, and seeking a redemption of the premises. Demurrers to said complaint having been interposed, principally on the ground of the running of the statutes of limitation against the cause of action, the same were by the court sustained and judgment entered dismissing the action. This appeal is taken from said judgment.
The one question here is whether or not the statutes of limitation have run against appellants' cause of action as set out in the complaint above. However the equities of the case be viewed, it is well settled these statutes apply both to equity and law cases and to the most meritorious claims. (37 C. J. 684, 740.)
At the time of commencement of the present...
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...and Id., 30 Cal.2d 575, 184 P.2d 505 at 510. Statutes of limitations are applicable in equity and to proceedings. Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 49 Idaho 293, 287 P. 949, Section 5-240 I.C. 'Process and procedure under this act [Workmen's Compensation] shall be as summary and simple as reas......