Steinsvik v. Vinzant
| Citation | 640 F.2d 949 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-2643,79-2643 |
| Parties | Anders STEINSVIK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Douglas VINZANT, Respondent-Appellee. C.A. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Robert Adelman, Seattle, Wash., for petitioner-appellant.
Carol Horan Rainey, Tacoma, Wash., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.
Before SNEED and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges and JAMESON, * District Judge.
Anders Steinsvik has appealed from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
On February 1, 1971, Steinsvik entered a plea of guilty to the crime of credit card forgery in King County, Washington. On September 16, 1971, the imposition of sentence was deferred and petitioner was placed on probation. On July 27, 1974, probation was revoked, and petitioner was given a maximum sentence of 20 years, to run concurrently with sentences imposed on pleas of guilty to the crime of grand larceny.
On May 14, 1976, Steinsvik filed a personal restraint petition in the Washington Court of Appeals. On September 9, 1976, this petition was denied as "frivolous on its face." On June 27, 1977 review was denied by the Washington Supreme Court.
On August 20, 1977, Steinsvik filed the instant petition, alleging that his guilty plea was not intelligently and voluntarily made, that he was mentally incompetent to enter the plea, and that he was not advised as to the maximum penalty for the offense to which he was pleading guilty. The petition was denied on March 28, 1978, the court concluding that the record clearly established that the petition was without merit. 1
The report of the magistrate, following a careful analysis of the proceedings in state court, concluded that there was nothing to indicate to the trial judge that petitioner "was not competent either at the time of plea or when he was sentenced." The magistrate rejected petitioner's contention that the totality of the circumstances surrounding entry of the plea indicated that it was not freely, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The magistrate did not "believe that the record indicates either that (petitioner) was unaware (of the maximum sentence) or that even if he was unaware, any prejudice resulted."
After the court had adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation, objections were filed by petitioner. In a subsequent order the court concluded that its prior order had properly disposed of all issues and that "petitioner was not required to be advised that deportation was a possible consequence of his guilty plea," citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895, 97 S.Ct. 256, 50 L.Ed.2d 178 (1976).
Petitioner contends that (1) there was substantial evidence of his incompetence when he entered his guilty plea, so that the trial court should have ordered a competency hearing sua sponte; (2) there was a substantial doubt that petitioner could make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented when he pleaded guilty; and (3) his right to due process was violated when he entered a guilty plea without being informed of the direct consequences of his plea with respect to (a) the maximum sentence which could be imposed and (b) the possibility of deportation.
In Stone v. Cardwell, 620 F.2d 212 (9 Cir. 1980), this court held with respect to petitions for habeas corpus filed by state court prisoners that (1) where the material facts are adequately developed in the state court and made available to the district court, 2 there is no need for an evidentiary hearing; and (2) the findings of the district court as to the voluntariness of a guilty plea cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. The clearly erroneous rule applies even when based only on written evidence. See, e. g., United States v. Mountain States Construction Co., 588 F.2d 259, 264 n. 5 (9 Cir. 1978); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113-15 (9 Cir. 1962).
This court recognizes, as did the district court, that "under the due process clause a hearing on a defendant's competence to plead guilty is required if the trial judge entertains or should reasonably have entertained a good-faith doubt as to the competence of the defendant to understand the nature and consequences of his plea or to participate intelligently in the proceedings, including his ability to make a reasoned choice among alternatives presented to him." Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9 Cir. 1977). In Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9 Cir. 1973), the court had noted that competency to enter a guilty plea involves a "further inquiry" than that required in determining competency to stand trial and adopted a standard suggested by Judge Hufstedler in a dissenting opinion in Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9 Cir. 1970), "A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature of the consequences of his plea." 3
After reviewing all of the evidence before the magistrate in the light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that the district court properly rejected appellant's contention that the trial judge should have "held a bona fide doubt" with respect to appellant's competency to enter a plea of guilty. Appellant relies heavily on his statement to the court prior to the entry of his plea that he was a "little confused." We agree with the finding of the magistrate:
A review of the transcript of the proceedings before the trial judge at the time of the entry of plea clearly indicates that Steinsvik was alert and responded clearly and rationally to the court's questions regarding his plea and the facts underlying the charge. He did express some confusion with respect to the sentencing procedures and the statement he had signed regarding entry of his guilty plea, but the court took pains to assure that he understood and he finally indicated that he thought he understood "pretty well."
The statement signed by Steinsvik recited, inter alia, that he had been advised of his rights and waived them by pleading guilty; that he had been advised by counsel the sentence the prosecuting attorney would recommend, but knew the court might not follow that recommendation; and that he understood that if he were sentenced to an institution the court must sentence him "to the maximum under our state law; that the minimum term of sentence is fixed by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, and that the recommendation as to minimum made to the board by the sentencing judge and Prosecuting Attorney may not be followed by the Board."
The trial judge did not rely upon Steinsvik's written statement, but questioned him carefully to make certain that he understood it. The court ascertained from both Steinsvik and his counsel that counsel had gone over the written statement with Steinsvik and continued:
The Court: You understand that on the basis of your plea, I will simply proceed to sentence you, and you will have to accept that sentence: that you can't appeal from it; no matter what has been told you about a recommendation, you could be sentenced to prison: Do you understand sir?
The Defendant: Well, I'm a little confused right now.
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Apparently you had some question in your mind about what this form meant, and you have had a chance now to talk to Mr. Richey about that. Do you understand it now, sir?
The Defendant: Yeah, I think I understand it pretty well.
The Court: And you understand on the basis of your plea of guilty, if you desire to enter a plea of guilty, I will simply sentence you and you will have to accept that sentence; do you understand that, sir?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you have any question in your mind about your client's understanding of the proceedings, Mr. Richey?
Mr. Richey: No. I am sure he understands it fully.
Viewing the evidence as a whole, we cannot agree with appellant that his statement that he was a "little confused" indicates a lack of competency to plead guilty. Rather it appears that both the court and appellant were seeking to make certain that appellant understood the effect of his plea and the sentence which might be imposed.
Appellant argues further that the trial judge had knowledge at both the arraignment and sentencing that appellant had recently been hospitalized and was receiving psychiatric care. Again our review of the evidence supports the findings of the magistrate:
The only evidence (at the arraignment) of any psychiatric problems was the statement of Steinsvik's lawyer to the court that Steinsvik was involved in out-patient psychiatric counseling. The lawyer also indicated that Steinsvik had been involved in a serious automobile accident, had been in the hospital for several weeks and had only been discharged the prior week.
However, none of the foregoing really speaks to the issue of Steinsvik's competence or incompetence on February 1, 1971, and there was absolutely no evidence before the trial judge which could have led him to entertain any doubt regarding Steinsvik's competence to proceed or to enter a plea of guilty....
At the original sentencing on September 16, 1971, the trial judge had before him a presentence report which disclosed more...
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Dickey v. Davis
...to Steinsvik's competency, he would still be entitled to relief if it now appears that he was in fact incompetent." Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1979)). Petitioner bears the burden of proof by a preponderanc......
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...769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985). Actual incompetency at the time of trial may be the basis for habeas relief. Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Odle v. Calderon, 919 F. Supp. 1367, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (referring to such claim as an "actual incompetency"......
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