Steinway v. Board of School Trustees of Mill Creek Community School Corp., 4-385A67

• Decision Date: 23 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 4-385A67,4-385A67
• Citation: 486 N.E.2d 1045
• Parties: 29 Ed. Law Rep. 745 Steven STEINWAY, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF the MILL CREEK COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1045

486 N.E.2d 1045

29 Ed. Law Rep. 745

Steven STEINWAY, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF the MILL CREEK COMMUNITY SCHOOL

CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 4-385A67.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

Dec. 23, 1985.

Richard J. Darko and Bradley W. Skolnik, Tabbert & Capehart, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Robert A. Wood, Kendall, Wood, Coleman, Kessinger & Stegemoller, Danville, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Steven Steinway (Steinway) appeals a judgment rendered in favor of defendant-appellee Board of School Trustees of the Mill Creek Community School Corporation (the Board). Steinway brought an action against the Board alleging that the Board did not follow the procedure prescribed in IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11 when it cancelled his teaching contract.

The facts relevant to this appeal disclose that the Board notified Steinway ¹ by letter on April 21, 1983 that the cancellation of his indefinite teacher's contract would be considered on May 25, 1983. On May 5, 1983, Steinway requested a hearing before the Board, pursuant to IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11(a)(3). By letter dated May 23, 1983, Steinway was informed that a hearing would be held on May 25, 1983. Although Steinway agreed to the hearing date, he raised an objection based on the statute's requirement that a teacher be given not less than five days notice of the hearing. On the same day as the first notice, May 23, 1983, a subsequent letter was sent to Steinway informing him that the hearing would be held on May 31, 1983 instead of May 25, 1983. On May 24, 1983 Steinway acknowledged the new hearing date.

At the hearing held on May 31, 1983, Steinway's representative asked the Board to note an objection to the hearing date based on the time frame established by the statute. IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11(a)(1) states that:

"the teacher shall be notified in writing of the date, time, and place for the consideration by the school corporation of the cancellation of the contract; this notification must occur not more than forty (40) days nor less than thirty (30) days before the consideration[.]"

According to Steinway's representative, the hearing was held on the forty-first day after notification.

At the conclusion of the hearing held on May 31, 1983, a suggestion was made that the parties be allowed to prepare and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Steinway's representative welcomed the opportunity and suggested a week delay of the final decision. The following colloquy at the hearing demonstrates that Steinway's only objection to the proceeding was his belief that the hearing date fell beyond the 40 days provided in IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11(a)(1):

"MR. WOOD: As there is an issue between the administration and the teacher concerning this 30 to 40 days, by granting you the additional time to prepare the conclusion, the fact that the board does not render its decision today, are you going to object to that, other than what you objected at the outset of the--

"MR. GRABLE: No, I would not, you know, object to extending from today's date. But what has already transpired, I would continue to argue that point. You know, if the board is willing to grant us the opportunity to make additional arguments, basically, the findings of fact and conclusions for the record, then I would be willing to grant the board an extension from today, a week or ten days, whatever they feel or whatever they would like--(inaudible)--for the consideration, from today on, in lieu [sic] of what has transpired in the past.

"MR. WOOD: Okay.

"MR. GRABLE: To grant the extension today does not waive our argument--(inaudible)

"MR. WOOD: Well, by the same token, if it's later determined that today was the fortieth then you're not going to object to the fact that the board did not officially act today?

"MR. GRABLE: No--(inaudible)

"MR. WOOD: All right, how much time do you each feel that you need to prepare your findings and conclusions?

* * *

* * *

"MR. GRABLE: I would think that seven days would would be sufficient."

After a bench trial, the court concluded inter alia that the hearing was held on the fortieth day after notice and that the statute does not require a final decision at the time of consideration or the hearing. On appeal, Steinway has abandoned any allegation that the hearing was held beyond the 40-day limitation.

One issue is raised for review: whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the Board complied with the notice requirements of IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11. The gravamen of Steinway's complaint appears to be that the Board's final decision to terminate his contract must occur after the hearing on the same day as the hearing, or at least not beyond the 40-day time period after notice.

Steinway's appellate brief first states that the statute, IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11, is clear and unequivocal; thus, it needs no interpretation. Immediately thereafter, Steinway suggests an interpretation of the statute which would equate "consideration" with "final decision."

The relevant portion of the statute, other than the paragraph already quoted, states:

"(7) a contract may not be canceled until:

(A) the date set for consideration of the cancellation of the contract;

(B) after a hearing is held, if a hearing is requested by the teacher; and

(C) the superintendent has given his recommendations on the contract; on five (5) days' written notice to him by the school corporation, the superintendent shall present his recommendation on each contract, except on a superintendent's contract[.]"

The statute does not address time limitations for a final decision by the Board.

While no authority addressing this precise issue could be found, the case of Joyce et al. v. Hanover Comm. Sch. Corp. (1971), 150 Ind.App. 296, 276 N.E.2d 549 is instructive. In...