Steller v. Steller

Citation401 S.W.2d 473
Decision Date11 April 1966
Docket NumberNo. 51290,No. 2,51290,2
PartiesHenry STELLER and Lena Steller, Respondents, v. John R. STELLER and Elizabeth Steller, Appellants
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Bild & Cooper, Frank Bild, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Goldenhersh, Gallagher, Fredericks & Newman and Leo M. Newman, St. Louis, for defendants-appellants.

EAGER, Presiding Judge.

This is a suit to set aside a warranty deed alleged to have been executed by reason of coercion and undue influence exercised by the appellants. We shall refer to the parties as they appeared below. Henry Steller, one of the plaintiffs, is a brother of John Steller, one of the defendants. Both were 'distant' cousins of the grantor Eva Wlcek. The real estate involved was a comparatively small residence in St. Louis County; the deed was dated May 15, 1958, and it was recorded on February 28, 1961, after the grantor's death. By answer, the defendants denied all substantive allegations, and alleged that the deed was executed in consideration of love and affection and nursing care. Eva's executor was originally a party plaintiff, but he voluntarily dismissed his claim prior to trial. The trial court made detailed findings of fact in favor of plaintiffs; most of those matters will be covered in our recital of the evidence. The court also concluded that the deed was executed as a result of defendants' undue influence, and that the evidence was 'clear, cogent and convincing'; the deed was adjudged to be void and title was vested one-half in plaintiffs and one-half in defendants, as provided in Eva's will. After-trial motions were overruled by the lapse of time, and this appeal was duly taken.

On this appeal defendants assert: that no confidential relationship was proven, that no presumption of undue influence arose, and that plaintiffs failed to prove, to the degree required, that the will and free agency of the grantor was destroyed and replaced by the will of the defendants at the time of the execution of the deed. All the evidence was produced by the plaintiffs, and defendants stood upon their motion to dismiss.

At the time of Eva's death in February 1961, she was seventy-nine years old. She and her husband, Mihal (Mike) Wlcek, had lived for some years at 5351 Lode Avenue in St. Louis County, that being the property now in controversy. It seems that they had one child, who had died many years ago. In the fall of 1957 Eva had deteriorated until she was markedly senile; physically, she had a number of 'small strokes,' a severe heart condition and arteriosclerosis; mentally she had 'slowed down,' had memory lapses, and was lucid at times but confused at ohters. In September 1957, she became a patient in Miller's Nursing Home. Her husband died in October while she was there. She was taken to the funeral home, but was unable to attend his funeral. Dr. Wilucki, who had been her physician for about five years, attended her several times (four to six) in the nursing home. He testified: that she could answer simple questions but could not carry on any substantial conversations, was never 'real clear,' was depressed, and was kept on transquilizers; she sometimes recognized people, and at other times she did not. He last saw her shortly before Christmas, and was never called to see her later at defendants' home. It was his opinion that her senility would continue to go 'downhill,' with periods of increasing and slowing down, but that 'as a general rule' her condition would have been worse in May 1958 (five months later) than when he last saw her. Just before Christmas, 1957, the doctor, on request from the hospital, released Eva to go home for the holidays. The defendants took her to their apartment, as we shall note later.

While Eva was in the nursing home, and on October 18, 1957, she executed a power of attorney to Lena, authorizing her to handle Eva's affairs. These were not complicated, and Lena continued to attend to these matters until Eva's death, and apparently without complaint from anyone. The power of attorney was apparently suggested by officials of the nursing home, and not by Lena; she testified that she talked to a lawyer about the matter and later received the executed power by mail. Eva had previously said that she 'should take care of her business,'--everything. Henry and John, through their mother, were Eva's cousins. Lena had known Eva for about 38 years; she had visited Eva occasionally in her home, and later saw her approximately two or three times a week in the nursing home. During October 1957, Eva discussed with Lena the making of a will on two different occasions, telling her what she wanted in the will, namely, a bequest of $200 to the Salem Lutheran Church and the residue to be divided equally between John and Henry, with Henry and Lena to 'take care of everything.' Lena spoke to the officials of the home, and they advised her to go ahead with that request. Lena testified that at the time of the discussion concerning the power of attorney Eva knew what she was doing, and at the time of the discussions of her will she knew her relatives and knew of her ownership of a home. Lena procured the services of an attorney and a will was drawn and executed in accordance with Eva's expressed desires. Lena was not present at its execution. She told John and Betty of the power of attorney and of the execution of the will. There were times when Lena could not understand Eva in the nursing home, because her words were 'not plain,' but she did not 'ramble.' Lena was a receptionist for Dr. Wilucki, who was a witness.

As indicated, the defendants took Eva to their three-room upstairs apartment for Christmas of 1957. They continued to keep her and, early in January 1958, the plaintiffs and defendants met in that apartment to arrange for Eva's future care. The defendants suggested moving with Eva into her own home on Lode Avenue; it was agreed that defendants would continue to care for her but would move with her to that home (the property in controversy here), would receive her social security check of about $69.80 and $100 a month from Eva's funds, but would pay a monthly rent of $25. These arrangements were entirely satisfactory to John and Betty, but no one told Eva of them. She was moved by ambulance to her home in February 1958, and, with the exception of about two weeks in a hospital near the end of her life, lived there with John and Betty until her death in February 1961. Under the arrangement as made, defendants were to pay all household expenses and all cost of Eva's care, including medicine and doctor's bills, but excluding hospital costs. Soon after this arrangement was made, Lena and John opened Eva's safe deposit box and found a certificate of deposit for an amount slightly more than $2,500; John took this, and he later said that he had placed $1,000 in his bank to cover Eva's funeral expenses, but he obviously kept the remainder; at the time he said, 'Aunt Eva is with us, we may as well take it home.' Apparently John and his wife gave Eva credits of $100 per month until the $1,500 was exhausted; after that Lena paid them monthly out of Eva's funds; she also received the rent payments. John presented to Lena the real estate tax statements for 1958, 1959, and 1960, and she paid them from Eva's funds. She also paid a bill for plumbing repairs, submitted to her by John, the work being done by John's son-in-law.

On one occasion when Lena saw Eva in early January 1958, at defendants' apartment, Eva had been crying and was crying; when Lena asked her what was wrong, she said that John 'wanted her to change her will.' Lena said that she would talk to John but Eva protested; nevertheless, Eva called John into the bedroom, asked him if that was true, and the only reply she got was 'well.' Lena then suggested to Eva that she leave things even between John and Henry, 'as is.'

Lena frequently visited Eva; she was generally in bed, but during the spring she was sometimes sitting up; in fact, she apparently improved physically, but not mentally. She sometimes sat in a wheelchair, and occasionally walked a little with assistance. She knew Lena and became upset when Lena did not visit her frequently. Both John and Henry were retired, and Lena was the only one of the four who was holding a job. Henry seldom visited Eva, as he was afflicted with rather serious arthritis during much of this time. When Eva complained that she signed her social security checks but got no proceeds, Lena explained that the money went to Betty for taking care of her. On one occasion in late 1958 or early 1959 Betty told Lena that every time she came to see Eva the latter seemed more 'upset afterwards,' and that maybe it would be better if she did not come every week. Thereafter, Lena skipped a week, but when she came back Eva complained bitterly, so she resumed her regular visits. From late 1958 Eva continually asked Lena whether she should sell her house and go back into a nursing home; she had never said anything to Lena about having deeded her property away. At one time Lena suggested to Betty that they should tell Eva what she was paying for their care, because Eva seemed to feel that she 'was in the way,' but Betty said 'no.' In late 1959 or early 1960 Eva was frequently crying and dissatisfied and talked about going back into a home; Lena told Betty and John of this, and John immediately went in and said to Eva in German: 'What's the matter? Don't you like it here; aren't we good to you.' Eva replied 'all right, all right.'

Eva owned a 1951 Mercury car which was kept at the home. In the spring of 1958 one Tony Golaszewski called on her, wanted to buy the car and offered her $400; John took the man out to inspect it. John said that he was going to buy it, and Eva told the man to come back the next day; he did so, but was told by Betty that the car had been sold and, on inquiring of Eva, she confirmed it. It developed that the title was...

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  • Davis v. Pitti
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1971
    ...of the issue of undue influence. Holland v. Anderson, Mo., 196 S.W.2d 175; Houghton v. West, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 407; Steller v. Steeler, Mo., 401 S.W.2d 473. The mere lack of consideration in a deed from parent to child does not per se invalidate the deed but it is an element to be We hold, fi......
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    ...of one person for the free will of the other.' " In re Estate of Newsum, 798 S.W.2d 165, 171 (Mo.App.1990) (quoting Steller v. Steller, 401 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Mo.1966)). A presumption of undue influence arises in discovery of assets cases where substantial evidence shows (1) a confidential an......
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