Stemmle v. Interlake S.S. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 July 2016
• Docket Number: 15-CV-4937 (ADS)(AYS)
• Parties: Thomas Charles STEMMLE, Jr., Plaintiff, v. INTERLAKE STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

198 F.Supp.3d 149

Thomas Charles STEMMLE, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.INTERLAKE STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Defendant.

15-CV-4937 (ADS)(AYS)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed July 27, 2016

The Lanier Law Firm P.C., Attorneys for the Plaintiff, 6810 F.M.1960 West, Houston, TX 77069, By: W. Mark Lanier, Esq., Charles F Herd, Esq., Lawrence Paul Wilson, Esq., Of Counsel

Kaufman, Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, Attorneys for the Defendant, 21 Main Street, Suite 251, Hackensack, NJ 07601, By: Gino Zonghetti, Esq., Of Counsel

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION & ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

This case arises from an action initially brought by the Plaintiff Thomas Charles Stemmle, Jr. (the "Plaintiff") in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau County (the "Nassau County Supreme Court"), against the Defendant Interlake Steamship Company (the "Defendant"), and subsequently removed by the Defendant to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The Plaintiff alleges that he became ill while working as a seaman on a vessel owned by the Defendant, and the Defendant failed to provide him with maintenance and cure benefits.

Presently before the Court is a motion by the Plaintiff to remand this case to Nassau County Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Also before the Court is a cross-motion by the Defendant for sanctions against the Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

For the reasons set forth below, both motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 9, 2014, the Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a verified complaint in Nassau County Supreme Court against the Defendant. (See Original Compl., Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A [the "Original Compl."].) According to the original complaint, the Plaintiff is a Nassau County resident, and the Defendant is a "foreign corporation" with its principal place of business located in Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 3.) The case was assigned to Justice Antonio I. Brandveen.

The complaint stated that for an unspecified period, the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a "Jones Act seaman" on the M/V Mesabi Miner (the "Miner"), a large commercial ship owned by the Defendant. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5.) "A Jones Act claim is an in personam action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course of employment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel owner, or crew members." Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441, 121 S.Ct. 993, 997, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ).

According to the complaint, on April 30, 2011, while working aboard the Miner, the Plaintiff allegedly became ill with a condition later diagnosed as cardiomyopathy

. (Original Compl. at ¶ 7.) He has since undergone two heart surgeries and is presently waiting for a heart transplant. (Id.) Allegedly, the Defendant has not provided the Plaintiff with timely medical care and has refused to reimburse the Plaintiff for his medical expenses. (Id. at ¶ 1.)

In the original complaint, the Plaintiff asserted a claim against the Defendant for maintenance and cure seeking compensation for reimbursement of his medical expenses and additional damages to compensate him for injuries that he sustained as a result of the Defendant's alleged delay in providing the Plaintiff with medical benefits. (See id. at ¶ 8.) "A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner's obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship." Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441, 121 S.Ct. 993. That duty "arises from the contract of employment" and "does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner or master." Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527, 58 S.Ct. 651, 653, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938).

The Plaintiff also asserted the following claims against the Defendant: a claim for detrimental reliance arising from the purported representations made by a representative of the Defendant to the Plaintiff regarding the Defendant's willingness to provide the Plaintiff with coverage for his medical expenses; a claim seeking to the compel the Defendant to provide the Plaintiff with his personnel records; a claim for "additional damages" arising from the Defendant's alleged failure to provide the Plaintiff with prompt maintenance and cure benefits; a claim for attorneys' fees and punitive damages; and a claim for lost wages.

The Plaintiff sought damages, which the complaint specified exceeded $75,000; attorneys' fees; pre and post-judgment interest; punitive damages; costs; and other relief authorized in admiralty law and in equity to which the Plaintiff is "justly entitled." (Id. at ¶ 30.) Also, the Plaintiff requested a jury trial.

Of importance, the complaint contained the following statement with regard to jurisdiction:

By virtue of [the] Plaintiff's status and claims as a Jones Act seaman, and the seaman-related claims asserted herein, Plaintiff would show that his claims are properly brought in state court pursuant to the ‘Savings to Suitors' clause, 28 U.S.C. Section 1333. Under this Savings to Suitors clause, a plaintiff can elect to file his maritime case in any court that has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, including state courts. Moreover, Plaintiff's causes of action, which at his election under the Savings to Suitors clause may be filed in state court, are not removable to federal court .... A Jones Act seaman's claims filed in state court are not removable—under either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.

(Id. at ¶ 4.)

On February 10, 2015, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint pursuant to Rule 3211(8) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (the "CPLR") for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Zonghetti's Sept. 10, 2015 Aff., Ex. C, at 1–10 [the "Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss"].) In addition, the Defendant moved under Rule 3211(7) of the CPLR to dismiss the Plaintiff's second and third causes of action for detrimental reliance and failure to provide necessary documents. (Id. at 11.) The Defendant contended that there are no such causes of action under general maritime law. (Id.) He further moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for unearned wages pursuant to Rule 3211(1) of the CPLR because he argued that documentary evidence resolved all factual issues and conclusively disposed of the Plaintiff's claim. (Id. at 12–13.) Finally, he asserted that the three- year statute of limitations under the Jones Act applied to the Plaintiff's claims for maintenance and cure benefits, and therefore, the Plaintiff's first, fourth, and fifth causes of action for such benefits and related relief were time-barred. (Id. at 13–14.)

On April 29, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (See Am. Compl., Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1, Ex. B [the "Am. Compl."].) The amended complaint removed the causes of action from the original complaint for detrimental reliance, failure to provide necessary documents, and unearned wages. (See id.) Thus, the amended complaint asserted claims solely for maintenance and cure benefits, attorneys' fees, and punitive damages. (See id.) As in the original complaint, the amended complaint referred to the Plaintiff as a "Jones Act seaman." (Id. at ¶ 4.) In the amended complaint, the Plaintiff also continued to assert that his claims were not removable to federal court." (Id.)

On May 1, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an affirmation in opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss. (See the Pl.'s Opp'n to the Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Zonghetti's Sept. 10, 2015 Aff., Ex. B, at 1–10 [the "Pl.'s Opp'n to the Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss"].) In it, the Plaintiff asserted that the Nassau County Supreme Court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because he contended that the Defendant transacted business in New York. (See id. at 2–14.) Of importance, he also asserted that the three-year statute of limitations period under the Jones Act was not applicable to his maintenance and cure claim because he contended that he "pled a claim for maintenance and cure irrespective of [the Defendant's] negligence." (Id. at 15.) Instead, he argued that a six-year limitations period for contract actions was applicable to his maintenance and cure claims. (Id. at 14–15.)

On May 8, 2015, the Defendant filed a memorandum in further support of its motion to dismiss the original complaint, re-iterating its assertion that the Nassau County Supreme Court lacked personal jurisdiction. (See the Def.'s Reply Mem. of Law in Support of its Mot. to Dismiss, Zonghetti's Sept. 10, 2015 Aff., Ex. C. [the "Def.'s May 8, 2015 Reply Mem. of Law"].) In addition, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff brought his maintenance and cure claims under the Jones Act and therefore, the three-year statute of limitations for Jones Act claims, not the six-year limitations period for contract actions, applied to the Plaintiff's claims. (Id. at 16.) Finally, the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff's separate cause of action for punitive damages failed as a matter of law. (Id. at 17.)

On July 28, 2015, Justice Brandveen signed a short form order denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (the "July 28, 2015 Order"). (See the July 28, 2015 Order, Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1, Ex. C [the "July 28, 2015 Order"].) In so doing, he determined that the Plaintiff had met his burden in establishing that the Defendant transacted business in New York so that the Nassau County Supreme Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over it. (Id. at 2–4.) In addition, Justice Brandveen applied the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions rather than the three-year statute of limitations for Jones Act actions to the Plaintiff's maintenance and cure claims. (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, he found that the Plaintiff's claims were not time-barred. (Id.)

On July 31, 2015, the Nassau County Clerk's Office entered the July 28, 2015 Order. (See Zonghetti's Sept. 10, 2015 Aff., Ex. F.)

On August 21, 2015, the Defendant filed a notice...