Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co., Inc.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DOLLIVER
• Citation: Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co., Inc., 709 P.2d 793, 104 Wn.2d 710 (Wash. 1985)
• Decision Date: 21 November 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 50944-1,51280-9
• Parties: Kenneth D. STENBERG and Diane Stenberg, individually and as a marital community, Appellants, v. PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC., a corporation, Defendant, Yakima County, Respondent. Sheila SCHRODER, a single person, Petitioner, v. The COUNTY OF KLICKITAT, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

Page 710

104 Wn.2d 710

709 P.2d 793

Kenneth D. STENBERG and Diane Stenberg, individually and as

a marital community, Appellants, v. PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC., a corporation, Defendant, Yakima County, Respondent.

Sheila SCHRODER, a single person, Petitioner, v. The COUNTY OF KLICKITAT, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

Nos. 50944-1, 51280-9.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Nov. 21, 1985.

Velikanje, Moore & Shore, Inc., James P. Hutton, Yakima, for appellants.

Kargianis & Austin, George Kargianis, Mark Fortier, Seattle, for petitioner.

Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Pros. Atty., Ron Zirkle, Deputy Pros. Atty., Yakima, for respondent Yakima County.

Halverson & Applegate, Walter G. Meyer, Jr., David A. Thompson, Yakima, for respondent Klickitat County.

Bryan P. Harnetiaux, Washington Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Robert H. Whaley, Winston & Cashatt, Spokane, amicus curiae.

DOLLIVER, Chief Justice.

Both plaintiffs, in a consolidated appeal, challenge a trial court's dismissal or partial dismissal of their cases by summary judgment pursuant to RCW 4.16.130, the 2-year "catch-all" statute of limitation. The plaintiffs claim the 3-year statute of limitation, RCW 4.16.080(2), governs their cases, which involve an "injury to the person".

We hold RCW 4.16.080(2) applies to causes of action claiming both direct and indirect injuries to the person or rights of another and overrule the direct/indirect injury distinction promulgated in the case of Northern Grain & Warehouse Co. v. Holst, 95 Wash. 312, 163 P. 775 (1917) (hereinafter Northern Grain) and its progeny.

I

Kenneth Stenberg was rendered quadriplegic as a result of an automobile collision on October 30, 1980. Stenberg, the favored driver, entered the intersection of Scoon Road and Independence Road in Yakima County. Dennis Hysell failed to yield the right of way and, as a result, the two cars collided. The Stenberg vehicle then struck an electrical power pole erected by Yakima County and maintained by Pacific Power & Light Co., Inc. Apparently, it was the collision with the power pole that caused the fractures to Stenberg's spinal column which resulted in paralysis.

The Stenbergs settled with Hysell. On December 27, 1982, more than 2 but less than 3 years after the accident, the plaintiffs initiated the instant action against Pacific Power and Yakima County. Relying on Steele v. Bell, 37 Wash.App. 337, 679 P.2d 964 (1984), the trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that the action should have been commenced within 2 years of the accident, since any harm caused by the electrical pole was an indirect cause of harm.

The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal for direct review on September 5, 1984. They subsequently settled with Pacific Power leaving Yakima County as the sole defendant. In a case earlier consolidated with Stenberg (Cienfuegos, et al. v. Mike's Rental Machinery, Inc.), those parties settled subsequent to the direct appeal and are not before this court.

Plaintiff Schroder was seriously injured as a passenger in a single car accident in Klickitat County on the evening of November 15, 1978. The accident occurred on county road number 9234, at the foot of an incline where the road curves sharply to the right. The driver of the car saw the upcoming curve as an extension of the roadway going straight ahead. The centerline ended abruptly; and there were no guardrails above the embankment on the outside of the curve. Traveling at the speed limit, the car left the roadway, nose-diving off the embankment into a diagonal-end flip, and came to rest on its wheels.

Schroder initiated a negligence action against Klickitat County on October 5, 1981, more than 2 years, but less than 3 years from the accident, listing the following 8 claims or theories of negligence: (1) failure to provide or maintain a suitable shoulder at the edge of the road; (2) failure to provide and maintain a road of safe and adequate width; (3) failure to provide and maintain a guardrail; (4) failure to remove obstruction from the edge of the road; (5) failure to sign the road properly or maintain the surface of the road; (6) failure to design properly the roadway at the scene of the accident; (7) failure to mark the edge of the roadway; and (8) failure to keep the roadway clear of gravel. The trial court accepted the County's motion to dismiss in part, and barred the first 4 claims pursuant to Steele v. Bell, supra, as indirect causes and subject to the 2-year catch-all statute of limitation. The trial court permitted the other 4 claims to remain pending.

Schroder filed notice for discretionary review from the order granting in part defendant's motion to dismiss this action against it. We granted the motion for discretionary review and consolidated the case with the Stenberg case.

The sole issue before this court is whether the 2-year or the 3-year statute of limitation applies to a claim against a tort feasor who is only an "indirect" cause of the harm.

II

RCW 4.16.080(2) requires "[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated ..." shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action shall have accrued. RCW 4.16.130, the so-called "catch-all" provision, provides that "[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued."

These two statutes have undergone no substantive changes in language since their adoption in 1854. See Laws of 1854, § 4, p. 363; Laws of 1854, § 7, p. 364. To put the use and application of the statutes in perspective, we need to look to the purposes and policies of statutes of limitation.

The Limitation Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 16 (7 Chitty's Eng.Stats., at 619 (6th ed.1912)), marked the beginning of the modern law of limitations on personal actions in the common law. The purposes behind the act were to keep out inconsequential claims and to minimize hardships on poor defendants. Developments in the Law--Statute of Limitation, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177 (1950).

Today, all states have limitation statutes for the majority of actions before their courts. The purposes have remained intact; courts apply limitation statutes to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so opposing parties have fair opportunity to defend. 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 17 (1970).

Statutes of limitation are in their nature arbitrary. They rest upon no other foundation than the judgment of a State as to what will promote the interests of its citizens. Each determines such limits and imposes such restraints as it thinks proper.

Tioga R.R. v. Blossburg & Corning R.R., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 137, 150, 22 L.Ed. 331 (1873) (Hunt, J., concurring).

In Washington, the goals of our limitation statutes are to force claims to be litigated while pertinent evidence is still available and while witnesses retain clear impressions of the occurrence. Summerrise v. Stephens, 75 Wash.2d 808, 811, 454 P.2d 224 (1969). Our policy is one of repose; the goals are to eliminate the fears and burdens of threatened litigation and to protect a defendant against stale claims. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 664, 453 P.2d 631 (1969). A statute of limitation, in effect, deprives a plaintiff of the opportunity to invoke the power of the courts in support of an otherwise valid claim.

However, in applying a limitation statute, this court has insisted on a careful scrutiny of the changing conditions and needs of the times to prevent any application of the common law as an instrument of injustice. Lundgren v. Whitney's Inc., 94 Wash.2d 91, 95, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980). When there is uncertainty as to which statute of limitation governs, the longer statute will be applied. Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546 (9th Cir.1981); Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers, Inc., 76 Wash.2d 40, 51, 455 P.2d 359 (1969).

To determine whether recent applications of the Northern Grain "direct/indirect" analysis have departed from the statutory language or the goals of our limitation statutes, it is necessary to make a chronological survey of Washington case law in this area. In 1901, this court interpreted the limitation statutes as an attempt to provide a limitation for every kind of action that could be brought in the courts, with the catch-all provision (now RCW 4.16.130) intended to cover any action which did not fall into any of the other provisions. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Lucas, 26 Wash. 417, 418, 67 P. 252 (1901). A case decided later that same year found the catch-all provision had no relation to actions for "an 'injury to the person or rights of another,' [now RCW 4.16.080(2) ] for that was a matter before provided for." Robinson v. Baltimore & Seattle Mining & Reduction Co., 26 Wash. 484, 487, 67 P. 274 (1901).

After Robinson, there were three cases decided between 1904 and 1909 which provided a direct/indirect distinction in the court's interpretation of the 3-year statute (now RCW 4.16.080(1)) as it related to "an action for waste or trespass upon real property." Welch v. Seattle & M. R.R., 56 Wash. 97, 98, 105 P. 166 (1909); Denney v. Everett, 46 Wash. 342, 89 P. 934 (1907); Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Co., 35 Wash. 1, 76 P. 298 (1904). These cases held the 3-year statute governed trespass actions only when the trespass was a direct physical invasion of the property itself and not for an action for consequential damages. Thus, in all instances the 2-year catch-all limitation was applied.

In Welch v. Seattle & M. R.R., the plaintiffs sought to recover for damages resulting from tunneling underneath the property of their building. The railroad argued the action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitation. The court responded An action setting forth such facts as these was an action in trespass, as distinguished from what was...