Stenglein v. Beach

• Decision Date: 17 October 1901
• Citation: 87 N.W. 449,128 Mich. 440
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: STENGLEIN et al. v. BEACH, Circuit Judge.

87 N.W. 449

128 Mich. 440

STENGLEIN et al. v. BEACH, Circuit Judge.

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 17, 1901

Mandamus by John Stenglein and others, against Emmet L. Beach, Saginaw circuit judge, to compel the vacation of an order for a preliminary injunction. Denied.

James H. Davitt, for respondent.

MONTGOMERY C.J.

This is an application for mandamus to compel the respondent to vacate an order for a preliminary injunction. It appears by the return of the respondent that on June 24, 1901, Matthew Gramlich and others filed a bill of complaint against the relator and others, setting forth, in substance, that the complainants in such bill were, under the charter of the city of Saginaw, as it existed prior to the amendment hereinafter referred to, and continued to be members of the board of supervisors of Saginaw county, and representatives of the city of Saginaw in such board; that they are the actual incumbents of such office, but that the defendants named in the bill threaten to take the seats of the complainants, and sit as members of the board at future meetings of the board. The bill further alleges that at the session of 1901 the legislature undertook to withdraw the functions formerly exercised by complainants from them, and confer them upon defendants, and that said attempted legislation is unconstitutional. The bill asked for an injunction to restrain the defendants from sitting or attempting to sit as members of the board of supervisors, and also prayed that the complainants' right and title to the office be adjudicated and determined in their favor. A preliminary injunction was granted upon this bill. The case was brought to our attention at the June term upon a motion for a mandamus, but, it appearing that no motion to dissolve the injunction had been made to the circuit judge, we declined to interfere at that stage. A motion has since been entered in the circuit court to dissolve the injunction, and the returns shows that this application was denied, and the grounds stated by the circuit judge are set forth in an opinion attached to the return. These grounds are, in brief that the complainants in the equity case are the incumbents of the offices, and that pending a determination at law, and in a proper proceeding by quo warranto, the incumbents of a public office may, where the circumstances require it, obtain an injunction to restrain interference with the performance of their duties. We do not interfere by mandamus to control the discretion of a circuit judge in granting an injunction except in a very plain case; and we should not in this case unless thoroughly convinced of the want of jurisdiction to issue such an order. An examination of the authorities demonstrates that, in other jurisdictions at least, a court of equity has the right to interpose in protection of an officer de facto against the interference of claimants whose title is disputed until the latter shall establish the title by judicial proceedings provided by law. Thus, in 2 High, Inj. (3d Ed.) � 1315, it is said: 'The...