Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, WAMPLER-LONGACRE

• Decision Date: 01 March 1996
• Docket Number: 951050 and 951072,Nos. 950829,WAMPLER-LONGACRE,s. 950829
• Parties: , 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1573 The STENRICH GROUP, et al. v. Claudia H. JEMMOTT. PERDUE FARMS, INC. v. Linda Kay MARTIN.CHICKEN, INC., et al. v. Shirley A. BILLER. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 795

467 S.E.2d 795

251 Va. 186, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1573

The STENRICH GROUP, et al. v. Claudia H. JEMMOTT.

PERDUE FARMS, INC. v. Linda Kay MARTIN.

WAMPLER-LONGACRE CHICKEN, INC., et al. v. Shirley A. BILLER.

Record Nos. 950829, 951050 and 951072.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

March 1, 1996.

Cathleen P. Welsh, Harrisonburg (Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on brief), for appellants in Record No. 951072.

A. Thomas Lane, Jr., Arlington, for appellee in Record No. 951072.

Thomas G. Bell, Jr., Staunton (Timberlake, Smith, Thomas & Moses, on briefs), for appellant in Record No. 951050.

James B. Feinman, Lynchburg (James B. Feinman & Associates, on brief), for appellee in Record No. 951050.

S. Vernon Priddy, III, Richmond (Mary Louise Kramer; Matthew J. Ide; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on briefs), for appellants in Record No. 950829.

Daniel E. Lynch, Richmond (Williams & Pierce, on brief), for appellee in Record No. 950829.

Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, STEPHENSON, LACY, HASSELL, and KEENAN, JJ., and WHITING, Senior Justice.

CARRICO, Chief Justice.

The dispositive question in each of these cases is whether the Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that a job-related physical impairment resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion is a disease within the contemplation of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). The question arises in the context of the following factual and procedural scenarios:

Stenrich v. Jemmott

On August 1, 1989, Claudia H. Jemmott (Jemmott) began working for The Stenrich Group, Inc. (Stenrich), a Richmond advertising concern, as a copy editor/proofreader, later becoming a senior copy editor/proofreader. She spent between five and six hours of each workday using a pen and a "slant board" in the performance of her duties, with her hands moving repetitively "back and forth and downward" as she read and corrected written material.

On March 13, 1992, Jemmott experienced "an intense burning sensation" in her right hand. Thereafter, she tended to rely more upon her left hand, but it also began to cause her discomfort. In August 1992, she came under the care of Dr. Bruce M. Stelmack. He diagnosed her as suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands, which he attributed to the repetitive motions involved in her work. These motions, the doctor stated in a deposition submitted to the Commission, caused Jemmott "micro trauma," meaning "a small amount of injury in a repetitive motion to the same area ... occur[ring] in patients [who] flex their wrist and impinge the nerve as it courses through the carpal tunnel." The doctor opined that carpal tunnel syndrome is "a disease process" as distinguished from "a simple injury."

Deputy Commissioner Lee entered an award of compensation in favor of Jemmott. Affirming the award, the full Commission wrote as follows:

Dr. Stelmack testified convincingly that [Jemmott] has a disease, which he distinguishes from an injury. Dr. Stelmack stated that repetitive use of [Jemmott's] hands resulted in repetitive trauma but he also stated that this repetitive use resulted in a disease process. We find, therefore, that [Jemmott's] carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease.

Perdue Farms v. Martin

On June 12, 1990, Linda Kay Martin (Martin) began working for Perdue Farms, Inc. (Perdue) as a sanitation worker at its chicken processing plant in Bridgewater. For approximately 5 1/2 hours each day, Martin used a high-pressure water gun to clean production machinery. She operated the gun by pulling a trigger with all the fingers of one hand at the same time. She used her right hand until it began to trouble her, then switched to the left. Eventually, she also experienced trouble with her left hand.

In October 1992, the plant nurse arranged an appointment for Martin with Dr. G. Edward Chappell, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon. On October 19, 1992, the doctor diagnosed Martin as suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands, a consequence, he stated, of "doing repetitive work on the poultry line at Perdue." In his final report, the doctor opined that Martin's carpal tunnel syndrome "is a disease caused by her employment at Perdue--specifically on a poultry line."

Deputy Commissioner Herring held that Martin had "failed to meet her burden of proof that she suffers from a disease" and that "no award shall enter." The full Commission reversed and awarded compensation to Martin, holding that Dr. Chappell had "identified her condition as a disease" and that the Commission had "consistently held that a disease caused by repetitive motion or trauma is compensable as an occupational disease when supported, as here, by the medical record."

Wampler-Longacre v. Biller

Shirley A. Biller (Biller) began working for Wampler-Longacre Chicken, Inc. (Wampler-Longacre) on February 3, 1993, in the "Rehang" department of its processing plant in Broadway. Her job required her to use both hands to take chickens from a rotating belt and place them on "shackles" above her. In this process, her thumbs were "in an upward position." On average, she handled between 25 and 30 birds each minute during an eight-hour shift, with two one-half hour breaks.

On November 29, 1993, Biller reported to Dr. Galen G. Craun, Jr., a Harrisonburg physician, who found that her thumbs were "locked in extension." The doctor told Biller she had "trigger thumbs," and he diagnosed her as suffering from tenosynovitis. He testified in a deposition submitted to the Commission that while there are a number of causes of "trigger thumb," he was of opinion that Biller's tenosynovitis was "the accumulation or the product of many repetitious minor injuries to a joint, in the case here of the thumbs." The doctor also said that he considered "trigger thumb a disease."

Deputy Commissioner Herring held that Biller had "failed to meet her burden of proof that she suffers from a compensable disease" and that "no award shall issue." The full Commission reversed, pointing out that subsequent to the time the deputy commissioner decided the matter, the Commission had held in another case that " 'cumulative trauma which causes or results in a disease may be compensable.' " The Commission awarded compensation to Biller, citing Dr. Craun's opinion that Biller's "trigger thumb" was a disease and that it was "caused by work repetition."

In an unpublished opinion issued in each case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's action, holding that the impairment suffered by the particular employee constituted an occupational disease. Finding that the cases involve matters of significant precedential value, Code § 17-116.07(A)(2) and (B), we awarded appeals to Stenrich, Perdue, and Wampler-Longacre.

In reviewing the cases, the Court of Appeals treated as findings of fact the Commission's holdings that the impairments suffered by the three employees were diseases within the contemplation of the Act. The court then undertook a limited appellate review, inquiring only whether the findings were supported by credible evidence. Finding there was such support, the Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's awards.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals. Admittedly, an award of the Commission is "conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact." Code § 65.2-706(A); see City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 163, 335 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1985). However, we think the issue whether a worker has suffered an impairment that constitutes a compensable disease is a mixed question of law and fact and, hence, a Commission finding on the question is not conclusive and binding upon this Court but is properly subject to judicial review. See Braxton, 230 Va. at 163-64, 335 S.E.2d at 261 (mixed question of law and fact, properly reviewable, whether injury arose out of and in the course of employment); see also Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 519, 403 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1991) (mixed question of law and fact whether worker's actions constituted part of owner's trade, business, or occupation); VEPCO v. Kremposky, 227 Va. 265, 270, 315 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1984) (mixed question of law and fact whether safety rule strictly enforced); Derby v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 344, 49 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1948) (mixed question of law and fact whether worker suffered an accident).

Here, the factual part of the mixed question is whether the three claimants involved have suffered impairments, and there can be no doubt that they have; the evidence conclusively establishes that Jemmott and Martin suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and that Biller suffers from "trigger thumbs." The legal part of the mixed question is whether these impairments, which all parties agree were gradually incurred, constitute diseases within the contemplation of the Act. In resolving this part of the question, the crucial inquiry is whether the Commission correctly applied the law to the established facts. See Cinnamon v. International Business Machs. Corp., 238 Va. 471, 474, 384 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1989).

As first enacted in 1918, what is now the Workers' Compensation Act provided compensation only for injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Compensation for disease "in any form" was excluded except "where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident." Acts 1918, c. 400, § 2(d).

We first dealt with the question of a gradually incurred injury in Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 181 Va. 287, 24 S.E.2d 546 (1943). In Aistrop, we said that " 'injury of gradual growth, ... caused by the cumulative effect of many acts done or many exposures to conditions prevalent in the work, no one of which can be identified as the cause of the harm, is definitely excluded from compensation.' " Id. at 293, 24 S.E.2d at 548 (quoting Francis H. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev. 328, 343 (1912)).

The year after our decision in Aistrop, the General Assembly added "a...