Stenson v. Heath, 11-cv-5680 (RJS)(AJP)

• Decision Date: 18 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 11-cv-5680 (RJS)(AJP),11-cv-5680 (RJS)(AJP)
• Parties: CHARLES STENSON, Petitioner, v. PHILLIP D. HEATH, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

CHARLES STENSON, Petitioner,
v.
PHILLIP D. HEATH, Respondent.

No. 11-cv-5680 (RJS)(AJP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FILED: June 19, 2015
June 18, 2015

ORDER

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge:

Charles Stenson ("Petitioner") brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1 (the "Petition" or "Pet.")), challenging his conviction in New York Supreme Court, New York County, on one count of second degree burglary and one count of fourth degree grand larceny, for which he was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years of imprisonment. Now before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Andrew J. Peck, Magistrate Judge, recommending that the Petition be denied (Doc. No. 11 (the "Report" or "Rep.")), as well as Petitioner's objections to the Report (Doc. No. 16 ("Obj.")). The relevant facts and procedural history relating to the Petition are set forth in detail in the Report. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report in its entirety and denies the Petition.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief only if a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court (1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as detennined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "Clearly

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established Federal law means the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision." Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 296 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state court decision is "contrary to" such a holding only where the state court "either 'arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law' or 'confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [the opposite result].'" Lain fiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402 (2000)). An "'unreasonable application' of those holdings must be 'objectively unreasonable,' not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not suffice." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). A federal court should grant habeas relief only if "the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fainninded disagreement." Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011)).

A court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989). A court may accept those portions of a report to which no specific, written objection is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings are not clearly erroneous. See Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 956 F. Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985)). To the extent that a petitioner makes specific objections to a magistrate judge's findings, the court must undertake a de novo review of the objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997).

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Pro se filings are read liberally and interpreted "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, where objections are "conclusory or general," or where the petitioner "simply reiterates his original arguments," the report should be reviewed only for clear error. Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Cartagena v. Connelly, No. 06 Civ. 2047 (LTS) (GWG), 2008 WL 2169659, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008). A magistrate judge's decision is clearly erroneous only if the district court is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." SEC v. Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Chen v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 435 F.3d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2006)).

II. DISCUSSION

The Petition asserts two claims, both of which the Report thoroughly addressed and rejected. Specifically, Petitioner argues that (1) the trial court violated Petitioner's double jeopardy, due process, and fair trial rights, as well as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, when it allowed evidence to be admitted concerning four credit cards recovered from him when he was arrested, even though the counts related to the credit cards had been dismissed, and (2) Petitioner's trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the credit card evidence on double jeopardy and due process grounds. Petitioner objects to each of the Report's conclusions in this regard. The Court addresses each objection in turn.

A. Admitting the Credit Card Evidence

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his fair trial, due process, and double jeopardy...