Stephanie M. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 06 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-01711-MMA-BGS |
| Parties | Stephanie M., Plaintiff v. Andrew SAUL, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO: (1) GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 12]; (2) DENY DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 13]; and (3) REMAND FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 2020, Plaintiff Stephanie M (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) filed her Complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denial of his disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (ECF No 1.)[1] On September 15, 2020, this Court issued an order granting Plaintiff's IFP motion. (ECF No. 4.) The Commissioner filed the Administrative Record on June 3, 2021. (ECF No. 11.) On July 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking reversal of the final decision denying benefits and a remand for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 12.) Initially, Plaintiff argued that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed reversible error for his DAA analysis. (ECF No. 12-1 at 3.) However, the Plaintiff also seemed to have raised three additional reasons for why the ALJ erred: (1) for failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints regarding whether Plaintiff's symptoms are controlled when taking medication, (2) for failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints due to her daily activities, and (3) for not providing any explanation as to why the ALJ did not believe the second and third hypotheticals at Step Five. (Id. at 3-6.) On August 9, 2021, the Commissioner filed his Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff filed a Reply on August 23, 2021. (ECF No. 14.)
After careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the administrative record and the applicable law and for the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) be GRANTED, the Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) be DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income on October 23, 2017, with an alleged onset date of July 1, 2016. (ECF No. 11-2 at 23.) Plaintiff's application was initially denied on February 15, 2018, and upon reconsideration on April 27, 2018. (Id.) At Plaintiff's request, a hearing before an ALJ was held on July 22, 2019 at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified, along with a vocational expert (“VE”) who also provided testimony. (ECF Nos. 11-4 at 22-25 [request for hearing], 48 [notice of hearing]; ECF No. 11-2 at 50-76 [hearing transcript].) On September 10, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denied Plaintiff's application for benefits. (ECF No. 11-2 at 23-44.) The Appeals Council denied review on June 29, 2020. (Id. at 2-4.)
III. SUMMARY OF FIVE STEPS
The ALJ's decision explains and then goes through each potentially dispositive step of the familiar five-step evaluation process for determining whether an individual has established eligibility for disability benefits. (ECF No. 11-2 at 23-44); see Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
At Step One, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not “engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 23, 2017, the application date.” (ECF No. 11-2 at 25.) At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
Polysubstance Abuse/Dependence (Methamphetamines; Cocaine; Cannabis / Marijuana; Alcohol; Other Psychoactive Substances and Stimulants); Mental Impairments (Variously Diagnosed as Bipolar Disorder; Bipolar Manic-Depressive Disorder; Bipolar Disorder and Depression with Suicidal Ideation; Bipolar Disorder-Current Episode Depressed; Bipolar Disorder without Psychotic Features; Anxiety Disorder; Substance Induced Mood Disorder; Mania with History of Bipolar Disorder Precipitated by Drug Use; Borderline Traits; Binge Eating Disorder).
(Id.) At Step Three, the ALJ considered whether the Plaintiff's impairments “meet or equal” one or more of the specific impairments or combination of impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the listings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did meet a listing. (ECF No. 11-2 at 26-29.) The ALJ determined that the Plaintiff's impairments, including substance abuse, Plaintiff's impairments met section 12.04 of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d)). (Id.) The ALJ stated that the Plaintiff's “mental impairments, including the substance use disorder(s), meet the requirements of listings 12.04[ and that the] paragraph ‘A' requirements with the substance use are met[, ] as the claimant meets 12.04(A)(1)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (i).” (Id. at 27.) The ALJ then found that the Plaintiff “has a marked limitation in each area with the substance use[, ] [t]herefore, the ‘paragraph B' criteria are satisfied and 12.04(B) is met.” (Id. at 27.) The ALJ then provided his analysis in how he decided that Plaintiff met the requirements of listing 12.04. (Id.) However, the ALJ did not make a disability finding at this Step.
Instead of proceeding to Steps Four and Five as is required when there isn't a disability determination at Step Three, the ALJ reanalyzed Step Two. He found that “[i]f the claimant stopped the substance use, the remaining limitations would cause more than a minimal impact on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities; therefore, the claimant would continue to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments.” (Id. at 29.) Then at Step Three, the ALJ found that “[i]f the claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d)).” (Id. at 29-31.)
If the Plaintiff does not meet a listing, the ALJ “assess[es] and makes a finding about [the Plaintiff's] residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the Plaintiff's] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant's RFC is the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(c). The RFC is used at the fourth and fifth steps to determine whether the Plaintiff can do his or her past work (Step Four) or adjust to other available work (Step Five). Id.
Here, the ALJ found the following RFC for Plaintiff:
If the claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would have the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: She can learn, remember and perform simple, routine, and repetitive work tasks, involving simple 1- and 2-step work instructions, which are performed in a routine, predictable, and low stress work environment (defined as one in which there are no rapid production pace work tasks or high quota requirements, few work place changes, and no close personal supervision). She can attend, concentrate, and maintain pace for 2 hours at a time with normal breaks. She may have occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers. She should have only minimal and superficial contact with the public.
(See ECF No. 11-2 at 31-42.) At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Id. at 42-43.)
At Step Five, the ALJ considers whether the Plaintiff can do other work, considering the Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and the limitations in the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the Plaintiff can do other available work, then the Plaintiff is found not disabled; but if the Plaintiff cannot do any other available work, then the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g); see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ heard and relied on a VE's testimony that opined that work existed in significant No. in the national economy for a person of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and with the RFC found by the ALJ. (ECF No. 11-2 at 43-44.)
If the ALJ finds that the Plaintiff is disabled and there is medical evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism, the ALJ must determine whether the Plaintiff's drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, unless the ALJ finds that the Plaintiff is eligible for benefits because of his or her age or blindness. See 20 CFR 416.920(g) and 416.935. The ALJ found that “[t]he substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability because the [Plaintiff] would not be disabled if she stopped the substance use[.]” (ECF No. 11-2 at 43.) The ALJ then stated that “[b]ecause the substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, the [Plaintiff] has not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the date the application was filed through the date of this decision.” (Id.)
IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner's decision. See i...
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