Stephens v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 13 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. SKG-06-2476.,Civil No. SKG-06-2815.,Civil No. SKG-06-3120.,Civil No. SKG-06-1360.,Civil No. SKG-06-3051.,Civil No. SKG-07-396.,Civil No. SKG-06-2026.,Civil No. SKG-06-2477.,Civil No. SKG-06-1598.,Civil No. SKG-07-590.,Civil No. SKG-07-518.,Civil No. SKG-07-394.,Civil No. SKG-06-2903.,Civil No. SKG-07-1236.,Civil No. SKG-07-298.,Civil No. SKG-07-299.,Civil No. SKG-05-2574.,Civil No. SKG-06-2608.,Civil No. SKG-06-2949.,Civil No. SKG-06-2812.,Civil No. SKG-06-1163.,Civil No. SKG-06-3445.,Civil No. SKG-07-561.,Civil No. SKG-06-2507.,Civil No. SKG-06-2475.,Civil No. SKG-07-900.,Civil No. SKG-06-1311.,Civil No. SKG-06-2506.,Civil No. SKG-06-2948.,Civil No. SKG-06-2601.,Civil No. SKG-06-2509.,Civil No. SKG-06-2603.,Civil No. SKG-06-2960.,Civil No. SKG-06-378. |
| Citation | 539 F.Supp.2d 802 |
| Parties | Natalie J. STEPHENS v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security. Julia Litz v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Belinda Jackson v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Tori Addision v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Marsha Woodland v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Kim Douglas v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Henry Allison v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. David Anderson v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Karl Sharp v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Elaine Obee Johnson v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Paul Ward v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Suzanne Ruben-Popkin v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Christine A. Latham v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. William L. Underwood, Jr. v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Phillip J. Braxton v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Maria Cordova v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Kimberly Carter v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Cheryl Birdow v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Hope Parker v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Crystal Lundy v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Dorothy Morales v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Deborah Laquay v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Dion Gray v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Llewellyn Pratt v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Egidia Raminhos v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Joanne Hall v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Virgil Evans v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Mauricio Zelaya v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Zawdy Bukry v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Rawn Russell v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Christina Watts v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Donna Wright o/b/o Brittany Wright v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. Vincent Miles v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. John Gagel v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Stephen F. Shea, Elkind and Shea, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Allen F. Loucks, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
Before the Court are thirty four Petitions for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act in Social Security Appeals (hereinafter the "EAJA").1 The first of these petitions was filed in the summer of 2007, and others were filed throughout the year. All request an award of attorney's fees payable to the plaintiff's counsel. (See, e.g., Paper No. 31.) The government filed individual responses stating that it does not contest the amount of fees requested, but that the fees should be payable to the plaintiff, not her attorney. (See, e.g., Paper No. 34.) The plaintiffs filed reply briefs requesting additional attorney's fees for preparing the reply brief. (See, e.g., Paper No. 35.) The government has opposed the award of any fees for the litigation of this issue of proper payee, however. A hearing was held on the matter in all thirty four cases on November 14, 2007.
For the reasons set forth below, this Court holds that an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA is payable to the plaintiff's attorney and further, that the plaintiff's attorney is entitled to additional fees for litigating this issue. Thus, this Court GRANTS each plaintiff's Petition for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, with fees and, costs payable directly to counsel.
The issue before the Court is whether an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA is payable to the plaintiff or his attorney. This question is distinct from whether the attorney has the right to seek fees, contrary to the party's wishes or indeed his waiver of fees. In deciding this question, the Court has reviewed the subject statute in its entirety, and has considered principles of statutory construction and the body of case law interpreting the EAJA and other fee shifting statutes, to aid in its interpretation of the statute here. Having done so, the Court rules that the attorney, not the plaintiff, is entitled to the award of any fees sought. While courts are divided on this exact question under the EAJA, a historical survey and close analysis of the case law on all fee shifting statutes demonstrates a judicial appreciation that fees belong to the attorney, not the client. An interpretation of the statute that would entitle the prevailing party to the receipt of the fee award (as opposed to counsel) would frustrate this statute's remedial purpose and accord the plaintiff an unintended windfall, contrary to legislative intent and long term administrative practice. This judge joins many others in the "common sense policy of protecting the statutory purposes of the fee award." See FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 967 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1992) (Newman, J., dissenting).
The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether its language indicates a clear and unambiguous meaning. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:2 (7th ed.2007). The Supreme Court has said that "[o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.'" Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)).
Section 2412 (d)(1)(A) of the EAJA reads:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ...
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The government asserts that this language indicates clearly and unambiguously that fees be paid to the plaintiff, who is the "prevailing party." (Paper No. 34 at 2-3.) On the other hand, plaintiff contends that the government misreads the statute by viewing this provision in isolation and relying solely upon the words "a court shall award [fees] to a prevailing party," instead of viewing the statute as a whole, including the Savings Provision added in the 1985 amendments. (Paper No. 35, 12-13.) See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub.L. 96-481, Pub.L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). The Savings Provision reads:
Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act ... shall not prevent an award of fees and other expenses under section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code.... Section 206(b)(2) of the Social Security Act shall not apply with respect to any such award but only if, where the claimant's attorney receives fees for the same work under both section 206(b) of that Act ... and section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code ..., the claimant's attorney refunds to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.
Id. (emphasis added). The Savings Provision directs the attorney to refund to his client the lesser of his fee awards, if he is awarded fees for the same work under both the EAJA and the Social Security Act. Plaintiff contends that this provision acknowledges that the attorney is the direct recipient of the fee award under both 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a) (EAJA) and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (the Social Security Act) and therefore is in the position to refund or give the lesser fee amount to the claimant. (Paper No. 35, 13-14.)
The 1985 amendment does suggest the congressional understanding as to the actual recipient of the attorney's fee awards under EAJA. That provision would not be necessary if, as the government posits, attorney's fees under EAJA belong to and necessarily go to the prevailing party. This amendment can be interpreted as anticipating that the attorney would receive directly the fee under EAJA, as well as the fee under 406(b).
At least one court has noted that another provision of the Act suggests that the fee should go to the attorney, not the client. While the Tenth Circuit in Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir.2007), as will be discussed later, ultimately found that the fee should go to the party, not the attorney, the court nonetheless observed that "it seems counter intuitive to hold that an award of attorney's fees does not go to the attorney, especially since the EAJA fees are calculated based on the time spent by the attorney and based on the attorney's hourly rate, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), 2(A)." See also Lyons v. Astrue, 2008 WL 474285, *4 (S.D.Ala.) (). Thus, this other provision of the Act suggests it is the attorney, not the party who is to receive the award for his actual, documented work.
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Issue Topics
...Marre prevents it from pursuing offsets against EAJA fees for the debts of the party in the Fifth Circuit. See Stephens v. Apfel , 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 819 (D. Md. 2008). Given the split in the circuits, it is possible that the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict, so no one can be confi......
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Issue topics
...Marre prevents it from pursuing offsets against EAJA fees for the debts of the party in the Fifth Circuit. See Stephens v. Apfel , 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 819 (D. Md. 2008). Given the split in the circuits, it is possible that the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict, so no one can be confi......
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Table of Cases
...(N.D. Ill. 1997), §§ 301.2, 1301.2 Stephens et al. v. Astrue , 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. May 7, 2009), 4th-09, 6th-09 Stephens v. Apfel , 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 819 (D. Md. 2008), § 1701.20 Stephens v. Callahan , 971 F. Supp. 1388 n.4 (N.D. Okla., July 22, 1997), §§ 202.10, 203.1, 210.4, 210.5, ......