Stephens v. Carrara

• Decision Date: 12 April 1979
• Citation: 265 Pa.Super. 102,401 A.2d 821
• Parties: Dennis B. STEPHENS and Helen M. Stephens, his wife v. Robert M. CARRARA and Hedwig F. Carrara, his wife, Appellants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 821

401 A.2d 821

265 Pa.Super. 102

Dennis B. STEPHENS and Helen M. Stephens, his wife v. Robert M. CARRARA and Hedwig F. Carrara, his wife, Appellants.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 10, 1978.

Decided April 12, 1979.

George E. James, Beaver Falls, for appellants.

James A. McGregor, Jr., Beaver, and with him Robert F. Palmquist, Beaver, for appellees.

Before JACOBS, President Judge and HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and HESTER, JJ.

VAN der VOORT, Judge:

The plaintiffs-appellees instituted the instant action to recover damages for an asserted breach of a written contract by defendants-appellants, which agreement concerned the sale of realty owned by plaintiffs-appellees. Trial was held in the lower court before a judge and jury, but at the conclusion of the presentation of all evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $3,877.78. After the denial of defendants' motion for new trial or for judgment n. o. v., this appeal followed. While the verdict and the judgment in this case were against the husband appellant alone (for reasons which will be more fully explained herein), both Mr. and Mrs. Carrara are noted as having entered this appeal from the result reached in the lower court.

The facts of the underlying dispute are relatively simple. Plaintiffs-Appellees Dennis B. and Helen M. Stephens, husband and wife, desired to sell their home. The Defendants-Appellants, Robert M. and Hedwig Carrara, husband and wife, responded to the Stephens' newspaper advertisement and visited the home. After several visits and discussions, the Stephens and Mr. Carrara reached an oral agreement for the sale of the home. The Stephens had their attorney prepare a sales agreement and eventually they signed it as did Mr. Carrara, who also tendered a payment of $500.00 towards the agreed purchase price of $36,000.00, in accordance with the agreement. Mrs. Carrara never signed the sales agreement. Shortly before the scheduled closing date for the property, Mr. Carrara announced that his wife did not like the Stephens' home, that he was obtaining another home, and that he therefore did not intend to complete the purchase. He did not thereafter attend the closing or otherwise complete the deal, and the Stephens eventually sold to another purchaser for less than the amount that Mr. Carrara had agreed to pay. This action followed.

Several claims are raised on this appeal. One allegation of error which we find meritorious is the argument that the lower court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs under all of the facts presented.

In our Commonwealth, it has long been held that only in a case where the facts are all clear, and there is no room for doubt, should the case be removed from the jury's consideration, and a motion for directed verdict or binding instructions be granted. Cox v. Equitable Gas Co., 227 Pa.Super. 153, 324 A.2d 516 (1974). Thus, before granting a directed verdict, the court must accept as true all facts and proper inferences from testimony which tend to support the contentions of the party against whom the motion has been made, and further, must reject all testimony and inferences to the contrary. Livzzo v. McKay, 396 Pa. 183, 152 A.2d 265 (1959); Continental Supermarket Food Service, Inc. v. Soboski, 210 Pa.Super. 304, 323 A.2d 216 (1967). We find that the facts were not so clear as to justify a directed verdict in the instant case.

The defense maintained that the real estate sales agreement should have been declared a nullity because Mrs. Carrara never signed it. It was theorized that the agreement, since it referred to four parties, including Mrs. Carrara, was incomplete and merely executory without her signature, and therefore not enforceable. Our review of the record reveals some possible support for that position. First, the agreement itself lists Mrs. Carrara as a party and has a line on which she was to affix her signature. Also, in several places, it uses the term "purchasers" in setting forth the rights and liabilities of the parties. ¹ While there is an absence of testimony by either Mr. or Mrs. Carrara to the effect that it was agreed by all parties that the contract would be a nullity if Mrs. Carrara did not sign it, there was some other testimony which might have created an Inference of such an understanding. For instance, the record shows the following questions and answers in the cross examination of Mr. Stephens:

"Q: Okay. So according to the written terms of that agreement, there were supposed to be two persons as parties of the first part, namely, you and your wife, is that correct?

A: That's what we understood.

Q: And you also understood there was supposed to be two parties of the second part, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Carrara, is that correct?

A: That's what we were led to believe, yes."

"Q: How many lines are provided for people to sign at the end of the agreement, not as witnesses, but as parties?

A: Four.

Q: And what appears on that fourth line?

A: Nothing.

Q: That's the line Mrs. Carrara was supposed to sign, right?

A: That's where she was supposed to sign."

"A: Well, she was supposed to sign, and we were under the understanding that she was going to sign."

We believe that these questions and...