Stephens v. City of Crisfield

• Decision Date: 13 January 1914
• Parties: STEPHENS et al. v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF CITY OF CRISFIELD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

89 A. 429

122 Md. 190

STEPHENS et al. v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF CITY OF CRISFIELD.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 13, 1914

Appeal from Circuit Court, Somerset County; Henry L. D. Stanford Judge.

Proceeding by the Mayor and Council of Crisfield to widen a street, in which Sarah Stephens and others, property owners, appealed to the circuit court. From a judgment affirming the action of the Mayor and Council, such property owners appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Joseph L. Bailey, of Salisbury, and Thomas S. Hodson, of Crisfield for appellants. Clarence P. Lankford, of Crisfield, for appellee.

CONSTABLE J.

By section 87 of the Charter of Crisfield, as amended by chapter 529 of the Acts of 1910, the mayor and council are vested with the control of the streets of said town, and, among other things, are empowered to widen any of the existing streets. Provision is therein made for the appointment of examiners, and their course of procedure is prescribed. After the performance of their duties, return is made by them to the mayor and council of their findings, which, after due notice to the interested parties, is set for hearing and "may be ratified or rejected or altered and amended." Any one aggrieved by the decision of the mayor and council may appeal to the circuit court for Somerset county, "and the same proceedings shall be had upon appeal as in the case of appeal from judgments of justices of the peace." It was determined by ordinance, by the mayor and council, to widen one of the streets of the town, and a commission was issued to three disinterested citizens, with instructions to locate boundaries, and prepare an explanatory map of the street to be widened, together with the amount of damages awarded to each owner whose property would be taken and also the amount of benefits assessed to each lot, after having first given notice of the time and place of their meeting for the purpose. After performing the requirements of their commission, the examiners made return of their findings to the mayor and council, which in due course was ratified by them. The appellants prayed an appeal to the circuit court where, after trial, the finding was affirmed. From that ruling this appeal is taken.

At the very outset, we are met with the question as to whether this court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. It is firmly settled, in a long line of cases, that where the circuit court sits as an appellate court, under statutory authority no appeal will be to this court from the judgment of the circuit court, unless expressly given by the statute; the only exception to this being that, if the circuit court has exceeded its jurisdiction, then the judgment will be reversed. But where the court has acted within its special jurisdiction, its judgment is final and conclusive, and is not subject to review by this court. W. & S. R. R. Co. v. Condon, 8 Gill & J. 443; Webster v. Cockey, 9 Gill, 94; Turnpike Co. v. Railroad Co., 15 Md. 198; Hough v. Kelsey, 19 Md. 451; Kinnear v. Lee, 28 Md. 488; Rayner v. State, 52 Md. 376; Cole v. Hynes, 46 Md. 181; Herzberg v. Adams, 39 Md. 309. Indeed, so many are the decisions of this court, supporting the above principles, that it is impracticable to give them all.

If then we are to entertain this appeal, it can be only on the ground that the mayor and council and the circuit court acted without jurisdiction, or that they exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon them. We have no power to inquire into the merits, and are not concerned as...