Stephens v. Clash
Citation | 796 F.3d 281 |
Decision Date | 05 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–3337.,14–3337. |
Parties | Sheldon STEPHENS, Appellant v. Kevin CLASH. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Stuart S. Mermelstein [Argued], Herman Law, Boca Raton, FL, for Appellant.
Michael G. Berger [Argued], New York, N.Y., for Appellee.
Before: SMITH, JORDAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Sheldon Stephens appeals the dismissal of his claims against Defendant Kevin Clash for injuries resulting from the parties' sexual relationship while Stephens was underage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, 18 U.S.C. § 2423, and state law. The District Court dismissed Stephens's claims as untimely. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Because the District Court dismissed both Stephens's complaint and his amended complaint on motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the facts recited here are drawn from those pleadings. Kevin Clash is “an internationally-known puppeteer and voice actor for children's programming,” best known for his role as the voice of Sesame Street 's Elmo. A42, A52. Stephens and Clash met at a “social networking event for models and actors” in 2004 when Stephens was 16 years old and Clash was approximately 44. A43, A56. According to Stephens, “[f]rom their earliest conversations, Clash led [Stephens] to believe that [Clash] was interested in having a sexual relationship” with Stephens. A44, A54. Clash arranged by telephone on several occasions to have Stephens transported from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to New York City by chauffeured car for the purpose of a sexual relationship. The two engaged in a “pattern of sexual activity ... over a period of years.” A44, A54.
Although he was “a compliant victim showered with attention and affection,” Stephens contends that he “did not become aware that he had suffered adverse psychological and emotional effects from Clash's sexual acts and conduct until 2011.” A45, A55. According to Stephens, because of his “compliance with the sexual relationship” and the “attention and affection” Clash gave him, Stephens “could not reasonably have been expected to know that he had been injured and that Clash had caused his injuries at the time of their sexual contact.” A45, A55.
On the other hand, as stated in the amended complaint, Clash “compelled [Stephens] to engage in sexual contacts by intellectual, emotional and psychological force.” A56. Clash did so by “ingratiat[ing] himself to [Stephens] through [Clash's] wealth and celebrity with knowledge that [Stephens] wanted to enter the modeling industry.” Id. Taking advantage of Stephens's “low self-esteem and depression,” Clash then “dominate[d] [Stephens] in a sexual relationship.” Id.
Stephens eventually sued in March 2013—approximately nine years after the parties' relationship began, and seven years after Stephens turned 18 in 2006—bringing claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a)1 as well as a sexual battery claim under state law. Clash moved to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, and the District Court dismissed Stephens's federal claims as untimely. In doing so, the District Court assumed the discovery rule applied generally to § 2255 claims but held that Stephens's complaint demonstrated that he “discovered or should have discovered his injury in or before July 2006,” thus rendering his federal claims untimely. A26. But the District Court permitted Stephens to amend his complaint as to his state law claim. The District Court then granted Clash's second motion to dismiss Stephens's state law claim as untimely. Applying Pennsylvania's borrowing statute, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5521(b), the District Court looked to New York's one-year statute of limitations for battery claims, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3), and New York's tolling statute for claims that accrue during infancy, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208. Under New York law, Stephens's sexual battery claim was time-barred. Stephens appeals these dismissals, urging that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations for his federal claims and that Pennsylvania's longer statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse should have applied to his sexual battery claims.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 regarding Stephens's federal claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We first examine whether the discovery rule is applicable to claims brought under § 2255. In general, the discovery rule “tolls the limitations period until the plaintiff learns of his cause of action or with reasonable diligence could have done so” and “is an exception to the usual principle that the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon accrual regardless of whether or not the injured party has any idea what has happened to him.” William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey (Graham II ), 646 F.3d 138, 141, 150 (3d Cir.2011). To determine whether the discovery rule is available, we look to whether Congress intended that the discovery rule would not apply, either “by explicit command or by implication from the structure and text of the statute,” in which case we defer to that directive. William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey (Graham I ), 568 F.3d 425, 434 (3d Cir.2009) ( )(internal quotation marks omitted).2 But “[i]n the absence of a contrary directive from Congress, we apply the federal discovery rule.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Disabled in Action, 539 F.3d at 209 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We begin with the statute's text. At the time Stephens filed his complaint, § 2255 provided that “[a]ny action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability.” 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012).3 Missing from this text is an explicit command not to apply a discovery rule. Although the statute requires that the complaint be filed “within six years after the right of action first accrues,” id., the text does not expressly foreclose application of the discovery rule. Indeed, confronted with the Copyright Act's similar language, we held the discovery rule applicable. See Graham I, 568 F.3d at 433 ( ); cf. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169–70, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) ( ). The simple fact that Congress, in drafting the statute, did not include express language of discovery is not equivalent to an explicit command that the discovery rule does not apply.
Nor does the “structure and text” of § 2255 imply a Congressional directive not to apply the discovery rule. See Graham I, 568 F.3d at 434 ; cf. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ( ); United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir.2006) (). To the contrary, the statutory scheme supports the discovery rule's applicability. Section 2255 is an umbrella statute that creates a private cause of action for several crimes if the perpetrator victimizes a minor. See § 2255(a) (listing criminal statutes). Congress's prime objective when it first passed § 2255 as part of the Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986 was to reach crimes related to child pornography. Pub.L. No. 99–500, § 703(a), 100 Stat. 1783 (listing only 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252 ). Congressional findings also described § 2255 as an attempt to address the “multi-million dollar” child-exploitation industry, along with the “physiological, psychological, and emotional harm caused by the production, distribution, and display of child pornography” and the “lack [of] effective remedies under Federal law” available to “exploitation victims.” Id. § 702(1)-(3); see also S.Rep. No. 99–504, at 5 (1986) ( ); S.Rep. No. 99–425, at 87 (1986) (same).
Yet this objective, particularly with regard to remedying the harms caused by the distribution of child pornography, would be thwarted without the discovery rule. Specifically, § 2255 creates a civil remedy for, inter alia , knowingly transporting, receiving, or selling visual depictions “involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” § 2255(a) ; §§ 2252(a)(1)-(3). Violations do not depend on the victim's knowledge of such distribution. Instead, the focus is on the distributor's conduct. Indeed, child pornography is most often distributed in secret and without the victim's immediate knowledge, with no fault attributable to the exploited minor. Nevertheless, each act of distribution injures the child pornography victim such that “an omniscient plaintiff” would have a provable cause of action upon the completion of the act. See Graham II, 646 F.3d at 146 ( ); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (...
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