Stephens v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 10 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 96429,No. 11,11 |
| Citation | 449 Mich. 531,536 N.W.2d 755 |
| Parties | Shirley STEPHENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. C.J. DIXON, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
After the statutory limitation period had apparently expired, the plaintiff filed a negligence action for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. The circuit court granted summary disposition for the defendant on the ground that the suit was untimely filed, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Because we believe that summary disposition was appropriate, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
This case arises from an automobile accident on the evening of June 23, 1987. Plaintiff Shirley Stephens was a passenger in a vehicle owned by defendant C.J. Dixon. The car was being driven by Mr. Dixon's spouse, Emma J. Dixon, who is now deceased. Ms. Dixon attempted a left turn, but failed to yield the right of way to an oncoming vehicle. The cars collided, and Ms. Stephens was thrown about the passenger compartment. Her head struck and broke the windshield and also hit the car roof. She came to rest on the floor of the passenger compartment, facing the back of the vehicle, and was unconscious for a time. Ms. Stephens was not hospitalized, though she suffered contusions and abrasions. She experienced muscle pain and stiffness throughout her body, including her neck. These conditions resolved themselves within a period of weeks.
In February 1989, more than twenty months after the original accident, Ms. Stephens began to experience mild neck pain. It increased in severity over the course of several months. In December 1989, she sought medical attention. The condition was diagnosed as spondylolysis of the neck vertebrae at C-4, C-5, and C-6. Ms. Stephens describes spondylolysis as a latent condition associated with prior injuries. On February 23, 1990, Ms. Stephens underwent surgical microdiskectomy to the C-5 and C-6 vertebrae. An anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion at the C-6 and C-7 vertebrae was done on April 30, 1990, to correct a left-side radiculopathy.
On November 20, 1990, nearly forty months after the original accident, the plaintiff filed suit against Mr. Dixon. He responded with a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the suit had been filed after the three-year limitation period of M.C.L. § 600.5805(8); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(8). The circuit court granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition, explaining simply that the facts of this case did not serve to extend the statutory limitation period.
The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary disposition. It held that the discovery rule tolls a statute of limitation where a plaintiff alleges a latent injury, but not where a plaintiff misjudges the severity of an injury. The case was remanded for a hearing at which the plaintiff was to be given the opportunity to persuade the circuit court to apply the discovery rule to these facts. 199 Mich.App. 73, 79, 500 N.W.2d 749 (1993). The defendant applied to this Court for leave to appeal, and the plaintiff responded with a conditional application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant. We granted leave to appeal and cross appeal on October 19, 1994. 447 Mich. 886, 525 N.W.2d 454.
Plaintiff argues that the limitation period for her cause of action ought to be tolled by the discovery rule. Statutes of limitation are procedural devices intended to promote judicial economy and the rights of defendants. For instance, they protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence. They also prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights; a plaintiff who delays bringing an action profits over an unsuspecting defendant who must prepare a defense long after the event from which the action arose.
In Michigan, the limitation period for ordinary negligence actions such as the case at bar is three years. M.C.L. § 600.5805(8); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(8). The most complicated problem associated with statutes of limitation, and the problem presented in this case, is that of determining when they begin to run. M.C.L. § 600.5805(8); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(8) provides that "[t]he claim accrues at the time ... the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results." M.C.L. § 600.5827; M.S.A. § 27A.5827. We have held that the term "wrong," as used in the accrual provision, refers to the date on which the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's negligent act, not the date on which the defendant acted negligently. Connelly v. Paul Ruddy's Equipment Repair & Service Co., 388 Mich. 146, 200 N.W.2d 70 (1972). Otherwise, a plaintiff's cause of action could be barred before the injury took place.
Another accrual problem associated with statutes of limitation occurs when a plaintiff is injured but is unaware of the injury. If the statute of limitation begins to run at the time of injury, it is possible that plaintiffs with perfectly valid claims could be prevented, through no fault of their own, from bringing their actions within the specified period of limitation. In situations such as these, the common law has developed equitable rules to mitigate the harsh effects of the statute of limitation. One such exception is the discovery rule. The discovery rule, based on principles of fundamental fairness, "was formulated to avoid the harsh results produced by commencing the running of the statute of limitations before a claimant was aware of any basis for an action." Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis.2d 257, 264, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987).
We explained the discovery rule in Chase v. Sabin, 445 Mich. 190, 196-197, 516 N.W.2d 60 (1994). In Chase, a 1963 eye operation failed because of an event that occurred during the operation. The plaintiff was not told of the occurrence. In 1988, while pursuing an unrelated worker's compensation claim, the plaintiff's attorney obtained a hospital record of the surgery and learned of the event. We stated:
Similarly, because statutes of limitation do not evidence a legislative intent to extinguish a cause of action before the plaintiff is aware of the possible cause of action, we have adopted the discovery rule in the appropriate instances. Last term ... we held that the discovery rule controls the date a pharmaceutical products liability action accrues. (Citation omitted.)
We note that while the discovery rule serves as an important limit on a mechanical and unjust termination of a legitimate cause of action, there can be equitable problems with the imposition of the discovery rule as well. As one commentator has stated:
While providing equitable relief to plaintiffs otherwise barred by a strict application of the statute of limitations, the discovery rule also threatens legitimate interests of the defendant which the statute protects. While it may be harsh to bar the action of a plaintiff who, through no fault of his own, did not discover his injury until after the running of the statute, it is also unfair ... to compel a defendant to answer a charge arising out of events in the distant past. The discovery rule tends to undermine the sense of security that the statute of limitations was designed to provide, namely, that at some point a person is entitled to put the past behind him and leave it there. [Olsen, The discovery rule in New Jersey: Unlimited limitation on the statute of limitations, 42 Rutgers L.R. 205, 211-212 (1989).]
Hence, in deciding whether to strictly enforce a period of limitation or impose the discovery rule, we must carefully balance when the plaintiff learned of her injuries, whether she was given a fair opportunity to bring her suit, and whether defendant's equitable interests would be unfairly prejudiced by tolling the statute of limitations.
In the present case, the plaintiff proposes that we take a step beyond the rule of Chase. There, we held that "the discovery rule governs the accrual date for negligence claims, pursued against hospitals and their agents, which are similar to malpractice claims." Id. at 201, 516 N.W.2d 60. By contrast, the present case involves allegations of ordinary negligence.
In Moll v. Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich. 1, 12-13, 506 N.W.2d 816 (1993), we noted this Court's adoption of the discovery rule for medical malpractice cases in Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963), in negligent misrepresentation cases in Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974), and in products liability actions for asbestos-related diseases in Larson v. Johns-Manville, 427 Mich. 301, 399 N.W.2d 1 (1986). In Moll, we extended the application of the discovery rule to products liability actions for pharmaceutical products liability actions. Defendant correctly points out that in these contexts, evidentiary records are rarely diminished by the passage of time. Hence, as we stated in Larson, 427 Mich. at 312, 399 N.W.2d 1, quoting Eagle- Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517, 523 (Fla.App.1985), "the concern for protecting defendants from 'time-flawed evidence, fading memories, lost documents, etc.' is less significant in these cases." That is not the case in automobile tort liability cases, where the evidence for liability defense is often dependent on fading memories of individual witnesses....
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